Madison’s Ratchet: Ambition Counteracting Ambition and the Aggregation of Political, Managerial, and Legal Controls Over Federal Administration

• Published date: 01 August 2018
• DOI: 10.1177/0275074016688958
• Author: David H. Rosenbloom,Meghan Doughty,Stephanie P. Newbold
• Date: 01 August 2018
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074016688958

American Review of Public Administration

2018, Vol. 48(6) 495 –505

© The Author(s) 2017

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DOI: 10.1177/0275074016688958

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Article

Introduction

In Federalist 47, James Madison, the leading architect of U.S.

constitutional separation of powers doctrine, contended that

the accumulation of legislative, executive, and judicial pow-

ers in the hands of one body or person would be “the very

definition of tyranny” (Cooke, 1961, p. 324). In Federalist

51, he explained that “ambition must be made to counteract

ambition” by “giving to those who administer each depart-

ment, the necessary constitutional means, and personal

motives, to resist encroachments from the others” (Cooke,

1961, p. 349). He counterbalanced his concern for the poten-

tial aggregation of powers with the observation that the prac-

ticalities of governance dictate that legislative, executive, and

judicial powers are not entirely separated, but rather blended.

The separation of powers doctrine is not absolute. Rather, it

maintains, “Where the whole power of one department is

exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power

of another department, the fundamental principles of a free

constitution are subverted” (Cooke, 1961, p. 325). Consequently,

subordinating federal administration to Congress, the presi-

dent, and the judiciary is consonant with constitutional sepa-

ration of powers theory and serves to protect against both

bureaucratism and the concentration of all administrative

authority in the president.

Madison was largely concerned with the ability of each

branch of government to check encroachments on its own

powers by the others. As with the Constitution’s framers

generally, he did not anticipate the rise of a powerful federal

administrative component that, as former Supreme Court

Justice Robert Jackson noted, “would become a veritable

fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our

three-branch legal theories” (Federal Trade Commission v.

Ruberoid, 1952, p. 487). In response to the emergence of this

new power center during the New Deal era, ambition coun-

teracting ambition has prompted each branch to expand its

own powers over the “fourth branch,” often augmenting

rather than limiting those of the other branches.

As Paul Light (1997) observed, administrative reforms

since 1945 cannot always be viewed as though the separation

of powers is a zero sum or hydraulic model. One branch may

initiate reforms that strengthen the power of another. Overall,

Light finds both the presidential and congressional roles in

federal administration have been strengthened—and the

same holds true for the federal courts (Rosenbloom, O’Leary,

& Chanin, 2010). Rather than serving as a checking dynamic

alone, ambition counteracting ambition has promoted an

expansion of the aggregate political, managerial, and legal

688958ARPXXX10.1177/0275074016688958American Review of Public AdministrationRosenbloom et al.

research-article2017

1American University, Washington, DC, USA

2Renmin University of China, Beijing, China

3Rutgers University, Newark, NJ, USA

Corresponding Author:

Stephanie P. Newbold, School of Public Affairs and Administration,

Rutgers University, 111 Washington Street, Newark, NJ 07102, USA.

Email: stephanie.newbold@rutgers.edu

Madison’s Ratchet: Ambition Counteracting

Ambition and the Aggregation of Political,

Managerial, and Legal Controls Over Federal

Administration

David H. Rosenbloom1,2, Stephanie P. Newbold3, and Meghan Doughty1

Abstract

In Federalist 47 and 51, James Madison contended that the accumulation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in

the hands of one body or person would produce tyranny. He explained that one defense against such tyranny was to

make “ambition . . . counteract ambition” by giving each of the three constitutional branches of the federal government

the “means,” “motives,” and wherewithal to “resist encroachments” on their powers by another. However, after the

development of the contemporary administrative state in the 1930s, rather than serving as a check against encroachments

alone, the process of ambition counteracting ambition prompts each branch to develop its own set of controls over federal

agencies without necessarily trenching on the powers of the other branches. “Madison’s Ratchet” is the tendency for these

controls overwhelmingly to aggregate and thereby vastly complicate federal administration.

Keywords

U.S. public administration, federal administrative management, political and administrative power, James Madison, ambition