Lobbying Regulations and Political Equality in the American States

• Author: Patrick Flavin
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X14545210
• Published date: 01 March 2015
• Date: 01 March 2015
• Subject Matter: Articles

American Politics Research

2015, Vol. 43(2) 304 –326

© The Author(s) 2014

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X14545210

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Article

Lobbying Regulations and

Political Equality in the

American States

Patrick Flavin1

Abstract

Laws that regulate the conduct of professional lobbyists in statehouses across

the nation are one attempt to ensure that citizens’ opinions receive more

equal consideration when elected officials make policy decisions. Do states

with stricter lobbying regulations actually display more egalitarian patterns

of political representation? Using public opinion measures from the National

Annenberg Election Surveys and data on state policies, this article first

demonstrates that state policy decisions are consistently more proximate

to the opinions of affluent citizens. I then evaluate the relationship between

the stringency of state lobbying regulations and representational equality

across the states and find evidence that states with stricter regulations weigh

citizens’ opinions more equally in the policymaking process. These findings

suggest that lobbying regulations can play an important role in promoting

greater political equality.

Keywords

political inequality, political representation, lobbying regulations, public

policy

There is growing concern among social scientists, policymakers, and the gen-

eral public about unequal political influence and its consequences for eco-

nomic inequality in the United States (Bartels, 2008; Flavin, 2012; Gilens,

2012; Gilens & Page, 2014; Jacobs & Skocpol, 2005; Kelly, 2009; Kelly &

1Baylor University, Waco, TX, USA

Corresponding Author:

Patrick Flavin, Baylor University, One Bear Place #97276, Waco, TX 76798, USA.

Email: Patrick_J_Flavin@baylor.edu

545210APRXXX10.1177/1532673X14545210American Politics ResearchFlavin

research-article2014

Flavin 305

Witko, 2012). One common explanation for why affluent citizens tend to be

more successful at getting their preferences translated into policy is that

industries that tend to share their opinions (finance, real estate, etc.) are well

represented among professional lobbyists in Washington and statehouses

across the nation (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). In contrast, disadvantaged citi-

zens do not enjoy the same level of representation among professional lobby-

ists, and correspondingly exert less influence over the policy decisions made

by elected officials. In response to these perceived inequities, laws that regu-

late the registration and conduct of professional lobbyists are one attempt to

lessen the influence of wealthy interests and ensure that citizens’ opinions

receive more equal consideration when elected officials make important pol-

icy decisions.1

Are lobbying regulations actually effective at enhancing the equality of

political representation? This question is difficult to answer at the federal

level because one uniform set of laws regulates professional lobbyists in

Washington and changes in those laws that occur over time are contempora-

neously correlated with many other changes in the political system. In com-

parison, the 50 states vary dramatically in terms of how much, or little, they

regulate the registration and conduct of professional lobbyists (Brinig,

Holcombe, & Schwartzstein, 1993; Newmark, 2005; Opheim, 1991; Ozymy,

2013). For example, some states have few regulations on lobbying activities

whereas other states have enacted strict requirements for lobbying disclosure,

rules governing when lobbyists can meet with legislators, and limits or out-

right bans on the gifts lobbyists can give to elected officials.

Despite the important implications for the quality of American democracy,

no study to date has evaluated whether stricter lobbying regulations corre-

spond to more egalitarian patterns of political representation. This article

uses the variation across the 50 American states to examine the relationship

between lobbying regulations and the equality of political representation and

uncovers evidence that stricter regulations are associated with greater politi-

cal equality. Specifically, states with more stringent lobbying regulations

tend to exhibit a weaker relationship between income and political influence.

These findings contribute to our understanding about the potential effects of

lobbying regulations and ultimately underscore the important role that laws

and institutional design can play in promoting greater political equality in the

United States.

Background and Theoretical Expectations

Professional lobbyists are increasingly active in statehouses across the nation

(Newmark, 2005; Ozymy, 2010; Rosenthal, 2001). Regardless of the interests