Malevolent Forces

• Author: Fawzia S. Bashatah,Mark Alden Morgan,Nora F. Almosaed,John Paul Wright,Sameera S. Moghrabi,Pedro R. Almeida
• Date: 01 April 2017
• DOI: 10.1177/1541204016667995
• Published date: 01 April 2017
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Malevolent Forces: Self-Control,

the Dark Triad, and Crime

John Paul Wright

1,2

, Mark Alden Morgan

1

,

Pedro R. Almeida

3

, Nora F. Almosaed

2

,

Sameera S. Moghrabi

2

, and Fawzia S. Bashatah

2

Abstract

The Dark Triad is represented by three interrelated personality characteristics thought to share a

‘‘dark core’’—that is, to be associated with a range of negative outcomes. We investigate this link

alongside another potent predictor of crime, low self-control. Our analyses found the Dark Triad

was strongly predictive of delinquency, especially violent delinquency, where it accounted for the

effects of self-control. Yet it exerted no significant effect on drug-based delinquency. However, an

interaction between the Dark Triad and low self-control remained substantive and predictive across

all models, where low self-control amplified the effects of the Dark Triad on delinquency.

Keywords

dark triad, low self-control, psychopathy, malevolence, juvenile delinquency

The publication of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) A General Theory of Crime generated

unparalleled criminological interest. Backed by an easy to employ attitudinal scale developed

by Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, and Arneklev (1993), along with a slew of other scales constructed in

secondary data sets, studies and debates into the effects of self-control have flourished (de Ridder,

Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & Baumeister, 2012; Moffitt et al., 2011; Pratt & Cullen,

2000; Rebellon, Straus, & Medeiros, 2008). Indeed, by any metric, tests of self-control have

accumulated at a rate never before witnessed in the criminological cannons. Few theories or

variables can claim to have had such an impact on criminological discourse, theorizing, or

research. Even so, the success of the general theory in directing research and scholarly interest

has likely also had heretofore unrealized consequences.

One of the more important consequences has been that the almost exclusive focus on self-control

has drawn attention away from other individual-level variables related to criminal behavior.

Research into personality factors and individual traits related to aggression and criminal

1

School of Criminal Justice, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, USA

2

King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

3

School of Criminology, Faculty of Law, University of Porto, Porto, Portugal

Corresponding Author:

John Paul Wright, School of Criminal Justice, University of Cincinnati, ML 210389, 665 Dyer Hall, Clifton Avenue, Cincinnati,

OH 45221, USA.

Email: john.wright@uc.edu

Youth Violence and JuvenileJustice

2017, Vol. 15(2) 191-215

ªThe Author(s) 2016

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DOI: 10.1177/1541204016667995

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involvement has received scant attention in criminology even though a large body of evidence in

psychology documents a link between personality and conduct problems (Fridell, Hesse, Jaeger, &

Kuhlhorn, 2008; Le Corff & Toupin, 2010; Miller, Lynam, & Leukefeld, 2003; Samuels et al.,

2004). Individual traits, such as negative emotionality (Krueger et al., 1994), intelligence (Lynam,

Moffitt, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1993), psychopathy (Hare, 1996), impulsivity (White et al., 1994),

and callous and unemotional (CU) traits (Frick & White, 2008), have all been linked to problem

behavior, as have the personality factors of low contentiousness and agreeableness (Jones, Miller, &

Lynam, 2011; Miller & Lynam, 2001; Ozer & Benet-Martinez, 2006; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner,

Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007).

Historically, Agnew, Brezina, Wright, and Cullen (2002, p. 45) notes, ‘‘the role of personality

traits was discounted by mainstream criminologists until recently and most data sets do not allow for

the examination of personality traits’’ (see also, Andrews & Wormith, 1989; Caspi et al., 1994;

Walsh, 2000). Granting Agnew et al.’s (2002) argument, the almost exclusive focus on self-control

has likely further precluded investigation into other individual features—features that may compete

with, interact with, or otherwise account for the effects of self-control on conduct problems. By any

measure, omitted variable bias is potentially serious, empirically and theoretically. A second con-

cern, however, emerges when Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) assumptions about the nature of

crime are juxtaposed against a growing body of research evidence—a body of evidence that presents

a different picture of criminal behavior than they proposed originally.

Malevolent Forces

Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) based their conception of self-control on what they called the ‘‘nature

of crime.’’ The nature of crime is that it is easy to commit,takes little planning, and is driven predomi-

nately by available opportunities.Criminals, by extension,are simply opportunists wholack the ability

to control their impulse to offend in the presence of a criminal opportunity. Theyare impulsive, do not

think of the consequences of their behavior,prefer immediate gratification over long-termplanning and

rewards, and theyput little cognitive effort into their criminal actions. Offenders haphazardly stumble

from crime to crimeand are easily induced to act in ways thatviolate social mores and laws.

At one level, Gottfredson and Hirschi’s conception of the nature of crime is supported by a broad

array of evidence. Criminals are generally impulsive (Lynam et al., 2000; White et al., 1994), show

little planning in the commission of crime (Hochstetler, 2001; Petrosino & Brensilber, 2003), and

engage in a variety of offenses ranging from petty crimes to serious crime (Baron, 2003; Evans,

Cullen, Burton, Dunaway, & Benson, 1997; Keane, Maxim, & Teevan, 1993; Piquero, MacDonald,

Dobrin, Daigle, & Cullen, 2005). This depiction has gone largely unchallenged in criminology. By

contrast, however, threads of disparate studies paint a very different picture of an important sub-

group of offenders: a subgroup of offenders that are predatory and callous. These offenders are, at a

minimum, indifferent to the suffering they cause others or they may appear to relish in the suffering

they cause. Their behaviors, moreover, may seem excessively cruel and morally repugnant. And

contrary to the assumptions of Gottfredson and Hirschi, their behaviors are not entirely driven by

opportunity but instead appear rooted in emotional and cognitive preferences to inflict harm on

others for reasons that are often instrumental. They are, in other words, malevolent.

Some psychologists have called attention to the role of malevolence in human conduct gener-

ally (Goldberg, 1995; Hurlbert & Apt, 1992). Others, however, have argu ed that a subgroup of

individuals with antisocial personality disorder can be characterized as malevolent. Millon, Gross-

man, Millon, Meagher, and Ramnath (2004, p. 161), for example, describe these individuals as

‘‘belligerent, rancorous, vicious, malignant, brutal, callous, vengeful, and vindictive.’’ Malevolent

individuals ‘‘anticipate betrayal and punishment,’’ and they are willing to victimize ‘‘those too

weak to retaliate or those whose terror might prove particularly entertaining.’’ Similar to other

192 Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice 15(2)