Locke the hermenaut and the mechanics of understanding.

• Author: Berman, Michael P.
• Position: Critical essay

"Nothing that is said has its truth simply in itself, but refers instead backward and forward to what is unsaid." --H. G. Gadamer "The use of language is, by short sounds to signify with ease and dispatch general conceptions: wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but also a great variety of independent ideas, collected into one complex one...." --J. Locke Opening Statement

John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding contains an implicit hermeneutics. Following Hans-Georg Gadamer's assertion that "the sense of a text in general reaches far beyond what its author originally intended" (Gadamer 1989, 372), I will reconstruct and reinterpret Locke's treatment of language in the third book of his Essay to show that there is a nascent hermeneutical understanding at work. Whether or not this is a robust hermeneutics is yet to be seen, but it does open an avenue of thinking beyond the empiricist tradition. In this vein, I will begin with J. C. Weinsheimer's objection that Locke's philosophical outlook is thoroughly anti-hermeneutical. This assertion is drawn from his chapter devoted to Locke in Eighteenth-Century Hermeneutics, Philosophy of Interpretation in England from Locke to Burke. I will outline Weinsheimer's general positions, and then present an alternative interpretation. I will then provide a brief overview of Locke's descriptions of the relations among words, ideas and objects of experience; however, I will not attempt to delve into the issues of his philosophy of language, (1) for that would take this project too far afield. Instead, my approach will be informed by Gadamer's assertion that "Language is the fundamental mode of operation of our being-in-the-world and that all-embracing form of the constitution of the world" (Gadamer 1977, 3), which was in part anticipated by Locke's philosophy.

The Objection

Weinsheimer's book employs a Gadamerian approach to hermeneutics. Weinsheimer states that "an interpretation that is an interpretation and not a duplicate of the text must differ from it" (Weinsheimer 1993, 11). The interpretation is justifiable by its inventiveness and difference, advancing beyond the text (or source) of its interpretation. It thus brings a new richness to what is wrought and wrangled from the object of its inspiration. Essentially speaking, Weinsheimer explicitly holds that Locke represents the "anti-hermeneutic animus" of eighteenth-century British philosophy (Weinsheimer 1993, 8). Placing aside Locke's practices, but concentrating on his philosophy, Weinsheimer states, "virtually nothing in the latter renders dialogue or interpretation fundamental to knowledge" (Weinsheimer 1993, 26). This claim, taken as an objection, will be answered by demonstrating that there is nascent hermeneutic in Locke's Essay, which makes dialogue and interpretation fundamental to knowledge.

Weinsheimer's methodology differs significantly from the latter sections of this essay. He draws on Locke's larger corpus, whereas this work intentionally draws from the Essay alone. According to Weinsheimer, Locke's later political writings and commentaries on religious texts promoted peace and tolerance, which is indicative of certain reversals and changes in his political philosophy over the course of his career (Weinsheimer 1993, 24-25). This point is important for Weinsheimer's thesis as it demonstrates Locke's anti-hermeneutical stance. As Locke developed his ideas, his "general desire [was] to suppress interpretive difference by minimizing interpretation wherever possible" (Weinsheimer 1993, 32-33). The reason for this, as Weinsheimer indicates, is that there is a structural element to Locke's philosophy that precludes interpretations. Supposedly this is the case for dialogue.

Dialogue between persons, or between a person and text(s), which would necessitate interpretation, is judged to be pointless. "The pointlessness of dialogue seems to be a direct corollary of Locke's epistemological individualism" (Weinsheimer 1993, 26). Weinsheimer identifies this with a "natural atomism" (2) and "epistemological solipsism" wherein "whatever a person does and thinks, it [that is, he or she] does and thinks alone" (Weinsheimer 1993, 28 and 38). This is a justifiable claim; for, as Locke writes in the Essay, "Every man being conscious to himself, that he thinks, and that which his mind is employed about whilst thinking being the ideas, that are there, 'tis past doubt, that men have in their minds several ideas ..." (Locke 1996, II.I.1). (3) The presence of this Cartesian cogito (self-consciousness) in Locke's philosophy supports Weinsheimer on this point. Locke's own epistemology then suffers from the same substance dualism as Cartesian thought. If understanding, and subsequently knowledge, is to be acquired, such will be exclusively held in the mind and be pertinent for that mind alone (or primarily). This knowledge, if at all true, must rely on what is plainly self-evident, which "is not susceptible of proof" and "is a force to which the mind submits" (Weinsheimer 1993, 36-37). In this sense, the understanding passively acquires true knowledge, whereas interpretation requires an active engagement of the understanding, which precludes access to anything that is self-evident.

Access to that which is self-evident is obscured by language. The discussion of language in Weinsheimer's chapter on Locke actually appears quite late in his examination. He holds that Locke sees language as a medium that necessarily clutters, distorts or obscures our intuitions or immediate, non-inferential knowledge, which is then the leading cause of all kinds of disputes. "What we know are above all, our own ideas, since they and they alone, in Locke's view, are known without the mediation of any intervening ideas" (Weinsheimer 1993, 41). Any kind of intercessional phenomena will cause problems for gaining knowledge: "Whatever intervenes and mediates between the subject and its object not only fails to make knowledge possible but impedes it. Language is by far the most important among such mediations" (Weinsheimer 1993, 43). Thus, according to Weinsheimer's reading, Locke would rather dispense with language altogether, for, and he quotes Locke here, "Learning [that is, being learned or well-read] is distinct from knowledge, for knowledge consists only in perceiving the habitudes and relations of ideas one to another, which is done without words" (Weinsheimer 1993, 44). Even Locke seems to admit that language is more of a hindrance than an aid to the understanding and the acquisition of knowledge. This objection must be answered in order to provide a different reading that would fulfill Weinsheimer's wish: if there were an alternative conception of language in Locke, admitting "that language is 'scarcely separable' from thought and truth, this admission would have metamorphosed his monological epistemology into a dialectical hermeneutics, for understanding oneself would then be 'scarcely separable' from understanding others" (Weinsheimer 1993, 44). This is the explicit goal that the next sections seek to flesh out. In order to do this, we must first turn our attention to the nature and role of ideas in Locke's Essay. This will point to some correctives for Weinsheimer's critique, and provide a foundation for a Lockean dialogical hermeneutics.

Ideas and Language

As an empiricist, Locke holds that all knowledge is generated through experience. He rejects innate ideas, though he does recognize some universal characteristics of animate and inanimate constitutions. For example, humans are attracted to pleasurable experiences, and avoid negative or harmful ones. This is not to say that certain built-in principles guide such behaviour, but rather our complex embodiments favour certain kinds of conditions. (4) We see this with the non-verbal cues qua perceptual experiences that employ the significatory capabilities of our embodiment, such as with the pointing of fingers to indicate specific objects/qualities. The bases for knowledge are the simple ideas impressed upon us by our senses whose sources are the objects, things or events in the external world; the term "Idea ... serves best to stand for whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks ..." (Locke 1996, I.I.8). External phenomena impact the sense organs that provide the raw sensations that the mind passively accepts as transformed into simple ideas. These simple ideas are the basic building blocks of complex ideas, produced through the activities and reflections of the mind. When Weinsheimer discusses the disclosers given via intuition, he neglects to distinguish simple from complex ideas, surreptitiously forgetting their differences for the mind. These ideas in the mind are mere representations that resemble the (properties of) objects out in the world. Norman Kretzmann claims the following passage from Locke is indicative of this doctrine (Parret 1976, 338): "... Since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas" (Locke 1996, IV.XXI.4). We must note that there is an ontological and epistemological gulf here, though this gulf is nominally bridged by words and language use.

The...