Lobbying, the public interest, and democracy: Communication perspectives

• Date: 01 May 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2091
• Author: Scott Davidson,Øyvind Ihlen,Chiara Valentini,Anna Shavit
• Published date: 01 May 2020

EDITORIAL

Lobbying, the public interest, and democracy: Communication

perspectives

The literature on public affairs, lobbying and interest groups has

grown substantially (e.g., Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, &

Leech, 2009; Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Berry, 1977; Godwin, Ains-

worth, & Godwin, 2013; Harris & Fleischer, 2017; Kollman, 1998;

Scott, 2018). Scholars point to how, on the one side, lobbying is a cru-

cial part of democracy by providing information to legislators and by

being a supplement to other channels of influence, be it the corpora-

tive or the media channel. In this sense, lobbying is seen as an impor-

tant part of policy advisory systems (Craft & Howlett, 2012). On the

other hand, debates have evolved around the lack of lobbying trans-

parency and the need for regulation (e.g., Chari, Hogan, & Murphy,

2012; Holman & Luneburg, 2012). In particular, the large sums corpo-

rations use for lobbying has caused concern for potential undue dem-

ocratic influence (e.g., Drutman, 2015; Mikler, 2018; Schlozman,

Verba, & Brady, 2012). Interest group studies present contradictory

findings in this regard (Leech, 2010). In discussing “why and how are

interest groups influential,”Leech concludes that the evidence is

strongest that interest groups exercise influence, “at least under some

circumstances,”through “provision of information and other policy-

related aid”(p. 550). Studies of lobbying in the European Union have,

pointed out that so-called lobbying insiders (typically business inter-

ests) succeed in shaping policy outcomes in those instances where it

is difficult to mobilize a public on the same issue (Dür & Mateo, 2016).

This then, poses a challenge to democratic norms of participation and

due influence.

Early scholarship on organizations was typically based on a plu-

ralist perspective, operating from the assumption that all voices

could work for their own private interests and make themselves

heard in the public sphere. Through a competition in the public

sphere, the interest most beneficial to the public interest would pre-

vail since self-interest would be tempered by public debate and

scrutiny. Political actors would either pre-empt this process or lose

the public debate since the public interest arguments hold greater

sway. Still, much criticism of this pluralist perspective has been

voiced, most poignan tly by Schattschneider & Adamany: “the fla w in

the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong

upper-class accent”(1975, pp. 34–35). As mentioned, other studies

too have shown how political participation in politics is dominated

by resource rich actors (Binderkrantz, Bonafont, & Halpin, 2016;

Binderkrantz, Christiansen, & Pedersen, 2014; Schlozman et al.,

2012). This research has concluded that financial resources and

human capital are important components for organizations and their

ability to achieve their lobbying goals.

As several others, we maintain that communication is arguably of

tremendous importance for lobbyists (Klüver, Mahoney, & Opper,

2015; Oehmer, 2017), not just as a tool to reach organizational goals,

but as a tangible “trace”or “practice”(Craig, 2006), showing how lob-

bying relates to and influences communities and arenas. Some have

even argued that lobbying is “essentially a form of persuasive commu-

nication in the political arena”(McGrath, 2007, p. 269). In political sci-

ence, game theoretic approaches to information “demonstrated the

existence of equilibria in which lobbying is influential”(Austen-Smith &

Wright, 1996, p. 2). Lately, within interest group studies, more

attention has been paid to quantitative analysis of framing

(e.g., Binderkrantz, 2019; Boräng et al., 2014). Such studies have, for

instance, studied lobbying influence operationalized as congruence

between lobbyists' frames and those conveyed by politicians

(Boräng & Naurin, 2015; Klüver & Mahoney, 2015).

Baumgartner et al. (2009) have, for example, differentiated

between so-called inside advocacy (e.g., personal contacts with politi-

cians and provision of research data and other materials), outside

advocacy (e.g., attempts to obtain media coverage), and grassroots

advocacy (e.g., mobilizing mass membership to protest publicly). The

latter study also demonstrated how lobbyists use a whole range of dif-

ferent arguments when they try to sway legislators concerning partic-

ular policy suggestions. Topping this list were “problems/no problems

with implementation or feasibility,”“promotes/inhibits some widely

shared goal (e.g. public safety, improving the economy),”and “imposes

or reduces costs on nongovernmental actors”(p. 132). Another con-

clusion emanating from this study was that those supporting status

quo had a considerable advantage over those advocating for a policy

change.

Despite the demonstrated interest for lobbying and communica-

tion, we maintain that there are several huge questions that remain.

For instance, there is a need for a better understanding of communi-

cation strategies in light of democratic norms, the use of particular

argument types, as well as communicative attempts to fuse private

and public interests. What communication strategies are employed

and how these can be evaluated against democratic goals of participa-

tion as well as the problem of unequal influence and regulatory cap-

ture? Is there any evidence that lobbying practitioners are boundary

spanners assisting in orienting their clients towards serving the public

interest, or do they merely advise on how to camouflage vested

interests?

The questions above pose important challenges to both organiza-

tions and society-at-large in terms of organizational influence and role

Received: 20 August 2019 Revised: 6 November 2019 Accepted: 31 January 2020

DOI: 10.1002/pa.2091

J Public Affairs. 2020;20:e2091. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 1of5

https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2091