Malicious Prosecution as Undue Process: A Fourteenth Amendment Theory of Malicious Prosecution

• Author: Hon. Timothy Tymkovich and Hayley Stillwell
• Position: Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit/Graduate of the University of Oklahoma College of Law (2017)
• Pages: 225-281

Malicious Prosecution as Undue Process:

A Fourteenth Amendment Theory of Malicious

Prosecution

HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH AND HAYLEY STILLWELL*

ABSTRACT

Section 1983 is not itself a source of constitutional rights, but is instead

merely a vehicle to vindicate constitutional rights that independently exist. But

since the Supreme Court advised in dictum that actions pursuant to § 1983

should be read against the background of tort liability, § 1983 actions based on

malicious prosecution have sparked disagreement over where, if anywhere, this

cause of action fits within the Constitution. Most recently, the Supreme Court

determined that malicious prosecution finds its constitutional home in the

Fourth Amendment, so § 1983 claims require a showing of both a Fourth

Amendment violation and the common law elements of a malicious prosecution

claim. This approach fails on multiple levels, however, because malicious pros-

ecution is a poor fit for the Fourth Amendment—the tort and the constitutional

amendment have distinct requirements that do not harmonize, but damage each

other, causing the other to alter its core features. Instead, this article explains

why courts should adopt an alternative framework that treats § 1983 malicious

prosecution claims as constitutional violations of due process rights protected

under the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, § 1983 claims require only a show-

ing of the common law elements of a malicious prosecution claim, a claim that

at its core protects the fundamental right to be free from prosecution without

probable cause. This right is fundamental regardless of whether a Fourth

Amendment violation occurs simultaneously with a malicious prosecution. This

is the superior doctrinal approach to § 1983 claims based on malicious prose-

cution because it properly recognizes that malicious prosecution independently

has a home in the Fourteenth Amendment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

I. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AT COMMON LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

* Hon. Timothy M. Tymkovich is the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit and Hayley Stillwell is a graduate of the University of Oklahoma College of Law (2017)

and served as a law clerk to Hon. Patrick R. Wyrick (2018), Hon. Timothy M. Tymkovich (2020), and

Hon. Michael H. Park (2021). We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Lauren Colantonio, Mark

Goldberg, Frank Kailey, Alex Kaminski, and Emma Sargent. © 2022, Hon. Timothy Tymkovich &

Hayley Stillwell.

225

A. The Evolution of Malicious Prosecution in Britain . . . . . . . . . 229

B. Common Law Malicious Prosecution in the States . . . . . . . . . 231

1. Malicious Civil Prosecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

2. Malicious Criminal Prosecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

3. Prevalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

A. The Origins of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

B. The Modern Iteration of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

C. Constitutional Torts in Federal Courts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

III. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: ALBRIGHT V.

OLIVER & THE VIRTUAL REJECTION OF THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

A. The Road to Albright v. Oliver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

B. Albright v. Oliver: An Unhelpful Plurality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

2. Plurality Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

3. Concurring Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

4. Dissenting Opinion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

a. Is an Accused’s Liberty Deprived by a Criminal

Prosecution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

b. Is Due Process Satisfied So Long as Procedures Are

Followed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

c. Addressing the Plurality & Concurrences . . . . . . . . 256

IV. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: THE RISE OF

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S “SEIZURE” THEORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

A. An Incomplete Answer: Manuel v. City of Joliet. . . . . . . . . . . 262

V. DOCTRINAL SHORTCOMINGS & AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK . . . 267

A. The Fourth Amendment’s Shortcomings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

1. Seizure v. Criminal Proceeding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

2. Reasonable v. Malicious. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

226 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:225

3. Irrelevance of Proceedings v. Focus on Proceedings . . . . 271

B. Implications – So Why Does It Matter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

1. Functional Elimination of Malicious Prosecution . . . . . . 272

2. Damage to the Fourth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

C. A Case for Due Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

D. Alternate Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

1. Initiation or Continuation of Criminal Proceedings . . . . . 277

2. Outrageousness of Executive Conduct: (2) Lack of

Probable Cause, (3) Malice, and (4) Favorable

Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

3. Lack of Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

4. Malice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

5. Termination in Plaintiff’s Favor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

6. Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

INTRODUCTION

Legal systems have long recognized the inherent unfairness of malicious pros-

ecutions. It thus comes as no surprise that malicious prosecution has long been an

actionable tort in the United States and that its creation predates America, not to

mention the enactment of federal statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The elements

of malicious prosecution have remained consistent over time: an action that is ini-

tiated or continued with malice, is without probable cause, and is terminated

favorably to the defendant in the action. Despite this history, courts have strug-

gled to determine whether malicious prosecution is a tort claim masquerading as

constitutional law or a constitutional claim itself.

Since the Supreme Court advised in dictum that actions pursuant to § 1983

should be read against the background of tort liability,

1

§ 1983 actions based on

malicious prosecution have sparked disagreement over where, if anywhere, this

cause of action fits within the Constitution. After all, § 1983 is merely a vehicle

to vindicate constitutional rights that independently exist. Most recently, the

Supreme Court determined that malicious prosecution finds its constitutional

home in the Fourth Amendment. But this approach fails on multiple levels

because malicious prosecution is a poor fit for the Fourth Amendment.

1. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).

2022] MALICIOUS PROSECUTION & THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 227