Locke on Equality

• Published date: 01 September 2016
• Author: Bruce A. Hunt
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912916652239
• Date: 01 September 2016
• Subject Matter: Articles

652239PRQXXX10.1177/1065912916652239Political Research QuarterlyHunt
research-article2016
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2016, Vol. 69(3) 546 –556
Locke on Equality
© 2016 University of Utah
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DOI: 10.1177/1065912916652239
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Bruce A. Hunt Jr.1
Abstract
Scholars overlook that Locke has two distinct concepts of equality entrenched in his political theory. By recovering
the centrality of natural law in Locke, these two concepts of equality can be easily identified. The first I call “natural
equality,” which includes every human being regardless of rational capacity, each possessing rights to life, liberty, and
property. The second is “law-abiding equality,” which includes the subset of people who adequately recognize the
dictates of natural law. This distinction is significant because it helps overcome the conflict in liberalism between
universal dignity and the necessarily exclusionary character of citizenship.
Keywords
Locke, equality, rights, natural law, citizenship, democracy
Human beings all being equal, should the political rights
Essential to my argument is that for Locke, natural law
of anyone—for example, voting, jury participation, run-
mandates respect for rights and this law is perceptible
ning for office—ever be restricted within society?1 Some
through reason. The importance of this claim will become
political scientists say “yes” in cases where democratic
apparent in the first section of this paper, where I engage
ideas are viewed with suspicion or even hostility: “as
with the interpretative stance of Michael Zuckert (1994,
[Robert] Dahl argues, simple insistence on the majority
2004, 2005). I focus on Zuckert’s work mainly because it
formula per se will not do anything until the appropriate-
provides the best opportunity to review and engage with
ness of the [political] unit is established” (Linz and
two popular arguments for equality deeply rooted in
Stepan 1996, 27). Prematurely establishing full demo-
Western consciousness: (1) that human beings have equal
cratic rights within any given political unit can therefore
dignity in their possessing of the same fundamental
(and unfortunately) increase the probability of demo-
capacities and (2) that nearly all human beings have suf-
cratic failure.
ficient reasoning capacity for, and thus are entitled to,
This piece of empirical prudence, however, lacks a
equal citizenship.
normative framework that could mitigate the appearance
By carefully reassessing Locke’s views on how the
(or reality) of injustice. For this very reason, restricting
concepts of natural law, equality, and rights interrelate, it
rights must raise risky prospects for political order.
can be seen that there are two distinctive tiers to his
Fortunately, a justified way of approaching this has been
understanding of equality. I refer to the first of these as
available for some three centuries in the theoretical works
“natural equality,” which is inclusive of all human beings,
of John Locke.
even those that reject this concept. This equality implies
Influential interpretations of Locke today wrongly
rights to life, liberty, and property, according to Locke.
conclude that equality implies full political rights for all
The second tier of equality is referred to as “law-abiding
(Strauss 1968, 22). On the contrary, scholars who do see
equality” (LAE), which includes the potentially very
limitations on political rights typically view this as a
large subset of people who sufficiently recognize and
product of historical circumstance, including influences
abide by the principles of civility and decency codified in
of racism, classism (Macpherson 1962), and/or sexism
natural law. This awareness in turn entrusts law abiders
(Hirschmann 2003). Opposed to each of these camps, I
with the legitimate power and duty to punish, a power at
argue that Locke’s political theory limits political rights
the heart of all rights inherently political. Although
but does so to protect the universal dignity of all, rather
than to violate it. Nor are the criteria for granting political
1University of Houston, TX, USA
rights strictly related to race, class, or gender. Instead,
these rights are reserved for those with a sufficient com-
Corresponding Author:
Bruce A. Hunt Jr., Department of Political Science, University of
mitment to the belief that everyone has equal rights to life,
Houston, 447 Phillip G. Hoffman Hall, Houston, TX 77204, USA.
liberty, and property.
Email: bahunt2@uh.edu

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Hunt
547
everyone is entitled to their natural rights to life, liberty,
Where things get more difficult is in Zuckert’s (2004,
and property, only the law-abiding can legitimately
569) additional inference that this self-conscious self-
secure these rights via the establishment and enforcement
ownership preserves “the equal rights of all persons.”
of positive law.
This is a common inference in discussions of equality, but
to suggest that “a right” automatically leads to “the equal
Lockean Equality as Self-Ownership
rights” is a questionable move. In contrast, it would seem
perfectly consistent to conclude from self-ownership
For Zuckert, Lockean equality is based on the self-
alone that a person indeed has a right to life but not any
ownership one naturally enjoys over oneself.2 His inter-
additional rights, for example, equal liberty or equal
pretation primarily relies on Locke’s (1988, ST, § 27)
political authority. This restricted catalog of rights is rec-
statement that “every Man has a Property in his own
ognized for incarcerated (and presumably self-owning)
Person,”3 combined with select passages from the
criminals, for example. Prisoners must have several rights
Essay Concerning Human Understanding that empha-
respected as dignity-possessing human beings, such as
size man’s nature as a self-aware being (Locke 1975).
the right to due process of law, protection from cruel and
Despite the strengths of this reading, however, there
unusual punishment, and the like, yet their rights as
are important limitations that warrant consideration.
human beings do not shield them from extensive rights
Primarily, this concept of equality is insufficient for going
denials imposed on them. Although the self-ownership
beyond establishing universal dignity to justify society-
principle sufficiently grounds our universal rights to not
specific political rights. This significantly weakens the
be enslaved, full and equal rights, including political
coherence of Locke’s social compact, which inherently
rights, are less persuasively accounted for.
relies on an exclusive membership of citizens. That
Political rights therefore require more than self-own-
Locke’s compact is “signed” only by those who recog-
ership equality. They may potentially be justified through
nize other “signers” as political equals is evidence of this.
the ability to be rational and/or obedient to legitimate
This equality also obscures Locke’s clear sanctioning of
laws, and denied to those who lack such ability. An apoc-
both democratic and undemocratic forms of government
alyptic religious group, for example, may seem irrational
in his Second Treatise of Government.4
to its fellow members of society. It may mistreat animals,
Let us first examine whether self-ownership is indeed
children, and the members themselves, and even seri-
universal—a concern posed by James Stoner. Perhaps
ously harm those outside the group. The members of such
this concept in fact points away from human equality—
a group, an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or
both in dignity and political rights—as “surely some
a Taliban, may reasonably be seen by others in society as
people are more conscious of themselves than others”
rightfully excluded from the political process. Another
(Stoner 2004, 563). Those who are very self-aware might
example would be a violent revolutionary group seeking
be, under this principle, considered more “equal” or dig-
regime change within its nation, such as the Revolutionary
nified than others. This raises doubts regarding whether
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). We could consider a
this equality can satisfactorily support Locke’s main
large population of undocumented immigrants, as cur-
theoretical principles, such as placing government’s ulti-
rently exists in the United States. Should such people be
mate power in “the people” as a whole. Self-aware self-
allowed the right to vote? It seems only reasonable to
ownership may instead be a more natural complement to
expect that reliably law-abiding people within their social
an aristocratic society—suggesting that the less self-
compact could want more rights than these others.
aware majority may be subordinated to the enlightened
These questions help to show that relying on a single
and philosophic few.
concept of equality hamstrings Locke’s theory into an all-
To this, however, Zuckert (2004, 569) responds that
or-nothing gambit concerning rights. If equal rights
“consciousness of self . . . is not a matter of degree.”
emerge out of self-ownership, then the exclusionary
What matters is that human beings are conscious of them-
social compact would seem impossible. Equality in all
selves at all. This is the universal and democratic manner
rights would amount to a global political society. If self-
in which Locke conceives of...