The Long-run Impact of Childhood Wartime Violence on Preferences for Nuclear Proliferation

• Published date: 01 January 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231159287
• Author: James D. Kim
• Date: 01 January 2024
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Journal of Conf‌lict Resolution

2024, Vol. 68(1) 108–137

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/00220027231159287

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The Long-run Impact of

Childhood Wartime Violence

on Preferences for Nuclear

Proliferation

James D. Kim

1



Abstract

How do childhood experiences of wartime violence affect individuals’preferences for

nuclear proliferation? This paper argues that individuals who experienced severe war

violence during childhood are more likely to value the security-enhancing aspects of

nuclear weapons. These individuals are more concerned about being exposed to

additional wartime violence, so they view nuclear weapons as a deterrent against large-

scale invasions. By utilizing the geographic variation of violence intensity during the

Korean War, this paper compares the pre-war and post-war cohorts who resided in

severely damaged regions and relatively safe areas. Within the pre-war cohort, I f‌ind

that individuals who resided in war-torn areas are more supportive of nuclear pro-

liferation than those who were exposed to less violence. This regional d ifference,

however, is not substantial in the post-war generation. The results suggest that direct

exposure to wartime violence during childhood increases public demand for nuclear

weapons when confronted with security threats.

Keywords

childhood war exposure, national security, nuclear proliferation, wartime violence

1

Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA

Corresponding Author:

James D. Kim, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, 1002 George Bush Drive West,

College Station, TX 77843, USA.

Email: jamesdkim@tamu.edu

Introduction

Does early exposure to wartime violence affect an individual’s preference for national

security policies? During a war, military soldiers are not the only ones who face life-

threatening situations; many civilians are also placed in harm’s way, experiencing

traumatic violence and even death. Witnessing the deaths of neighbors, friends, and

family members due to war violence at a young age is a highly traumatic experience for

individuals. This destructive experience can have a long-run impact on one’s per-

sonality and value system. Extensive research in social science shows that childhood

violent experiences affect individuals’political attitudes and behaviors in both the

short- and long-term. For example, early exposure to violence causes individuals to be

less trusting in the government and more active in political participation (Blattman

2009;Carmil and Breznitz 1991;Conzo and Salustri 2019;Hong and Kang 2017;

Punamaki, Qouta, and Sarraj 1997).

Surprisingly, however, the effect of childhood wartime violence on preferences for

national security policies is a question that has received little attention in

scholarship. War-related violence, in comparison with interpersonal, social, and state

violence, is especially likely to shape individuals’preferences and attitudes toward

national security policy because it is closely related to the goal of preventing a similar

type of violence in the future. This paper examines whether people who experienced

wartime violence during childhood demonstrate a greater propensity for nuclear

weapons acquisition.

I argue that individuals who were exposed to traumatic wartime violence during

childhood are more likely to support nuclear proliferation. Violent experiences of this

nature have a tendency to lead individuals to be more concerned about their safety and

being exposed to additional wartime violence. The experience of the government’s

inability to safely secure its national territory makes these individuals question whether

or not the country will be able to protect them in the future. Therefore, when an external

security threat arises, people who have experienced wartime violence perceive the

threat as riskier than those who have not, and they hyperfocus on worst-case thinking of

suffering from a catastrophic war. This leads them to prefer a national security policy

that they believe can deter such large-scale conf‌lict.

Scholars have shown that nuclear weapons can have both positive and negative

security effects (Bell and Miller 2015;Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010;Jervis 1989;Lee

et al. 2023;Monteiro and Debs 2014;Sagan 1994;Waltz 1981). Some studies show that

nuclear weapons benef‌it national security by bolstering deterrence, while others

demonstrate that possessing nuclear weapons does not lower the risk of conf‌lict but

rather increases it by inviting preventive strikes and low-level disputes. I argue that

people exposed to violence early in life naturally favor the security-enhancing aspects

of nuclear deterrence. Since they have suffered from traumatic wartime violence, they

are more fearful of suffering from a disastrous war in the future. This will lead them to

favor a nuclear arsenal that is effective in deterring major invasions on their home soil.

Also, people with childhood war trauma who better understand the tragic nature of

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