Managing the "Republic of NGOs": accountability and legitimation problems facing the UN cluster system.

AuthorHeath, J. Benton
PositionV. Supervisory Accountability in the UN Humanitarian Architecture through VII. Conclusion, with footnotes and table, p. 268-293
  1. SUPERVISORY ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UN HUMANITARIAN ARCHITECTURE

    Institutional innovation and development in the humanitarian arena takes place in a tightly constrained normative landscape. Accountability strategies must navigate the preexisting normative demands on the institution, which often greatly constrain the types of mechanisms that may be imposed. This Part maps the constraints of autonomy and coordination on humanitarian institution building, before proceeding to outline the formal accountability structure of the cluster approach. As will be shown, the formal system was likely to fail not only because of logistical and practical constraints but also because it is fundamentally unable to cope with the values of coordination and autonomy that shape action in this field.

    A. Autonomy and Coordination as Constraints on Accountability

    The UN cluster approach depends for its survival on the participation of a broad range of actors that possess no defined legal obligation to work with the United Nations. (138) Therefore, the mechanism must be made to appear sufficiently attractive and justifiable (or legitimate) to secure the participation of the major humanitarian actors whom it purports to coordinate. This does not mean that the participants themselves necessarily need to be convinced. Donors and political actors, if convinced of the value of a centralized UN mechanism for humanitarian coordination, may be able to force reluctant NGOs to participate. At the same time, however, the Red Cross and other humanitarian NGOs wield significant normative influence that might be used to undermine any effort at coordinating relief activities. (139) So, while the pathways for influence might be diffuse, the system must justify itself in order to work. (140)

    Any effort to impose accountability upon or within the cluster system will confront the problem of navigating between autonomy and effective coordination. (141) This tension is particularly pronounced within the cluster system, where both concepts are closely tied to deeply held values and principles. On the one hand, effective coordination has emerged as the watchword of emergency response, and the system will face pressures to orchestrate the increasingly varied and numerous foreign and domestic actors engaged in major disasters. (142) On the other hand, the system will also face significant pressure to preserve the autonomy of humanitarian actors, who continue to operate under competing sets of principles and compete for donors. (143) In order to be perceived as normatively justifiable, any central effort to coordinate relief activities must hold at least the possibility for resolving the tension between these two impulses.

    Though calls for coordination have become increasingly prevalent as the number of humanitarian actors has multiplied, (144) this should not imply that actors are coalescing around a single correct approach to disaster response. (145) By emphasizing the need for diversity and experimentation in approaches, humanitarian agencies have been relatively successful in delegitimizing any effort to wholly integrate emergency response efforts under one hierarchical structure. (146) In his review of "international disaster response law," David Fisher suggests that the failure of the International Relief Union in the early 1940s taught the international community to avoid "command and control" coordination mechanisms. (147) Fisher argues that the resulting independence of the Red Cross and other humanitarian NGOs may be viewed as a "salutary effect" of the move away from centralization. (148)

    Humanitarian organizations and donors value diversity for different reasons. Aid actors have long been skeptical of the United Nations' emphasis on peacekeeping and peace building, an approach that is not always compatible with the fundamental humanitarian principle of neutrality with respect to antagonistic parties. (149) Indeed, the cluster system in its early years suffered the criticism that the clusters were a UN-centric mechanism, (150) raising concerns about the system's long term legitimacy and sustainability. The preferences of powerful donors such as states are also not neutral, as history indicates that they seek the ability to channel their money to multiple possible sources. (151) Thus the cluster system must accommodate normative arguments for autonomy. Otherwise, actors might seek to undermine the coordination process by pointing to operational defects that harm affected populations or by emphasizing the value of diversity and experimentation. (152)

    B. Outlines of a Formal Supervisory Structure

    On paper, the cluster approach solves monitoring problems through an elegant, two-tiered structure of hierarchical supervision. (153) The in-country humanitarian coordinator, a UN official, appoints the cluster lead agencies and holds them responsible for ensuring effective coordination within their sectors. (154) Though the cluster system does not alter the formal legal relationship between the United Nations and the relevant agency, the humanitarian coordinator could essentially fire a cluster lead by replacing it or embarrass the agency by releasing information about its activities. The humanitarian coordinator is, in turn, formally supervised by the head of OCHA in New York, who may hire and fire the in-country official. (155)

    The substance guiding this relationship is outlined in Part II. (156) Lead agencies are responsible to the humanitarian coordinator largely for a number of general procedural and substantive considerations: inclusion of humanitarian actors, establishment of coordination mechanisms, coordination with local authorities, community participation, consideration of "cross-cutting issues," needs assessment, emergency preparedness, "planning and strategy development," application of humanitarian and human rights standards, monitoring and reporting, advocacy, resource-mobilization, training and capacity building, and provision of services as a "last resort." (157) The substantive norms governing cooperation, crosscutting issues, and the like are expected to develop through repeated interactions within clusters at the global and local levels. (158) By producing or endorsing handbooks, toolkits, and guidelines, the IASC can exercise some control over the normative standards that inform cooperation. (159) The humanitarian coordinator's responsibilities are phrased in similar procedural terms: articulating a "Common Humanitarian Action Plan," ensuring the coordination of clusters and the proper functioning of lead agencies, and establishing a mechanism for intercluster coordination. (160)

    This vertical structure replicates the legal basis for the cluster system itself. (161) The authority of the IASC to create something like the cluster approach can be traced largely to a single resolution of the General Assembly in 1991. (162) That resolution sketched a hierarchical system, which remains the backbone of this accountability structure. (163) The central innovation of the cluster system, established 15 years later, was the creation of lead agencies, which now occupy the ground-level tier of the accountability structure.

    The possibility of greater institutionalization of humanitarian activities may have been threatening to disaster-prone states, whose emergency authority might be threatened by a strengthened humanitarian response structure. (164) This fear is observed in the practice of the cluster system, in which states have occasionally resisted the implementation of the approach, sometimes successfully. (165) Endeavoring to make the system directly responsive to a subordinate of the secretary-general, who is appointed by the General Assembly, (166) suggests a desire to maintain some measure of state control over the system, rendering it more palatable to states. In addition, the hierarchical mechanism grounds the system in the internal law of the United Nations, as it is built on the General Assembly's powers to establish organs and offices. (167) Also, the mere fact that the hierarchical structure mapped earlier forms of humanitarian organization within the United Nations may have been attractive: if the cluster innovation is to be seen as a technical improvement, rather than a transfer of leadership power from the host states to international and nongovernmental organizations, it appears natural to subject the system to familiar procedures, which are responsive to a familiar set of interests.

    C. The Breakdown of the Formal Structure

    The weakness of the formal structure is among the most widely recognized failings of the cluster approach. (168) The oversight mechanism is of course vulnerable to a range of logistical problems-OCHA, which exercises the top level of supervisory responsibility, cannot realistically be expected to "line manage" the large number of coordinators around the globe. (169) But this subpart suggests that the deeper reasons for the system's failure are normative. The vertical accountability structure reflects a view of humanitarian practice that is incommensurable with the strong commitment to autonomy that is shared, for different reasons, by humanitarian practitioners and donors. The mechanism's inability to resolve the tension between coordination and autonomy opens the way for new institutional solutions, which are the subject of the following Part.

    So far, this Article has discussed the humanitarian coordinator as if the coordinator is a discrete official who is responsive to the head of OCHA in New York, but this is generally not the case. Often, the coordinator also serves as the UN "Resident Coordinator," who is responsible for overseeing development operations. (170) This position comes with a parallel chain of command, with the resident coordinator reporting through a regional team and ultimately responsive to the UN Development Group, which involves a different set of actors. (171) The coordinator...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT