March 2017: Summaries of Published Opinions, 0517 COBJ, Vol. 46 No. 5 Pg. 89
Colorado Court of Appeals
The summaries of Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions are written for the CBA by licensed attorneys Teresa Wilkins (Englewood) and Paul Sachs (Steamboat Springs). They are provided as a service by the CBA; are not the official language of the Court; and are available only in The Colorado Lawyer and on the CBA website, www.cobar.org (click on “Opinions/Rules /Statutes”). The CBA cannot guarantee their accuracy or completeness. The full opinions, the lists of opinions not selected for official publication, the petitions for rehearing, and the modified opinions are available both on the CBA website and on the Colorado Judicial Branch website, www.courts.state.co.us (click on “Courts/Court of Appeals/Case Announcements”).
March 9, 2017
2017 COA 27. No. 15CA1306. People v. Newell. Self-Defense Jury Instruction—Assault.
Defendant had an altercation with his cousin during which defendant cut his cousin’s back with a straight-edge razor, causing a wound that required 12 stitches. There was some evidence at trial that defendant acted in self-defense. The district court denied defendant’s request for a self-defense instruction because the court found he did not provide evidence that he was not the initial aggressor. Defendant was convicted on a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree assault with a deadly weapon.
On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred when it failed to give the jury a self-defense instruction. A defendant need not disprove that he or she was the initial aggressor to benefit from a self-defense instruction when there is any evidence to support a self-defense theory. Once the defendant offers evidence of self-defense, and the prosecution offers evidence that defendant was the initial aggressor, the jury should be provided with the self-defense instruction, including the initial aggressor exception, and be permitted to weigh the evidence and decide whether self-defense has been disproved. Here, the district court failed to properly instruct the jury on the law of self-defense, the prosecution did not bear the burden of disproving self-defense, and defendant was deprived of his right to acquittal on that ground. Accordingly, the error was not harmless.
The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.
2017 COA 28. No. 15CA1372. Pressey ex rel. Pressey v. Children’s Hospital Colorado. Medical Malpractice—Health Care Availability Act—Damages Cap—Medicaid—Collateral Source Statute —Contract Exception—Pre-majority Economic Damages—Minor—Statute of Limitations.
Naomi Pressey (Naomi), by and through her conservator Jennifer Pressey, sued Children’s Hospital Colorado (Hospital) for negligence. The case was tried to a jury, which found the Hospital negligent and awarded Naomi $17,839,784.60. The damages award included past medical expenses, past noneconomic losses, future medical expenses, future lost earnings, and future noneconomic losses. After trial, the court reduced the damages to $1 million based on the legislative directive in CRS § 13-64-302(1)(b) of the Health Care Availability Act (HCAA). The court approved Naomi’s motion to exceed the damages cap for good cause and entered judgment in her favor for $14,341,538.60.
On appeal, the Hospital argued that the court erred in excluding evidence of Medicaid benefits and private insurance available to Naomi in the post-verdict proceeding to exceed the damages cap. Sound public policy supports both the cap and the contract exception to the collateral source statute. The Court of Appeals concluded that the contract exception to the collateral source statute is applicable in post-verdict proceedings to reduce damages in medical malpractice actions under the HCAA. Medicaid benefits are paid on behalf of the injured party and are thus collateral sources subject to the contract exception. Accordingly, the trial court correctly did not consider Medicaid payments and private insurance in determining whether to exceed the HCAA damages cap.
The Hospital also argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Naomi failed to establish that she, rather than her parents, was entitled to her pre-majority economic damages. Parents own the legal right to seek reimbursement for a minor’s pre-majority economic damages. Here, Naomi’s parents did not relinquish this right and failed to institute a claim within the applicable statute of limitations.
The Hospital further argued that irrespective of the evidence of Medicaid and private insurance benefits, Naomi did not establish good cause to exceed the damages cap. The trial court considered a multitude of factors in concluding there was good cause. Its decision was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, and was not a misapplication of the law.
Lastly, the Hospital argued that Naomi received a duplicate award for future medical care and lost future earnings. The Court concluded there is record support for the trial court’s findings that the damage award does not overlap with the future lost earnings award.
That portion of the judgment awarding pre-majority economic damages to Naomi was reversed. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. The case was remanded for recalculation of the total amounts owed by the Hospital.
2017 COA 29. No. 15CA2039. City of Lakewood v. Safety National Casualty Corp. 42 U.S.C. § 1983—Indemnification—Defense Costs—Insurance—Employer Liability Law.
A City of Lakewood (City) police officer was killed by friendly fire, and his widow filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the City and various fellow officers had violated the deceased officer’s rights under the U.S. Constitution. The City sought indemnification for its own defense costs and those of the officers named in the lawsuit, which the City has an independent statutory duty to cover. The insurance company, Safety National Casualty Corporation, denied coverage. The district court concluded that a § 1983 claim did not arise under an employer liability law of any state and granted summary judgment for the insurance company.
On appeal, the City contended that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the insurance company because the policy...
To continue reading
Request your trial