Looking at the other in Gilgamesh.

AuthorDickson, Keith

THE TRAPPER'S GAZE

One day, across a water-hole, in a wilderness three days' trek from the city, a trapper sees what has not been seen before: a wild man, like a beast--like a god--fallen from heaven, naked, his body rough with matted hair, down on all fours, crouching to lap up the water. This happens for a second day, and also for a third, but in the way in which this story gets told, these three distinct occasions are fused into a single encounter, as if each were identical to the others, as if each happened at one and the same time, or else all were stuck somehow in a kind of recursive and possibly nightmarish loop. The trapper looks, and his gaze for that brief moment could be ours, but what we see most clearly is not what he saw, but how what he saw gives his face in our eyes a different and yet still recognizable look: It is the look of "one who has travelled distant roads" (Gilgamesh I 113-21): (1)

A hunter, a trapper-man, came face to face with him by the water-hole. One day, a second and a third, he came face to face with him by the water-hole. The hunter saw him and his expression froze, [he ] and his herds--he went back to his lair. [He was] troubled, he grew still, he grew silent, his mood [was unhappy,] his face clouded over. There [was] sorrow in his heart, his face was like [one who has travelled] distant [roads]. An odd shift thus occurs, a kind of narrative bait-and-switch. The fact that the verbs in this passage are all preterit and that the narrated action has already taken place does not change the fact that in the narration of the story--whether we are reading it, or else hearing it told--we are implicitly invited to look at Enkidu with or through the trapper's eyes. This is encouraged by the formulaic looping of the action ("one day, a second, and a third ...") that sets up the scene (I 115) by heightening suspense. The narrative leads us twice to the same brink of direct encounter, only to draw back on each occasion and then return to that brink a third time, thereby generating expectation of something that will happen or be seen. What we are shown, however, is not the face of the wild man--which we have already seen "for ourselves," after all (I 105-12)--but instead the face of the one through whose eyes we expected to look, with the result that the reputed viewer now becomes the object of the view. We see the trapper when he has seen Enkidu "face to face" (I 114, 115).

What is the significance of this shift? At least two questions are involved here, which the present essay aims to explore. One is perhaps existential, and the other has to do with what narratologists generally call "discourse"--"the narrating as opposed to the narrative" (Prince 1987: 21)--or more simply, how the story (whatever its content may be) gets told. Specifically, it is an issue that concerns shifts in "focalization," namely in the "perspective" or "viewpoint" or "angle of vision" that orients a story's telling. (2) In the passage quoted above, the narrator of the enframing tale makes the trapper the "focalizer" in his encounter with the wild man, and the wild man takes the part of the "focalized," one the subject of the gaze, and the other its object. Or at least that initially seems to be the case. As we have noted, it is the trapper himself who becomes focalized through his encounter with Enkidu; the seer becomes the seen. Why do we see his face? I propose to address this question first narratologically, in the expectation that the answer will also bear on its existential import.

What can it mean that our view of the wild man in this passage is a refracted one, and this also in two senses of the word? It is refracted first because it represents a different focalization from that of the story's narrator, with whose point of view ours is identical through much of the narrative. This too involves a shift, since in the lines (I 105-12) immediately preceding the passage at issue, we in fact glimpse the beast from the narrator's detached and, for all intents and purposes, omniscient vantage point. (3) From the all-encompassing distance of that view, ranging (in the course of barely 40 lines) from the temples of Uruk to the court of Anu and then down to the wilderness, we are given the sight of an utterly natural being; thick hair on his body, long tresses like those of a woman, the strength of Ninurta within him as he eats grass along with the gazelle and jostles with other beasts at the water-hole. But having seen him thus once, why are we invited to see him twice, so to speak, and from a different perspective? What difference does it make that after the "objective," narrated vision of the wild man we are manipulated into expecting to look at him again from another point of view?

The switch from seeing through the eyes of the external narrator ("extradiegetically") to seeing through the eyes of a character embedded in the story ("intradiegetically") is a narrative device that aims chiefly at generating affect. It does this first by reducing the distance between the viewer and the viewed. (4) Here in the wilderness, the trapper's implicitly far more limited perspective allows us in turn to share in a more naive and thus more direct vision of what he sees, or at least in the semblance of such a vision. It offers a sight that is apparently less mediated by the narrator's extradiegetic view and also less filtered, perhaps, by the experience of what might even at this early date be conventional representations of wild men. (5)To the extent to which we and the original audience are invited to crouch down and look across the water-hole, we are also encouraged to see as it were directly what it is that crouches on the other side, over there, just opposite us. Rather than maintaining separation, then, the trapper's viewpoint would bring us into dangerous proximity to the beast. This close encounter tends to cancel out the distance of our initial perspective from the safety of the omniscient narrator's viewpoint. As a corollary, the wild man himself would therefore seem less a fictional type--something encountered in stories told by narrators--than an individual in his own right. For Enkidu to be seen intradiegetically gives him greater authenticity, as it were.

Proximity in turn supplies the encounter with the emotional content it initially lacked. To be sure, our embedded gaze is an interrupted one, a kind of narrative feint, a blind alley, in that it never actually reaches its target. We see Enkidu only once, after all, not twice; we never see the beast as the trapper really saw him. Instead, our gaze is deflected onto the trapper's face, where we see not what he saw but instead his own response to the sight. This is a loss, perhaps, but at the same time also a gain. The response in its emotional and existential density is in fact something we could not have seen extradiegetically, from a remote position outside the narrative. Seeing the trapper after he has seen Enkidu lends us a different kind of vision, namely a vision with greater affective depth. Even in the case of an embedded as opposed to an external point of view, vision still remains the most distancing of the senses; it keeps its object at arm's length, and to that extent perhaps controls it better, but at the same time also precludes direct involvement. Note that in the run of lines preceding this encounter (I 105-12), where the perspective is that of the detached narrator, the description is dominated by the sense of sight: body, matted hair, long tresses, coat of hair, grazing, jostling. Only twice is what is narrated an inner state--interestingly, the beast's ignorance (I 108) and satisfaction (I 112)--rather than some outward, visible feature.

By contrast, the description of the trapper dwells mostly on inward feelings. All but two of the adjectives attributed to him in lines I 117-21 refer to affective and thus not directly observable states: "troubled, he grew still, he grew silent, I his mood [was unhappy,] ... | There [was] sorrow in his heart." Even the reference to his actual features ("his face clouded over" [I 119]) addresses his appearance as an index of mood. The encounter "face to face" (I 114, 115) exposes the trapper's own face (I 116, 119, 121) not as surface but instead as transparency, allowing us a glimpse into the depth of his heart. Unlike the distancing of sight, emotions are markers of proximity--to the trapper himself, perhaps, as much as to the beast across the water-hole. Through them, we are brought perilously closer to experiencing less Enkidu himself than the significance of an encounter with him.

Through the literary device of embedded (and interrupted) focalization, we gain a kind of affective vision, or better, the vision of an effect. What we see on the surface, the rigidity of the expression, the clouding of the face, reveals, what lies within. (6) This device in turn reflexively turns on us too, since by its means we are also implicitly led to reassess our own initial response to our first view of Enkidu just a few lines earlier (I 105-12). How likely is it, after all, that upon that first sight of the wild man our own expressions "froze," that we "grew still ... grew silent," and that our faces seemed to others like the faces of those who have "travelled...

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