Market Design.

Members of the NBER's Market Design Working Group met October 18-19 in Cambridge. Research Associates Michael Ostrovsky of Stanford University and Parag A. Pathak of MIT organized the meeting. These researchers' papers were presented and discussed:

* Liran Einav, Stanford University and NBER; Amy Finkelstein, MIT and NBER; Yunan Ji, Harvard University; and Neale Mahoney, University of Chicago and NBER, "Voluntary Regulation: Evidence from Medicare Bundled Payments"

* Amanda Y. Agan, Rutgers University and NBER; Bo Cowgill, Columbia University; and Laura K. Gee, Tufts University, "Salary Disclosure and Hiring: Field Experimental Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit Study"

* Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research; Jacob D. Leshno, University of Chicago; and Irene Y. Lo, Stanford University, "Information Acquisition Costs in Matching Markets"

* Christina Aperjis, Power Auctions LLC; Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland; and Oleg V. Baranov, University of Colorado Boulder, "Supply Reduction in the Broadcast Incentive Auction"

* Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Microsoft Research; Lior Kovalio and Noam Nisan, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and Assaf Romm, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Stanford University, "Matching for the Israeli 'Mechinot' Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements"

* Tayfun Sonmez and M. Bumin Yenmez, Boston College, "Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations"

* Marek Pycia, University of Zurich, "Evaluating with Statistics: Which...