The limits of credulity (presidential address).

• Author: Beckman, Gary
• Position: Interpretation of historical writings

However, skepticism on principle is neither a more estimable nor a more productive intellectual attitude than the credulity with which it is frequently blended in the simpler minds. Marc Bloch (1) For Bill Hallo Historiography has often been the subject of the after-dinner talk delivered by the scholar whom you have honored with your presidency. For instance, in 1952 Egyptologist John A. Wilson discussed "Oriental History" of early and modern times; (2) in 1992 Jack Lassner spoke of the difficulties facing the historian of early Islam; (3) in 1993 Thorkild Jacobsen addressed us on the use of Sumerian religious texts as historical sources; (4) in 1997 Jack Sasson set out the problems attendant upon reconstructing the events of the reign of King Zimri-Lim of Mari; (5) and in 1989 my teacher Bill Hallo considered "The Limits of Skepticism." (6) Bill argued forcefully that the historian of the early Near East should accord greater trust to the ancient narrative sources than has been customary in the wake of the "linguistic turn" (7) and stressed that above all "we should not expect to know more than the ancient sources knew, but we can hope to know more than they chose to tell." (8) I am in agreement with Bill that the scholar must not dismiss any relevant textual evidence out of hand, but as a confirmed skeptic, I will offer here some observations in support of adopting a rigorous and hypercritical approach to the sources.

Any consideration of historiography must open with the question: what is history? (9) To begin with, we must distinguish between history and the past, that is, the humans who lived before us and their institutions and activities. The past in all of its manifold aspects is gone forever and cannot be retrieved. (10) History is a reconstruction of elements of the past in the mind of a human being of a later generation. It should be stressed that in principle there will exist multiple histories of any given period, each congruent to the mental world, social purposes, and sources available to the person who creates it. Thus the history of the Sargonic kings of the twenty-fourth and twenty-third pre-Christian centuries written in Babylonia during the second millennium B.C.E. differs from a history of the same dynasty produced in Italy or the United States in the twentieth century C.E. (11)

Bill is fond of quoting (12) Johan Huizinga to the effect that "[h]istory is the intellectual form in which a society renders account to itself of its past." (13) This is true, as far as it goes, but why do societies even perceive a need to render such account? Historian of England J. H. Plumb remarks that "[history] is always a created ideology with a purpose, designed to control individuals, or motivate societies, or inspire classes." (14) Furthermore, it "was needed to strengthen the purpose of those who possessed power and, equally important, to reconcile those who lacked it." (15) In practice, the sanctioned history of a social group conveys the message that the current organization and power distribution of that society is the inevitable result of the progress of events, a function exemplified by the current vulgar belief that the triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy in Eurasia after 1989 has brought human political development to its end. (16) Alternatively, some idealized future or past state of affairs may be held up as a goal to be achieved, as in Christian eschatology or Stalinist visions of a communist utopia under construction on the one hand, (17) or as in German National Socialist nostalgia for a premodern society purportedly free of internal conflict on the other. (18)

Furthermore, each individual member of society fashions his or her own history as part of the construction of identity. (19) This idiosyncratic history will be an amalgam of elements drawn from personal experience and components of one of the available histories of the encompassing society, suitably adapted to the situation of that individual. For example, people of modest means from my parents' generation in America often recall the Great Depression as a time when they struggled against personal hardship while President Franklin Delano Roosevelt waged a larger battle on their behalf to repair the national economy. In contrast, some of our conservative and/or very wealthy fellow citizens may consider the 1930s as a period in which their values and interests were endangered by the legislative and administrative programs of that same F.D.R.

As an historian, I am not in a position to declare which of these views is "true"; I may only decide which--if either--better fits the history of the United States I generate for myself. But what I wish to illustrate here with this pairing is that each of these plausible histories of the 1930s inserts personal memories into a societal frame, in this case the common schoolbook attribution to American presidents of the capacity to determine the destiny of their times (as in "the Roosevelt era" (20)). This emphasis on the "great man," in preference to social or economic factors, as the shaping force of history is part of a widely accepted American ideology.

Thus it is imperative--and indeed inevitable--that a society and each individual member thereof develop histories of that societal group. But why do we feel called to construct histories of other cultures, particularly of those long dead? It is a commonplace that the past experience of even a foreign culture might offer paradigms for our own individual or group conduct, that we may draw "lessons from history." This is certainly the justification often given during the Graeco-Roman period for the contemplation of the past. (21) I may, however, be permitted to doubt the practical value of reasoned historical considerations for the determination of the conduct of nations. More often than not, it seems to me, national leaders and their advocates simply mine the past for precedents to justify their own policy predilections. For example, with little or no appreciation of divergent context, the dreadful consequences of the Munich agreement of 1938 have been adduced repeatedly in political debate as justification for an uncompromising stance in international disputes. (22)

I probably should not cast too much aspersion on the notion of history as teacher, however, for its widespread popularity is undoubtedly a factor in securing continued societal support for the study and teaching of history in a time of straitened economic circumstances and reduced educational budgets. But I must confess my own rather different motivation for pursuing history: simple curiosity about other times and places. I know that this impetus moves many of my colleagues as well. In addition, it affects countless members of the general public, to judge from the strong presence of popular historical productions on cable television and the nonfiction bestseller lists. There has even been a recent Turkish film featuring reenactments of the most famous events in Hittite history, interspersed with talking heads, including those of several members of this Society. (23) It seems that inquisitiveness about even the exotic past is a widespread phenomenon.

I would furthermore endorse the opinion of historian of Germany Richard Evans that "historical writing can enhance our appreciation of the human condition by bringing to life and explaining beliefs and cultures that are very different from our own, and so perhaps adding to the richness of human experience and understanding, and fostering tolerance of different cultures and belief systems in our own time." (24) So, history is good to think.

But how do those of us who create accounts of the past for the consumption of others, that is, professional historians, do so responsibly? (25) Here I will sketch my personal approach to the theory of historical inquiry. While I am hardly a postmodernist, I feel that a perusal of the writings of recent theorists of historical practice is very instructive for historians of the early Near East, if only for making us aware of the often unconscious presuppositions with which we undertake our work. (26)

Given that it is impossible to falsify an historical proposition through experiment, we must recognize that the natural sciences do not provide a viable model for historical research. (27) In my view, the historian's task is to recreate a simulacrum of the past through empathy (Verstehen), rather than to explain it...