Losing mythic authority.

• Author: Vlahos, Michael
• Position: Viewpoint essay

MOST NOW acknowledge that America has failed in its war. Some see that failure limited to Iraq, while others describe a larger strategic liability. Thus the question is in part: How big is America's failure? But more significantly, what are the consequences?

In broad terms, we have squandered the World War II canon. We have lost its mythic authority. We are at the historical end of its protective embrace. We are on our own now. This intangible is the most significant, and in some ways surprising, consequence of the war. It has resulted from the most temporal of events and will indeed deliver most apparent costs. But before considering the importance of the consequences, it is first necessary to map the landscape of failure, to diagram its dimensions. Our failure has unfolded in four dimensions: in terms of military objectives; reconstruction promises; "hearts and minds" goals and lofty, transformative ambitions for the region.

Failure How Big, How Far?

MILITARILY, AMERICA'S initial success in Afghanistan and Iraq did not bring secure and stable environments to these countries. However, America's military campaigns have overseen a yearly escalation in chaos and violence in both. And while it is to be hoped that U.S. forces will eventually be extricated successfully, they will leave behind a menagerie of Islamist principalities locked in ceaseless struggle. These, of course, were not our military goals.

America also pledged to redeem and uplift Iraq and Afghanistan, just as we "reconstructed" Germany and Japan after World War II. This promise was not kept. Both countries are in ruins. By some measures, they are worse off than ever. Moreover, money is short, so there is little more we can do to help them. Our policies and practices have perversely helped to achieve the wreckage over which we now preside.

Further, we are losing what we declared to be a "war of ideas." After September 11, the world--even the Muslim world--rushed to our emotional support, but by now we have convinced the overwhelming majority of Muslims that we are attacking Islam itself. We have not liberated Muslims long abused by radical and fundamentalist ideology, as we said we would, or brought them greater freedom. We have failed in our promise to support democracy movements and dissidents, and continue to support political tyranny. Among Arab Muslims especially, we are universally hated.

We also boasted of our aim to transform the region, signaling that not even our "friends and allies" would escape the mighty wind of democratic reform. That boast has evaporated. And we now sit by and watch open political repression without even a mention. Not only do Arab regimes no longer fear us, but others, like Pakistan's, openly mock us through their support of the Taliban. Our great Muslim adversary, Iran, has gratefully accepted our help in achieving almost all its strategic goals, including formal spheres of influence in Mesopotamia and western Afghanistan. Again, this was hardly our goal.

The aggregate consequence of failure across these four dimensions of our war effort abroad is the larger damage...