Litigating A Collateral Attack Through A Federal Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief

• Jurisdiction: Maryland

VIII. Litigating a collateral attack through a federal petition for habeas corpus relief

A. Full and fair opportunity to litigate a constitutional claim in state court

1. A federal petition for habeas corpus relief must be filed in the U.S. District Court. A federal habeas corpus petition may be used to address illegal state convictions and illegal federal convictions.

The defendant may seek federal habeas corpus relief if a state court denied a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate a federal constitutional claim. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 333-36 (1915). In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court held that, "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Id. at 494-95.

However, some constitutional claims may be litigated in a federal habeas corpus petition, even though there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in state court. The defendant may use federal habeas corpus to challenge a denial of due process, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1979) (beyond a reasonable doubt standard); a denial of equal protection, Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 560-62 (1979) (discrimination in selection of the grand jury); a denial of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 376-80; and a denial of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688-94 (1993).

B. 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

1. Federal review is limited to state court decisions that are contrary to well-established law or render an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law

In 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides for a hearing on a federal habeas corpus petition only if a state court decision is (a) contrary to well-established federal law; or (b) involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In essence, the AEDPA eliminated the full and fair hearing exception. Under the AEDPA, federal courts may review state court decisions, following a full and fair hearing in state court, only if there is clearly erroneous application of federal constitutional law when viewed at the time the state court rendered its decision, as determined by using the record that was before that court.

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme Court explained:

[U]nder the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state decides a case differently that this court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Id. at 412-13.

To demonstrate an "unreasonable application," the defendant must demonstrate that the state court's error was more egregious than just an error in application of the law. In Williams, the Supreme Court held: "For the purposes of today's opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Williams, 529 U.S. at 410 (emphasis in original). Compare Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 6-9 (2011) (state court did not unreasonably apply Jackson v. Virginia); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106-13 (2011) (state court's application of Strickland was not unreasonable), with Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable). See also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (given the lack of federal precedent, state court did not unreasonably apply federal law in holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by spectators wearing buttons with the picture of the murder victim); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663-64 (2004) (state reasonably applied Miranda to determine that the defendant was not "in custody"); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (state court reasonably applied Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence regarding "gross disproportionality"); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638-43 (2003) (state court reasonably applied the Double Jeopardy Clause).

Some rules, e.g., when is a suspect in custody for purposes of Miranda, are more general, and therefore may have more flexibility in interpretation than other, more specific legal rules. In those more "general" areas of law, application "can demand a substantial element of judgment," and it is less likely that a state court's interpretation will be deemed unreasonable. See, e.g., Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664.

In Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), the Supreme Court held "that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Id. at 181-82. See also Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011). A defendant may introduce new evidence only on claims that were not adjudicated in the state court. Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181-85. Furthermore, the AEDPA "imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings [and] demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010).

2. Claims are limited to issues under the United States Constitution

Federal habeas corpus claims are limited to challenges based on federal law (i.e., the U.S. Constitution and the laws and treaties of the United States). In Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1 (2010), the Supreme Court held: "[I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State's criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts." Id. at 5.

In Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011), the defendants were denied parole from state prison and were denied relief by state courts. Id. at 217-19. The defendants then filed for federal habeas relief, which was granted based on a "liberty interest" in parole protected by the Due Process Clause, which was violated by the State's incorrect application of the evidentiary standard required for granting parole. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding:

Whatever liberty interest exists is, of course, a state interest created by [state] law. There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and States are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners. When, however, a State creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication—and federal courts will review the application of those constitutionally required procedures. In the context of parole, we have held that the procedures required are minimal. In Greenholtz, we found that a prisoner subject to a parole statute similar to California's received adequate process when he was allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied. The Constitution, we held, does not require more. [The defendants] received at least this amount of process. . . .
That should have been the beginning and the end of the federal habeas court's inquiry into whether [the defendants] received due process. Instead, however, the Court of Appeals reviewed the state courts' decisions on the merits and concluded that they had unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence.

Id. at 220. Because this additional inquiry did not involve a question of federal law, it was erroneous. Id. at 220-21.

In Wilson, the Supreme Court stated: "It is not enough to note that a habeas petitioner asserts the existence of a constitutional violation; unless the federal court agrees with that assertion, it may not grant relief." Wilson, 562 U.S. at 6.

3. Default under state procedural rules

Federal habeas corpus relief is limited to federal constitutional issues previously raised in (a) a state appeal; (b) a state post conviction proceeding; or (c) another state collateral proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), (e). Further, the claims presented in a habeas corpus petition must be identical to those presented to the state courts. In Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995), the Supreme Court held that "mere similarity of claims is insufficient to exhaust." Id. at 366. In Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982), the Supreme Court stated:

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 [ ] (1971), we made clear that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires a federal habeas petitioner to provide the state courts with a "fair opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support

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