A lobbyist just for you: and two other solutions to counter corporate influence in Washington.

• Author: Drutman, Lee

Over the past four decades, large corporations have learned to play the Washington game. Companies now devote massive resources to politics, and their large-scale involvement increasingly redirects and constricts the capacities of the political system. The consequence is a democracy that is increasingly unable to tackle large-scale problems, and a political economy that too often rewards lobbying over innovation.

Much public opinion on the subject of political influence suffers from a confusing and counterproductive mix of hopeless idealism and fatalistic cynicism. On the one hand, many people think that if only we could get special interests out of politics, then we would have a government run by perfectly rational Solomonic lawmakers, capable of divining the true public interest and making wise and uncorrupted judgments. On the other hand, they look at the political system and think that most politicians are at once craven and venal, ready to sell their votes for the promise of a hosted fund-raiser or, even more cheaply, a few thousand dollars in PAC contributions.

The reality is, of course, more complicated, but it's also much more interesting. Like everyone else, politicians are motivated by a mix of both noble and not-so-noble intentions. There are good politicians and not-so-good ones, but any attempt to cut them off from societal pressure is a betrayal of both the idea of representative democracy and the potential for the collective intelligence that widespread participation in the political process allows for. The Washington lobbying community is full of many bright policy minds, and the expertise and knowledge that the business community can provide makes for a more informed policymaking process.

Any attempt to directly limit the participation of corporate lobbyists in the political process runs immediately into the practical problem that efforts to limit political influence have always encountered. If corporations (and other actors) are determined to influence the political process, they will find a way. If the history of political influence regulation has taught us anything, it should be this: those determined to participate in the political process will find ways to do so.

There are, however, three genuine problems that do need fixing, and that can be fixed in ways that work with, not against, the realities of politics.

The first problem is the balance of power. When corporate interests spend $34 for every $1 diffuse interests and unions combined spend on lobbying, it is not a fair fight. If we want a political system that is capable of responding to broad societal interests, we want a political system in which a broad range of societal interests are capable of presenting their most effective case. When large corporations are the dominant actors in Washington, policy attention will almost certainly reflect their priorities.

Take drug companies. In 2004, the industry won the passage of Project BioShield, which allocated $5.6 billion in federal funding to stockpile drugs to combat a potential bioterrorism attack. Yet, even after the bill was passed, drug companies were not entirely satisfied; they wanted protection from loss in developing bioterrorism vaccines. It was a telling sign of just how emboldened the industry had become.

The second problem is the asymmetry of information and the related complexity. When government actors are forced to rely on outside lobbyists for policy expertise, and when that expertise is provided largely on behalf of a narrow set of actors, this is likely to distort outcomes.

Additionally, policy complexity makes it easier for the corporate actors with the most resources to make quiet changes with little to no scrutiny. Tax policy is a good example of this influence. As the authors of a 2005 presidential advisory panel report on tax reform noted about the 15,000 changes to the tax code between 1987 and 2005,

Each one of these changes had a sponsor, and each had a rationale to defend it. Each one was passed by Congress and signed into law. Some of us saw this firsthand, having served in the U.S. Congress for a combined 71 years, including 36 years on the tax-writing committees. Others saw the changes from different perspectives--teaching, interpreting, and even administering the tax code. Almost all of these were small provisions in larger bills. Few received anything close to public scrutiny. As the report acknowledged, this approach has had negative consequences: "In retrospect, it is clear that frequent changes to the tax code, no matter how well-intentioned, ultimately undermine the integrity of the code in real and significant ways." The tax code is now almost four million words long.

The third problem is particularism. Companies are increasingly oriented toward narrow, rent-seeking outcomes. Parochial intra- and inter-industry battles take up an increasing amount of Washington bandwidth, and the growing investments in particularism crowd out the capacity of the political system to address larger problems. University of North Carolina at Charlotte professor Ken Godwin and colleagues have argued that corporate lobbying can be modeled as a two-stage game. First, companies join together in order to get an issue onto the agenda, aware that it often takes a large coalition to break the threshold of attention. Then, once the issue gets serious consideration, companies break off and advocate for themselves.

What may be good for some powerful companies is almost certainly bad for the economy as a whole. One chemical company's lobbyist summarized the process: "In the beginning most of us cooperate to get Congress's ear, but in subcommittee it's every man for himself." Another lobbyist provided a similar perspective on lobbying the bureaucracy: "When EPA is considering a new rule, we [the firms in her industry]...