Local Managerial Perceptions of Intergovernmental Management

• Author: Luke Fowler
• Published date: 01 March 2018
• Date: 01 March 2018
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0160323X18769974
• Subject Matter: General Interests

General Interest
State and Local Government Review
2018, Vol. 50(1) 6-14
Local Managerial Perceptions
ª The Author(s) 2018
Reprints and permission:
of Intergovernmental
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DOI: 10.1177/0160323X18769974
Management
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Luke Fowler1
Abstract
Interjurisdictional policy problems have facilitated both interlocal cooperation and opportunities for
self-interested behavior from local governments. However, intergovernmental management (IGM)
approaches shape how local governments interact with each other and how much influence local
managerial efforts have on policy outcomes. After identifying three IGM models used to manage air
quality, analyses of local managerial perceptions indicate that some approaches facilitate more
cooperation and organizational efficacy than others through structuring responsibilities in Clean Air
Act policy implementation. Conclusions suggest that approaches to IGM are important in shaping
how managers perceive efforts to manage complex policy problems.
Keywords
cooperation, managerial perceptions, air quality
Over the past several decades, interjurisdic-
local needs; (2) top-down, in which local
tional policy problems have facilitated both
governments serve as administrative subunits
interlocal cooperation and opportunities for
of the state; and (3) uncentralized, in which
self-interested behavior from local govern-
local governments manage complex policy
ments (Conlan 2006; McGuire 2006; Feiock
problems outside of state-led efforts. Depend-
and Scholtz 2009). However, intergovernmen-
ing on local managers’ place in state-led CAA
tal management (IGM) approaches shape how
implementation strategies, some approaches
local governments interact with each other and
facilitate more cooperation and organizational
how much influence local managerial efforts
efficacy than others through structuring respon-
have on policy outcomes. While different
sibilities in policy implementation. As such,
approaches to IGM likely lead to different local
certain IGM approaches may create a better
managerial perceptions of interlocal interac-
platform for engaging local managers in
tions and organizational efficacy (i.e., agency
effectiveness), there are few examples of alter-
native approaches being used for the same pol-
1 School of Public Service, Boise State University, Boise, ID,
icy. However, the U.S. Clean Air Act (CAA)
USA
provides a unique case of a complex policy
Corresponding Author:
problem that includes multiple IGM models:
Luke Fowler, School of Public Service, Boise State University,
(1) delegated-authority, in which local govern-
1910 University Dr., MS 1935, Boise, ID 83725, USA.
ments are delegated power to adapt programs to
Email: lukefowler@boisestate.edu

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Fowler
7
collaborative management of complex policy
implementation partners by delegating regula-
problems. In order to examine these issues, this
tory and enforcement powers to local agencies.
article proceeds with a discussion of IGM mod-
Local governments develop programs and
els used in U.S. CAA implementation, fol-
negotiate partnerships with other local agencies
lowed by an examination of managerial
as necessary. Finally, uncentralized states nei-
perceptions of interlocal cooperation and orga-
ther preempt nor delegate authority to the local
nizational efficacy using data from local air
level in their SIPs. In response, local agencies
agencies. Finally, conclusions suggest that
strategically interact with other organizations
approaches to IGM are important in shaping
but face barriers to forming partnerships and
how managers perceive efforts to manage
managing air quality outcomes. Consequently,
complex policy problems.
SIPs have important implications for local gov-
ernments and their roles in IGM. For instance,
by delegating authority, states encourage local
IGM and CAA Implementation
governments to adapt programs to local needs,
Federal and state administrative structures and
which may include interlocal partnerships. On
rules create institutional barriers to local gov-
the other hand, by using local governments as
ernment efforts by fragmenting authority and
implementation agents, states rely on hierarch-
formalizing intergovernmental interactions
ical relationships rather than cooperation.
(Chen and Thurmaier 2009; Feiock and Scholtz
Alternatively, by leaving local governments out
2009; Kwon and Feiock 2010). As framed
of implementation plans, states limit responsi-
under the CAA, air quality governance relies
bilities and opportunities for local governments
on a federal–state partnership. The U.S. Envi-
to work toward shared goals. Consequently,
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets the
how federal and state governments shape local
National Ambient Air Quality Standards
government roles affects local agencies’ ability
(NAAQS). States develop State Implementa-
to both cooperate with each other and impact
tion Plans (SIPs) to maintain those standards
complex policy problems.
based on control strategies and regulations
approved by the EPA (Belden 2001). However,
Delegated-authority IGM
some states have both the political will and the
institutional capacity to manage CAA pro-
The most sophisticated IGM approach provides
grams, and others have neither of those advan-
local governments with discretion and flexibil-
tages (Wood 1992; Potoski and Woods 2002;
ity, by delegating authorities. Consequently,
Emison and Morris 2010; Konisky and Woods
local governments find new, innovative ways
2010; Fowler 2013). Despite state-centralized
to manage programs to satisfy both local needs
power, federal, state, and local agencies, as
and national standards (Waterman and Meier
well as nongovernmental organizations
1998; Agranoff and McGuire 2001). Addition-
(NGOs), are involved in air quality manage-
ally, they voluntarily interact with state,
ment (Ringquist 1993a, 1993b; Lester 1995;
federal, or other local agencies that are part of
Emison and Morris 2010). Additionally, local
the implementation plan in the process of
context constrains what is feasible in practice,
managing shared goals (Scicchitano and
leading to both interlocal cooperation and com-
Hedge 1993; Agranoff and McGuire 2001;
petition (Woods and Potoski 2010; Gofen 2013;
Allik and Realo 2004). As a result, there is an
Reed 2014; Fowler 2016, 2018).
inherent bargaining process in which resource
As such, state SIPs can be divided into three
exchanges, program requirements, and respon-
general types. First, top-down states centralize
sibilities are negotiated. As such, delegated-
power at the state level. Local governments are
authority arrangements seem like partnerships,
treated as administrative subunits of the state,
in which local managers are semiequal partici-
with managers focused on compliance manage-
pants with bargaining power. Furthermore,
ment. Second, delegated-authority states create
local managers are able to adjust state or

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State and Local Government Review 50(1)
federal plans to improve local policy outcomes
governments still choose to manage complex
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001). Consequently,
policy problems from outside state-led efforts.
they see specific local outcomes as a result of
However, they find cooperation difficult, which
their efforts rather than the result of federal or
...