Lost Triumph Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg - And Why It Failed

• Author: Major Timothy P. Hayes, Jr.
• Pages: 07

188 MILITARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 186

LOST TRIUMPH

LEE'S REAL PLAN AT GETTYSBURG - AND WHY IT FAILED1

REVIEWED BY MAJOR TIMOTHY P. HAYES, JR.2

Success has a thousand fathers, but failure is an orphan.3

Lost Triumph is a new take on an old story. In a highly readable book, Tom Carhart establishes the very bold premise that Pickett's Charge on day three at Gettysburg was not a foolhardy last gasp by a commander with his back to the wall. Instead, it was part of a complex and brilliant plan that, if executed to perfection, would have resulted in a stunning and monumental victory for the Confederate Army under General Robert E. Lee. Perhaps even more controversial is Professor Carhart's theory that Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer of Little Bighorn fame thwarted the plan.4 Professor Carhart relies on primary sources wherever possible, but also depends on many secondary sources that he admits are pure conjecture in some instances.5 While perhaps not lending credence to his theory, these supplements are plausible and make the book a fascinating read for a student of military history.

Professor Carhart's theory in Lost Triumph is easily summarized. Pickett's Charge, the fabled "High Water Mark of the Confederacy,"6

was merely a "massive distraction."7 Coupled with that distraction was to be a renewed offensive by General Richard Ewell's 2nd Confederate Corps on the Union right. This offensive was in fact initiated by contact with the enemy ahead of schedule. But the presently forgotten or

unknown stroke of genius was a planned cavalry charge led by General J.E.B. (Jeb) Stuart into the heart of the Union rear, meeting Pickett at the center of the Union line and effectively cutting the Union Army in half, then destroying it gradually. Professor Carhart boldly asserts that this plan was thwarted only by George Armstrong Custer's "raw personal courage".8

Professor Carhart's book has a clearly defined purpose-to advance his theory-and his story is tightly woven to support that goal. He anticipates and attempts to answer the reader's most obvious questions: where is the evidence of Lee's plan, and why is it only now coming to light? Professor Carhart readily admits that he does not rely on any newly discovered evidence, but bases his theory on his own interpretation of existing sources,9 most notably eyewitness sources collected in the Bachelder papers.10 While noting that there were only two Confederate reports of the cavalry battle between Stuart and Custer in the official reports,11 Professor Carhart asserts that General Lee suppressed confederate reports of that aspect of the fight12 because they revealed that Jeb Stuart's invincible cavalry had been held off by a much smaller force. Such a revelation would have been devastating for confederate morale and a much needed boost to Union spirits. Professor Carhart surmises that, rather than allow the proliferation of this news, Lee preferred to shoulder the blame himself.13 But, of course, he could not control the Union reports. So why were they ignored? Professor Carhart cites ample anecdotal evidence of the cavalry prong of the attack provided by Union cavalrymen in various journals and articles, but he maintains that these reports were regarded by historians as mere puffery, and ignored.14 He does, however, acknowledge two previous historians who espoused his theory in works of larger scope.15 Critics, however,

tend to agree that Professor Carhart is the first to offer a comprehensive interpretation of this theory.16

Professor Carhart offers other support for his theory as well. First, he proposes that this grandiose plan was in keeping with General Lee's overall boldness in battle,17 although it could be argued that an unsupported Pickett's charge would have been even bolder. But tactically, Professor Carhart argues, Lee would not have attacked with only Pickett's Division, as it amounted to only twenty percent of his available forces.18 Professor Carhart also points to Lee's unfailing loyalty to his subordinates, and notes that Lee would have been particularly loathe to disparage Stuart's name following his combat-related death ten months after Gettysburg.19 To explain why there is no...