Managerialism and the Military: Consequences for the Swedish Armed Forces

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X211034908
• Published date: 01 October 2022
• Date: 01 October 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X211034908

Armed Forces & Society

2022, Vol. 48(4) 892 –916

© The Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X211034908

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Article

Managerialism and the

Military: Consequences for

the Swedish Armed Forces

Sof‌ia K. Ledberg

1

, Shirin Ahlb¨

ack ¨

Oberg

2

and

Emma Bj ¨

ornehed

3

Abstract

This article analyzes civil–military relations and the issue of civilian control through the

lens of new managerialism. It illustrates that the means and mechanisms applied by

governments to govern the military actually shape its organization and affect its

functions in ways not always acknowledged in the civil–military debate. We start by

illustrating the gradual introduction of management reforms to the Swedish Armed

Forces and the growing focus on audit and evaluation. The article thereafter analyzes

the consequences of these managerialist trends for the most central installation of the

armed forces–its headquarters. It further exemplif‌ies how such trends affect the work

of professionals at the military units. In conclusion, managerialist reforms have not only

changed the structure of the organization and the relationship between core and

support functions but have also placed limits on the inf‌luence of professional judgment.

Keywords

managerialism, civil–military relations, civilian control, Swedish armed forces

1

Institute for Security, Strategy and Leadership, Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden

2

Department of Government, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

3

Institute for Military Science, Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden

Corresponding Author:

Sof‌ia K. Ledberg, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership, Swedish Defence University, Box 278

05, Stockholm SE-11593, Sweden.

Email: sof‌ia.ledberg@fhs.se

,

Ledberg et al. 893

Managerialism and the

Military: Consequences for

the Swedish Armed Forces

Sof‌ia K. Ledberg

1

, Shirin Ahlb¨

ack ¨

Oberg

2

and

Emma Bj ¨

ornehed

3

Abstract

This article analyzes civil–military relations and the issue of civilian control through the

lens of new managerialism. It illustrates that the means and mechanisms applied by

governments to govern the military actually shape its organization and affect its

functions in ways not always acknowledged in the civil–military debate. We start by

illustrating the gradual introduction of management reforms to the Swedish Armed

Forces and the growing focus on audit and evaluation. The article thereafter analyzes

the consequences of these managerialist trends for the most central installation of the

armed forces–its headquarters. It further exemplif‌ies how such trends affect the work

of professionals at the military units. In conclusion, managerialist reforms have not only

changed the structure of the organization and the relationship between core and

support functions but have also placed limits on the inf‌luence of professional judgment.

Keywords

managerialism, civil–military relations, civilian control, Swedish armed forces

1

Institute for Security, Strategy and Leadership, Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden

2

Department of Government, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

3

Institute for Military Science, Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden

Corresponding Author:

Sof‌ia K. Ledberg, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership, Swedish Defence University, Box 278

05, Stockholm SE-11593, Sweden.

Email: sof‌ia.ledberg@fhs.se

,

Analyzing Changes in Civilian Control of the Armed Forces

This article analyzes the shifting patterns of civilian control of the Swedish military in

the past decades. It investigates the specif‌ic means and methods applied by the political

leadership to govern the military headquarters and the effect thereof on the organization

and work of this powerful military institution. Civilian control is a central issue within

civil–military relations, and this study corresponds well to the dominating aim in this

f‌ield, that is, “to explain how civilian control over the military is established and

maintained (Burk, 2002, p. 7; see also Bland, 2001; Feaver, 1999). Yetthe present study

differs from traditional ways of analyzing democratic civilian control. By applying

tools and methods from studies on new managerialism in other parts of the public

sector, we suggest an alternative operationalization of key concepts and a different level

of analysis. Our systematic study of changes in civilian control that appear incremental

in the daily work at the Swedish military headquarters reveals profound long-term

effects on the organization and its working methods; effects that also have conse-

quences for professional work at the military units. Thus, by broadening the approach to

the important question of how democracies govern their militaries and with what

consequences, this study contributes to the civil–military f‌ield. At the heart of dem-

ocratic civil–military relations, just as in the study of other public agencies, lies the

fundamental principal-agency problem of delegation. That is, how to make sure that

central government agencies implement policy eff‌iciently and in accordance with

political intentions. This is generally portrayed as the ambition to achieve both civilian

control and military effectiveness on the battlef‌ield (Huntington, 1957; Feaver, 2003).

This study addresses the control–effectiveness relationship from a different perspec-

tive. We argue that both the means of civilian control and the idea of military ef-

fectiveness have become more multifaceted in the past decades, and therefore, an

alternative approach is benef‌icial. Many European states saw the improved security

situation of the post-Cold War period as an opportunity to halt spiraling defense costs

and cut back on their standing forces (Christiansson, 2020; King, 2010; Petersson,

2011). As the threat to state survival vanished, defense spending was “normalized”and

made subject to greater political and managerial control, just as other parts of the public

sector (Dandeker, 1994; Norheim-Martinsen, 2016).

Following these insights, this study places civilian control of the Swedish Armed

Forces headquarters (SAF HQ) in the context of the overall changes in the governance

of central government agencies in Europe and the many rounds of public administration

reform during the past decades (Hammerschmid et al., 2016; Pollitt & Bouckaert,

2017). There are indeed studies that argue that the military can be studied as a public

bureaucracy among others (Norheim-Martinsen, 2016; Soeters et al., 2010). Yet few, if

any, systematic studies apply this approach when analyzing changes in, and conse-

quences of, civilian control, which points to an interesting research gap.

This article analyzes what increased managerialist governance of the SAF HQ has

entailed in the years 1998–2018, and what consequences it has had for this organi-

zation. As the head of the military bureaucracy, changes to the HQ also affect the work

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