Marching Orders? U.S. Party Platforms and Legislative Agenda Setting 1948–2014

• DOI: 10.1177/1065912918772681
• Date: 01 December 2018
• Published date: 01 December 2018
• Author: E. J. Fagan
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918772681

Political Research Quarterly

2018, Vol. 71(4) 949 –959

© 2018 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912918772681

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Article

In legislatures,1 “the most important part of the legislative

decision process is the decision about which decision to

consider” (Bauer, Poole, and Dexter 1963, 405). Attention

is a scarce resource; policymakers and their staff can only

move on a few of thousands of possible issues at any given

time. Given that most salient issues are what Egan (2013)

labels “consensus issues,” where all citizens and elites

would prefer an outcome ceteris paribus, information

about the priorities of policymakers is often more impor-

tant to voters than information about their outcome prefer-

ences. Attention scarcity forces a choice between these

consensus issues (Mayhew 2006). If voters observe differ-

ences in the priorities of political parties during elections,

they can choose between two different sets of outcomes.

However, the agenda setting literature has generally

minimized the role of political parties in setting the

agenda for legislatures (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

Given the importance of agenda setting in the policy pro-

cess, the absence of political parties from determining the

priorities of legislatures would be troublesome. During

elections, parties make appeals to voters both by taking

positions on public policy and by selectively emphasizing

issues (Egan 2013; Petrocik 1996). If parties in govern-

ments do not represent these promised priorities, then the

electoral conflict between parties does not structure polit-

ical conflict in government over policy agendas.

This paper argues that political parties in the United

States are able to contribute to agenda setting, but their

impact varies by type of agenda and timing. Policy areas

emphasized in the platform of the President’s party can

predict issues emphasized in Congress but only immedi-

ately after the Presidential election. In the second Congress

after the election, the opposition party may have some

agenda setting power. The relationship between the plat-

form and the Congressional agenda varies by issue, agenda

type, and whether or not government is unified. Under

divided government, Congress holds more roll call votes

on their prioritized issues. Under unified government,

Congress holds more referral hearings.

The paper proceeds as follows: In the section “Agenda

Setting and Political Party Promises,” I review the con-

flict between modern theories of agenda setting and the

responsible party framework. In the section “Legislative

Agenda Setting in the United States and Party Platforms,”

I develop a general theory of agenda setting and political

772681PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918772681Political Research QuarterlyFagan

research-article2018

1The University of Texas at Austin, USA

Corresponding Author:

E. J. Fagan, Department of Government, The University of Texas at

Austin, 158 West 21st Street, 116 Inner Campus Drive Stop G6000,

Austin, TX 78712, USA.

Email: ejfagan@utexas.edu

Marching Orders? U.S. Party

Platforms and Legislative Agenda

Setting 1948–2014

E. J. Fagan1

Abstract

What is the relationship between the priorities expressed in party platforms before an election and the subsequent

legislative agenda? The agenda setting literature often deemphasizes the role of political parties in agenda setting,

instead focusing on the importance of problems bubbling up to the surface and demanding attention from policymakers.

However, parties will often express different issue priorities during elections, and compete based on those priorities. If

those promises are credible, voters should be able to choose between different sets of priorities during elections. The

paper utilizes new data from the U.S. Policy Agendas Project and Wolbrecht on policy attention in U.S. party platforms

to study the relationship between U.S. parties and legislative activities in Congress. A time-series cross-sectional

analysis finds strong evidence to support the proposition that legislative agendas are influenced by the platform of the

President’s party in the short term, although the relationship differs for different types of agendas and by issue, and

fades over time.

Keywords

agenda setting, political parties, Congress, presidency