Lights, Camera . . . Ticket: Red Light Cameras After Idris v. City of Chicago
| Publication year | 2008 |
| Citation | Vol. 10 No. 2008 |
Red light camera technology is in use in many jurisdictions throughout the United States. For some, this technology represents a powerful tool for improving road safety. For others, its use represents overreaching by governments searching for ways to generate additional revenue. In Idris v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals examined the constitutionality of Chicago's red light camera ordinance and held, in part, that the ordinance did not violate the substantive due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Going forward, the Idris decision will likely limit the effectiveness of Fourteenth Amendment challenges pursued by red light camera opponents.
The use of red light camera technology is widespread: the Federal Highway Administration identifies twenty-one states that "have considered camera technology for [law] enforcement and have either passed legislation or are considering legislation to enforce red light running with camera technology."1 The City of Chicago has "one of the largest red light camera programs in the U.S.,"2 incorporating 248 cameras at 123 intersections.3 Since the program began in November 2003, fines totaling $109 million have been collected.4 In 2008 alone, 579,560 citations were issued, totaling $44.8 million in fines.5 These statistics reveal the scope of Chicago's program and its effect on the public's pocket book.
In Idris v. City of Chicago,6 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was rational for the City of Chicago to fine the owner of the vehicle, as opposed to the vehicle driver, for a violation of the City's red light camera ordinance.7 Specifically, the Idris court rejected the ordinance challengers' argument that the "vicarious liability" component of the ordinance violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment.8 The Idris court's analysis will likely have a negative impact on future Fourteenth Amendment challenges of red light camera technology and owner liability presumptions.
Part II of this Recent Development examines the City of Chicago's red light camera ordinance as it relates to the facts of Idris. Part III analyzes the court's application of the rational basis test and the tenuous connection between the means and ends of the City's ordinance within the innocent owner context. Part Iv examines the remaining options available to red light camera opponents in light of Idris. This Recent Development concludes by examining the impact this decision will have on the use of this technology and on future litigants who wish to challenge it under the U.S. Constitution.
Given that federal courts have largely "avoided deciding the constitutionality" of red light camera programs,9 Idris may serve as a benchmark for how federal courts deal with Fourteenth Amendment issues created by this technology.10 At a minimum, Idris suggests that any future Fourteenth Amendment challenge of Chicago's red light camera program will likely be unsuccessful.
In 2003, the City of Chicago instituted a red light camera program.11 The pertinent components of the red light ordinance at issue in Idris include: (1) the creation of a civil, non-criminal, penalty;12 (2) a presumption that the registered owner of the vehicle is liable for a violation;13 (3) the use of photographic images of the vehicle as "prima facie evidence of a violation;"14 and (4) the limited and narrow applicability of available defenses.15 Each of these components directly contributed to the conflict at issue in Idris.16
The distinguishing characteristic of the Idris litigation is the ordinance challengers' ("appellants") assertion that they were not driving at the time of the violation.17 In fact, one of the three named appellants was out of the country at the time of the alleged violation.18 Another argued that he received a ticket for a time when his vehicle was not in use.19 The third appellant simply paid the fine.20 For the Idris challengers, the fact that the ordinance did not take into consideration whether they actually committed the violation supported their position that the ordinance was unconstitutional.21
The appellants' constitutional claims focused, in part,22 on violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 Appellants claimed that the fine deprived them of their property without due process, resulting in a substantive due process violation,24 because the ordinance made it "irrelevant whether the penalized party [i.e., the owner of a car] actually violated a red traffic-signal."25 Appellants also claimed that an equal protection violation resulted from the inconsistent treatment of various vehicle ownership groups;26 specifically, owners that produce valid leases are not subject to liability.27 The Idris court's treatment of these claims could have implications beyond the Seventh Circuit, because other jurisdictions also provide exceptions for lessors28 and consider it irrelevant whether the penalized party actually committed the violation.29
The substantive due process and equal protection claims in Idris were subject to a difficult, if not impossible, obstacle.30 Specifically, a strict scrutiny analysis of the ordinance is unavailable because neither a fundamental liberty interest nor a suspect class exists within the Idris context.31 A fundamental liberty interest is lacking because the property interest at issue, a ninety-dollar civil penalty, is too modest.32 An equal protection violation is not present, given that the parties do not even attempt to argue that a suspect class exists.33 Consequently, both the substantive due process and equal protection claims are subject to rational basis review.34
Under the rational basis test "a law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose."35 Thus, as applied in Idris, the red light camera ordinance must have an objective that is legitimate for the City of Chicago to pursue.36 If legitimate, Chicago's objective is not required to be "compelling or important."37 Furthermore, the means used by Chicago to fulfill its objective need only be reasonable or rational in light of the objective.38
The burden is on the ordinance challengers to (1) show that there are no conceivable legitimate purposes or (2) prove that the means are so arbitrary as to be an unreasonable or irrational method for attaining the City's objective.39 This is an extremely difficult burden for the appellants because rational basis review "employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task."40 Consequently, the rational basis test allows potentially "[u]nfair laws . . . to stand because a conceivable legitimate purpose can be identified for virtually any law."41
As the district court states in Idris, "[t]he rational basis test under substantive due process is identical to the rational basis test under equal protection."42 For that reason, the first step in analyzing Idris is to identify a conceivably legitimate purpose for the City's ordinance.43 Chicago argues that it has a legitimate interest in "enforcing its traffic regulations."44 By extension, this interest reasonably includes public safety and efficient law enforcement components.45
Given that running a red light is relatively dangerous,46 Chicago's interest in public safety will ensure survival under rational basis review regardless of whether the innocent vehicle owner or violating driver challenges the relationship between the City's purpose and the red light camera ordinance.47 Avoiding consideration of any underlying safety justification,48 the Idris court found that photographic evidence of the violation and the presumption of owner liability are rational because it reduces the costs of law enforcement,49 increases violation detection,50 and prevents owners from easily escaping liability.51 The court also found that the distinction between lessors and owners is rational because owners can identify the violating driver and exercise control over that individual.52
Nevertheless, the rationales identified by the Idris court are seemingly peripheral considering that safety is the widely advertized basis for public support of red light camera programs.53 Unfortunately, the rationality of holding an innocent owner liable becomes tenuous within the safety context, because the non-owner drivers who create the safety risk are only indirectly affected by the direct punishment of the vehicle's registered owner.54 In effect, this approach creates thousands of non-owner violators, which the system merely assumes will be deterred from running red lights by the owner.55
Given that public support relies heavily on a safety justification,56 a meaningful assessment of Chicago's ordinance should require an evaluation of whether the use of this technology is an arbitrary and unreasonable method for improving safety.57 Using red light cameras as a means to improve safety requires consideration of at least three possible criticisms.58 First, red light cameras are frequently shown to increase the risks associated with intersections.59 Specifically, red light camera intersections allegedly increase rates of rear end accidents, presumably because drivers attempt to stop suddenly in reaction to a signal change;60 whereas, the technology is intended to reduce those accidents in which a red light runner is hit in the side by another vehicle traveling perpendicular to the red light violator.61 Second, the technology has been shown to be the object of manipulation: distortion of safety improvements,62 shortening of traffic signals,63 and selection of intersections for fine-generating potential rather than positive safety effects.64 Finally, the ordinance itself fails to create a...
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