Loyalty over Fairness: Acceptance of Unfair Supreme Court Procedures

• DOI: 10.1177/1065912920944470
• Published date: 01 December 2021
• Date: 01 December 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

2021, Vol. 74(4) 927 –940

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920944470

Political Research Quarterly

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Public perception of fair U.S. Supreme Court procedures

is strongly related to support for the judiciary and

compl iance with its decisions (Baird 2001; Gibson 1991;

Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 2006). However, recent evi-

dence indicates that commitment to certain moral norms—

such as fairness and honesty—is rooted in, and can be

suppressed by, group attachment (Hildreth, Gino, and

Bazerman 2016; Waytz, Dungan, and Young 2013).

Although outright cheating is seen as unethical and an

unacceptable moral failure (Gneezy 2005), there are

instances where ordinary individuals value loyalty

(Hildreth and Anderson 2018) and expect favoritism

(Bian, Sloane, and Baillargeon 2018). Specifically, uneth-

ical acts that are perceived as stemming from loyalty are

viewed more positively than ethical acts that are disloyal

(Hildreth and Anderson 2018). A tension exists between

fairness and loyalty (Waytz, Dungan, and Young 2013),

and individuals can encounter a psychological dilemma

when each norm is simultaneously primed. Due to the

preeminence of group loyalty (Tajfel and Turner 1979),

individuals may be willing to ignore violations of standard

norms—like fairness—when their group benefits.

In light of evidence that loyalty can trump fairness,

and on the immense—and growing—influence of group

loyalty in American politics (e.g., Iyengar and Westwood

2015), I believe now is an appropriate time to reexamine

the relationship between fairness and support for the

Supreme Court. Great rifts between, and cohesion among,

groups in the United States have occurred in recent

decades, such that individuals increasingly align with the

political in-group and increasingly avoid and dislike the

out-group (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Iyengar,

Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015).

Group members feel pride for conformity and shame for

disloyalty (Suhay 2015). This Balkanization, and the

motivations that accompany social identity-based polar-

ization, provides fertile ground for loyalty to confront

sociopolitical and moral norms like fairness.

This study sets out to determine whether individuals

are willing to forgo fairness on the part of the Supreme

Court when their group benefits. I take “fairness” to

encompass a host of characteristics, like trustworthiness,

ethicality, integrity, honesty, and believability. I ask

whether individuals will accept Court procedures that vio-

late these principles, provided that they view themselves

as policy “winners.” To find out, I conducted a nationally

representative survey with an embedded experiment, as

well as a convenience sample survey experiment. To con-

firm that the average American actually perceives the

Court to be fair (an important first step, given the assertion

944470PRQXXX10.1177/1065912920944470Political Research QuarterlyArmaly

research-article2020

1The University of Mississippi, University, USA

Corresponding Author:

Miles T. Armaly, The University of Mississippi, 233 Deupree Hall,

University, MS 38677, USA.

Email: mtarmaly@olemiss.edu

Loyalty over Fairness: Acceptance of

Unfair Supreme Court Procedures

Miles T. Armaly1

Abstract

Evidence of procedural fairness leads individuals to support Supreme Court decisions, even ones with which they

disagree. Yet, in some settings, unfair behavior is seen as acceptable, even praiseworthy, if it yields a pleasing outcome

for one’s group. The loyalty norm occasionally trumps the fairness norm, and group loyalty has taken on increasing

importance in American politics. I use a nationally representative survey with an embedded experiment, and a

convenience sample survey experiment, to relate group (i.e., partisan) loyalty and perceptions of (un)fair behavior to

support for the Court. I find that when group concerns are unclear, individuals tend to punish the Court for unfair

behavior. However, despite conventional wisdom regarding fairness and support, individuals fail to censure unfair

behavior when their group benefits from the Court’s impropriety. These effects hold when integrating preferences

regarding specific case outcomes. Perceived unfair procedures do not universally harm evaluations of the Supreme

Court.

Keywords

Supreme Court, group loyalty, procedural fairness, support