Between the lines: a textual analysis of the Gaza-Jericho agreement.

• Author: Drake, Laura

Since the signing of the Gaza-Jericho accord on 13 September 1993, the primary focus has been on the ambiguity and vagueness inherent in the agreement, or on what the agreement does not say. It is true that the issues which form the substance of Palestinian existence, or non-existence, are left out of the agreement altogether, their postponement a reflection of the asymmetry of power in the regional environment. Yet the text of the agreement brings up entirely new issues that will affect the future of the Palestinian people, issues which need to be addressed in their own right.

The purpose of this paper is to reflect upon what the agreement does say and the implications involved in the actual wording and focus of the text. These observations will be followed by an overall conclusion, in which the larger issues introduced by this agreement into the Palestinian-Israeli relationship will be identified.

PREAMBLE

The government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles.

The introductory sentence to the agreement addresses the concerns of the Israeli side, while barely touching upon those issues most crucial to the Palestinians. There are explicit and unambiguous references to the end of confrontation and conflict, peaceful co-existence, security, and historic reconciliation. However, there are no corresponding references to withdrawal, freedom, or self-determination.

The Palestinian concerns appear to be covered by three very ambiguous phrases. The term "mutual legitimate and political fights" is one of them. In this construction, the two adjectives "legitimate" and "political" bear no direct connection to each other by virtue of the insertion of the word "and" between them. However, it is an improvement upon Camp David, which refers only to the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." The term "mutual" serves to apply the entire statement to both peoples. This would seem to place Palestinian and Israeli political rights on the same moral plane, thus implicitly affirming the Palestinian fight to the same conditions the Israelis now enjoy.

The reference to "dignity" is a product of the Palestinian historical legacy. There can be no experience more humiliating than life under a belligerent military occupation by a foreign power. For 27 years, Palestinians under the post-1967 occupation have been killed, imprisoned, tortured, beaten, coerced, and otherwise oppressed both as individuals and as a people. The reference to "dignity" represents their demand that all such indignities come to an end, foremost among them, the control of their persons, their land, and their resources by a foreign power.

The third reference, to a "just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement," is left over from historical pan-Arab sensitivities about separate agreements. This derives from Henry Kissinger's step-by-step approach to peacemaking, which was correctly believed to represent a strategy of "divide and rule", aimed at weakening the Arab side through political and geographical fragmentation.

Arab attempts to resist separate political negotiations failed on the first order when Anwar Sadat decided unilaterally to travel to Jerusalem in 1977. Egypt's return to the Arab fold a decade later facilitated the acceptance of the remaining Arab parties to the Madrid formula of bilateral negotiating delegations, with the stipulation that the final settlement would be "comprehensive." The purpose of the term "comprehensive" in the Palestinian-Israeli agreement is to downplay its separateness to Arab states and to place it within the overall Madrid framework.

The terms "just" and "lasting" are borrowed from U. N. Security Council Resolution 242 and convey the conviction of the Palestinians that peace will not be "lasting" unless it is "just," which means that at least a portion of their fundamental rights must be recognized and implemented.

ARTICLE I: AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations ... is ... to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council ... for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The term "Council" carries obvious administrative overtones. In fact, its origins can be traced back to Camp David, which refers to the establishment of a "self-governing authority (administrative council)." A corresponding legislative term, had one been intended, would have been something akin to "constituent assembly."

By specifying "the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," the passage implies Israeli recognition of "Palestinian people" in other than the West Bank and Gaza Strip, of Palestinian peoplehood as a whole. At the same time, its placement at the beginning of the agreement under the heading "Aim of the Negotiations" introduces the document as applying to only one sector of the Palestinian people, those "in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," with "sector" being defined and categorized based on current place of residence.

While this may be positive in that it recognizes the Palestinian people as a whole, it legitimizes the concept that those sections of the Palestinian people expelled from their homeland in 1948, as well as their descendants, will not be party to the interim arrangements in any fashion. The result is to fracture the Palestinian people, such that some Palestinian segments are part of the agreement while others are not.

It is clear that the elected council is intended for the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip, yet nowhere does the document offer a precise definition of the term "West Bank," thus evading the issue of whether or not East Jerusalem and its annexed suburbs are part of that territory. It must be assumed that any default categories work in favor of the stronger party, meaning that these areas are not necessarily considered for the purposes of the agreement as belonging to the territorial unit of the West Bank, although the subject is left open to future debate.

The use of the term "transitional period" is noteworthy. This happens only in Article I and twice again in Article V, where it appears as a title. Elsewhere, the document employs the term "interim period." By contrast, "interim" does not appear at all in Camp David; instead, the more dynamic term "transitional" is employed throughout.

One can speak of an "interim government" between two military dictatorships in Haiti or Central America, whereas in South Africa a "transitional government" was inaugurated to carry the country out of apartheid and into a constitutional democratic system guaranteeing equal rights for all races, a change of historic proportions. The same could be said for the Soviet Union toward its end; Mikhail Gorbachev was often referred to as a "transitional figure."

The concept of "transition" carries the implication of historical change through forward, irreversible motion. The word "interim," however, refers simply to an interregnum, which, in the words of a Washington Post editorial, is "dependent on Israeli consent for further evolution."(1) In short, if the Palestinians are to enjoy a "transition," they can expect real and historic change, away from occupation and toward independence. If the upcoming stage is "interim," however, it could indicate nothing more than a period of restructuring for an existing occupation.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of 242 and 338.

The "whole peace process," of course, is understood as the Madrid process begun in October 1991. The placement of the interim arrangements within the Madrid framework is to underscore the concept that this agreement and those that will follow are elements of a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli problem.

Although the reference to 242 and 338 affords the document some grounding in international law, its meaning is ambiguous enough to be subject to ex post facto revisionism, which has indeed occurred in recent years. The passage "secure and recognized boundaries" has often been utilized to legitimize the occupation of whatever territory Israel decides is necessary for its security, in spite of the clause "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" which appears in the preamble. These areas could include some or all of the following: East Jerusalem and its surroundings, land along the length of the Green Line, especially at Israel's narrowest point and in the denser settlement areas, some of the high ground in the West Bank hills, and the strip of land on the West Bank's eastern frontier running parallel to the Jordan River.(2)

ARTICLE III: ELECTIONS

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

   The key word in this passage is "political." This carries the implication that the Council will become the nascent political authority for "the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." It is unclear how this affects the status of the PLO as the political representative of all the Palestinian people, inside and outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a status recognized by the Israeli prime...