Limits on the Reach of Contract Law
Author | Val Ricks |
Pages | 396-423 |
396
Chapter 9. Limits on the
Reach of Contract Law
A. Public Policy
Hazel Virginia REHAK v. Archie S. MATHIS (1977)
Supreme Court of Georgia
BOWLES, Justice.
[¶1] This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Floyd County
granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
[¶2] The appellant, Hazel Rehak, filed an action in equity against the appellee,
Archie Mathis, and in her complaint alleged that the parties, in 1957, had jointly
purchased a home in Floyd County, Georgia. For the first two years, 1957 and 1958,
she paid all installment payments upon the home. From 1959 through February of
1975, the appellant and appellee each made one-half of the monthly installment
payments on the house. The complaint further alleged that both parties lived and
cohabited together in the house for 18 years, during which time, appellant alleged
she “cooked for, cleaned for, and in general cared for the comforts, needs, and
pleasures of the (appellee) . . . while they cohabited together.” The appellant alleged
that on numerous occasions the appellee told her that the house belonged to them
jointly and that for the rest of her life he would support and take care of her and her
financial needs.
[¶3] In December of 1975, the appellee moved out of the house and told the
appellant to vacate the home. The appellee refused to pay her anything for her
purchase money interest in the house or for the services rendered to the appellee
over the 18-year period during which they cohabited.
[¶4] The appellant, in January of 1976, filed a verified petition for divorce
against appellee in the Superior Court of Floyd County, wherein the appellant
admitted that she cohabited with the appellee for 18 years. Following repeated
hearings and negotiations between the parties, the appellant filed a motion to
dismiss the divorce action with prejudice. The court entered an order dismissing the
complaint, said dismissal to affect the question of marriage only and in no way to
affect any future civil suit of equitable action by either party against the other.
397
[¶5] Following the dismissal, the appellant brought the present equitable action
seeking an award of $100.00 a month for the 18 years that she lived with and took
care of the needs of the appellee and additionally sought exclusive title and
possession to the house in Floyd County.
[¶6] Subsequent to the filing of the complaint a motion for summary judgment
was made by the appellee, which motion was supported by a brief. The appellant
filed no response to appellee’s motion. The court entered an order granting the
appellee’s motion for summary judgment for reason that there was no genuine issue
as to any material fact and, therefore, appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The appellant appeals that order.
[¶7] Summary judgment will be granted only where there is no issue as to any
material fact, and as a matter of law the moving party is entitled to a judgment.
Code Ann. s 81A-156(c). * * * *
[¶8] In the instant case, the appellee moved for a summary judgment contending
“the pleadings in this case conclusively show that all property and monetary claims
asserted thereon are based upon a meretricious relationship, which claims are not
recoverable because contrary to the public policy of this State.”
[¶9] It is well settled that neither a court of law nor a court of equity will lend its
aid to either party to a contract founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration.
Code Ann. s 20-501; Wellmaker v. Roberts, 213 Ga. 740, 101 S.E.2d 712 (1958);
Watkins v. Nugen, 118 Ga. 372, 45 S.E. 262 (1903).
[¶10] The appellee’s motion for summary judgment was supported by the verified
pleadings in the former complaint for divorce between the parties, and the pleadings
in the present case. The parties being unmarried and the appellant having admitted
the fact of cohabitation in both verified pleadings, this would constitute immoral
consideration under Code Ann. s 20-501, and it was appellant’s dut y to come
forward and introduce evidence which would rebut that conclusion. Appellant
having failed to introduce any rebuttal evidence sufficient to show to the court that
there was a genuine issue of fact to be decided, it was not error for the court to grant
summary judgment in favor of the appellee.
[¶11] Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except HALL and HILL, JJ., who dissent.
HILL, Justice, dissenting.
[¶1] Courts normally do not deny judicial relief to sinners. If that were the rule,
the caseload in all courts would be drastically reduced. Courts normally do not deny
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