MARKETING STRATEGY AFTER MEETING WALL STREET: THE ROLE OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY

Published date01 September 2017
AuthorJian Huang,Michaël Dewally,Minghui Ma
Date01 September 2017
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.12128
MARKETING STRATEGY AFTER MEETING WALL STREET: THE ROLE OF
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
Minghui Ma
SUNY New Paltz
Michaël Dewally and Jian Huang
Towson University
Abstract
We relate marketing strategy to the initial public offering (IPO) process during 1980
2010. Pre-IPO marketing intensity provides information to the market, which reduces
underpricing and the magnitude of price revisions during the ling period. Firms that
experience upward (downward) price revisions spend more (less) on marketing in the
ve years post-IPO. We conrm that marketing spending is related to a rms
informational environment by nding a positive relation between marketing intensity
and rm information transparency post-IPO. This nding indicates that marketing
spending is one channel through which a rm affects its perception by the public equity
market at issuance and later.
JEL Classification: G14, M30
I. Introduction
The literature investigating the interface of marketing and nance is ever expanding and
conrms that marketing activities do inuence the market behavior of rms. Joshi and
Hanssens (2010) hypothesize that marketing spending affects rm value not only
indirectly by increasing prots via increased sales but also by directly increasing the
intangible value of the rm, an increase reected in the rms valuation. L
evesque,
Joklegar, and Davies (2012) show that marketing spending, especially in recently public
rms, is a substitute for cost of goods sold and increases future protability. To
crystallize the impact of marketing spending on market reaction, the literature has
focused on major rm events ranging from the market reaction to product recalls (Chen,
Ganesan, and Liu 2009) to the process of going public, the initial public offering (IPO)
(Kurt and Hulland 2013; Luo 2008). In general, the studies have revealed that marketing
intensity is related to rm perception and valuation. Luo (2008) nds that an increase in
marketing intensity in the pre-IPO period helps reduce information asymmetry and
results in lower underpricing. Kurt and Hulland (2013) nd that after the IPO, an increase
in marketing intensity is positively related to the market value of the rm.
The authors thank the anonymous reviewer and participants at the 2017 American Marketing Association
annual meeting for helpful comments.
The Journal of Financial Research Vol. XL, No. 3 Pages 369400 Fall 2017
369
© 2017 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association
RAWLS COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY
PUBLISHED FOR THE SOUTHERN AND SOUTHWESTERN
FINANCE ASSOCIATIONS BY WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING
This study investigates whet her the result of the IPO process ha s a bearing on
arms strategic decision making for mar keting intensity. Whereas Luo (20 08) nds
evidence pre-IPO and Kurt and Hull and (2013) nd evidence post-IPO, we focus on
the outcome of the IPO process a nd how it informs subsequent rm po licies. The
literature has not linked the two periodsactions and has ignored the interaction
between rm behavior and market response. In a rst step, we investigate the impa ct of
marketing intensity leading to the I PO not only on underpricing but also on pr ice
revision. We hypothesize tha t, similar to its effect of redu cing underpricing, market ing
intensity reduces price re vision. In a second step, we r elate the sign of the price
revision experienced by the rm at IPO to its future policy. Indeed, al though the
magnitude of the price revis ion is appropriately reduced b y the communication of
information through marketing spending, the rm cannot ignore the direction of the
price revision as a signal of market attitude to the rms efforts and a sign of the
perceived value of the rm. We hypot hesize that rms experiencing upward
(downward) price revisions, an indication of positive (negative) market view, continue
(hesitate) to spend on marketing as it inc reases (does not increase) rm value. F inally,
we conrm that marketing intensity is also directly related to the informational
environment of a rm post-IPO. T o that end, we test the impact of marke ting intensity
on rm information transparenc y.
We use a sample of U.S. IPOs spanning 19802010. We dene underpricing as
the rst day of trading return, price revision as the change in IPO price from the initial to
the nal ling, and use Jin and Myerss (2006) denition of information transparency.
We relate these variables to marketing intensity, dened as the ratio of selling, general,
and administrative (SG&A) expenses net of research and deveopment (R&D) expenses
to total assets.
1
We nd that an increase in marketing intensity pre-IPO leads not only to
smaller underpricing but also to smaller absolute price revisions. This nding reinforces
the ndings of Luo (2008) that marketing intensity is a proxy for information revelation
to market participants and, as such, helps resolve information asymmetry. We also nd
that post-IPO, rms with upward price revisions outspend rms with downward price
revisions. This suggests that rms strategically respond to the interaction with the market
resulting from the IPO process. Although it is optimal for all rms to invest in marketing
activity pre-IPO, with the dual goal of increasing rmsmarket-based assets and
information revelation, post-IPO rms should strategically only spend on marketing
intensity to the degree that it supports rms growth and that the market rewards the rm
with a higher valuation due to the investment. A rm that experiences an upward
(downward) price revision at IPO will have an incentive (disincentive) to continue
spending. Finally, we nd a positive relation between marketing intensity and rm
information transparency. This conrms that (1) pre-IPO marketing intensity spending
does increase information transparency and this should therefore be reected in lower
underpricing and (2) post-IPO, for a rm having experienced an upward price revision, a
1
We follow the literature (see, e.g., Mizik and Jacobson 2007; Luo 2008) in dening marketing intensity as
the ratio of SG&A expenses net of R&D expenses to total assets. We also use SG&A expenses net of R&D
expenses scaled by total sales, as well as advertising expenses (Compustat item XAD) as robustness, and the results
remain qualitatively consistent.
370 The Journal of Financial Research
strategy of continued marketing spending not only creates more valuable market-based
assets (Luo and Donthu 2006; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998) that improve
customer and brand equity (Keller and Lehmann 2006), but it also concurrently reduces
information asymmetry and promotes information transparency.
By documenting the links between the result of the IPO process and a rms
marketing decision, this study contributes to the literature of the marketingnance
interface in several ways. First, it adds to our knowledge that marketing spending is a
critical way in which a rm communicates information to the equity market. Not only do
we nd such evidence in the pre-IPO period, but we also document that marketing
spending inuences the information asymmetry present once the rms are public.
Second, this research complements studies of rm behavior post-IPO by stressing that
rms react strategically to the initial market reaction to the rms public listing.
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses
IPO Process
The IPO process is a critical time in the history of a rm. This signicant funding
event has a profound impact on al l stakeholders. Early funde rs receive liquidity for
their investment, current m anagement benets from the injection of funds to allow for
rm expansion, and the investment community is allowed access to ownership of the
rm. All parties therefor e benet if the signicantly uneven informational eld is
leveled. To this end, the rm is expected to release informat ion to potential investor s.
This information release facilitates the rms access to the public capital market (Tang
2009), helps create a liquid m arket for the rms shares (Cao, Fi eld, and Hanka 2004),
and helps owners maximize the ir wealth gains during the go ing public process (Habib
and Ljungqvist 2001). To ex pedite and ease this proces s, a rm typically hires an
investment bank to act not only as advi sor but also as an intermediary with investors. It
is the dual duty of the issuer an d the investment bank to co mmunicate clearly the
potential cash-ow prospects of the rm to ascertain equi ty value. The necessary
information is primarily released in the pr ospectus and associated regulatory lings.
This information is compleme nted with the book-building pr ocess, during which
information is exchanged between rms and investors. Ritter and Welch (2002)
provide a comprehensive review of the i ssues surrounding informat ion asymmetry and
underpricing. Figure I dep icts the IPO process.
The range of information incorpor ated into the nal price is vast. Not only i s
the formal information laid out in the lings accounted for in the valuation but also the
informal information garner ed through the historical behavior of t he rm. Luo (2008)
nds that the extent of the marketing spend ing of the rm pre-IPO inuences
underpricing. By expanding resources to bu ild market-based assets o r by promoting
brand equity, the rm can increa se the information set avai lable to investors. Indeed,
the forecast of the level, timi ng, and risk of the cash ows that inve stors can expect
from this new investment is intim ately tied to the amount and the quali ty of the
information revealed dur ing this process. Loughran and McDonald (2013) and Hanley
Marketing Strategy after Meeting Wall Street 371

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT