Litigation & Case Law Update
| Publication year | 2019 |
| Author | By Katherine Cook, Bernadette S. Curry, Nicholas Norvell, and Clarisa Sudarma |
By Katherine Cook, Bernadette S. Curry, Nicholas Norvell, and Clarisa Sudarma
Katherine Cook is an Attorney with the California High-Speed Rail Authority.
Bernadette S. Curry is a Deputy County Counsel for Solano County and the Chair of the Public Law Section Executive Committee.
Nicholas Norvell is an Associate at Best Best & Krieger LLP's San Diego office.
Clarisa Sudarma is a Deputy County Counsel for the County of Solano.
Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City ofPomona (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1159, filed Nov. 7, 2018.
Public interest standing for a private attorney general action is not defeated solely because a plaintiff may have a personal interest in the outcome of the lawsuit.
In June 1993, the City of Pomona entered into an agreement with an advertising agency that required the agency to erect several billboards and remove those erected billboards on or before the last day of the agreement. The agreement included a provision that allowed for it to be extended for 10-year periods.
Proposition L passed in November 1993, prohibiting any new billboard construction in the City. An editor's note in the municipal code stated that Proposition L could not be modified without voter approval. In July 2014, the City Council adopted a purported "extension" to its agreement with the advertising agency for new billboards. The "extension" included changes to the fees the advertising agency would pay the City.
Plaintiffs—a citizen interest group and individuals, including a competitor to the advertising agency—sued alleging a violation of Proposition L. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and directed the City to set aside the ordinance adopting the amendment. It concluded that the July 2014 "extension" was actually a new agreement, supported by new consideration, containing new terms, and was enacted after the prior agreement had expired in June 2014. The trial court also granted an award of attorneys' fees under the Private Attorney General Act. Among other arguments, the City asserted that plaintiffs lack public interest standing because they sought mandamus to advance their own competitive objectives rather than to promote or safeguard the public welfare.
On appeal, the Second District affirmed, finding: (1) the individual plaintiffs, who were City residents, satisfied public interest standing; (2) the case could move forward without the advertiser as a party since their interests would be adequately covered and they were not an indispensable party; and (3) the trial court had not erred in finding the City failed to comply with Proposition L, which could only be amended by a vote of the City's residents. With respect to the issue of a plaintiff having a personal interest in the outcome of the suit, the Second District held that neutrality is not a prerequisite for public interest standing.
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Lee v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2018) 908 F.3d 1175, filed Nov. 19, 2018.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, race must be a predominant factor motivating a legislature's decision to successfully challenge new district lines.
Plaintiffs sued the City of Los Angeles City Council for actions it took to redraw council districts. Specifically, plaintiffs took issue with one city council member's remarks revealing racial motivations in the new boundaries. The council member stated, both verbally and in writing, that he sought to increase the percentage of registered African-American voters in a particular district to over 50%. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the U.S. and California Constitutions and the city charter.
The district court issued a protective order to prevent the plaintiffs from questioning the elected officials and granted the City summary judgment. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing Cooper v. Harris, which held that, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, race must be a predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to successfully challenge the new district lines. While one city council member declared his intent after the plan was adopted, the person he tasked with redistricting was part of a larger commission and did not have final decision-making powers. The plan then went through several amendments and changes, so much so that the court concluded that plaintiffs could not show race was the predominant factor throughout the process. The court also upheld legislative privilege, noting that because judicial inquiries into legislator's motivations are a substantial intrusion, they should be avoided.
Thompson v. Hebdon (9th Cir. 2018) 909 F.3d 1027, filed Nov. 27, 2018
While upholding contribution limits applicable to individuals and organizations, the Ninth Circuit held that a state law limiting aggregate funds received by a candidate from out-of-state residents violates the First Amendment.
In 2006, voters in the State of Alaska approved an initiative containing various limits on campaign contributions. Among the limitations, the initiative capped the aggregate amount a candidate could receive from non-Alaskans to $3,000 per year. The initiative also set monetary limits on individual-to-candidate contributions, individual-to-group contributions, and political party-to-candidate contributions.
In Thompson v. Hebdon, residents and nonresidents of Alaska challenged these campaign finance limitations as violations of the First Amendment. The District Court upheld all four challenged limitations as consistent with the First Amendment. Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision regarding contributions by individuals to candidates and groups, and by political parties to candidates, the court reversed the District Court with regard to the aggregate limit on contributions from nonresidents.
As summarized by the Ninth Circuit, state campaign contribution limits will be upheld if: (1) evidence shows that the limitation furthers a sufficiently important state interest; and (2) the limits are "closely drawn." As to the latter element, the limits must "(a) focus narrowly on the state's interest, (b) leave the contributor free to affiliate with a candidate, and (c) allow the candidate to amass sufficient resources to wage an effective campaign." Based on the decisions in Citizens United v. FEC and McCutcheon v. FEC, the Ninth Circuit noted that the only state interest that justifies a limit on campaign contributions is the prevention of quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.
The Ninth Circuit applied this test to each of the limitations challenged by the plaintiffs. Ultimately, the court concluded that each of the limits on individual and political party contributions did indeed further the state's interest in avoiding quid pro quo...
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