"letters I've Written, Never Meaning to Send ...": Conditional Relevance, Evidence Rule 104(b), and Mark Edwards' Curious Murder Trial

• Publication year: 2009

§ 26 Alaska L. Rev. 171. "LETTERS I'VE WRITTEN, NEVER MEANING TO SEND ...": CONDITIONAL RELEVANCE, EVIDENCE RULE 104(B), AND MARK EDWARDS' CURIOUS MURDER TRIAL

Alaska Law Review
Volume 26
Cited: 26 Alaska L. Rev. 171

"LETTERS I'VE WRITTEN, NEVER MEANING TO SEND ...": CONDITIONAL RELEVANCE, EVIDENCE RULE 104(B), AND MARK EDWARDS' CURIOUS MURDER TRIAL

James Fayette Stephanie Busalacchi ^{[*] [**]}

Abstract

With the 2002 double homicide case of State v. Edwards as their backdrop, the Authors discuss Alaska Rule of Evidence 104(b) and the concept of conditional relevance. Using the example of a letter written by one of the victims in the Edwards case, the Authors explain how, although there was no evidence that the letter was ever mailed to or read by the defendant, the prosecutor correctly argued that the letter should be admitted into evidence at the criminal trial. The Authors then provide a history of Rule 104(b), discuss common applications of the rule, and present a guide for practitioners on how to conduct a Rule 104(b) analysis.

Table of Contents

Introduction................................................................................................172

I. Mark Edwards' Trial......................................................................174

A. Factual Background...................................................................174

B.Analysis of Admissibility of Testimony About the

Letter's Content..........................................................................178

C.Judge Andrews' Ruling.............................................................180

II. Admissibility of Conditionally Relevant Evidence Analyzed: Rule-by-Rule, Step-by-Step.........................................181

A. Commonly Encountered Conditional Relevance Examples.....................................................................................181

B. Step-by-Step Analysis Under Rule 104(b)..............................183

C. Rule 104(b) and Huddleston .......................................................185

D. Historical Development of the Rule........................................187

III. Common Trial Applications..........................................................192

A. Disputed Motive Evidence.......................................................192

B. Disputed Statement of Defendant ...........................................194

C. other Relevant Acts and prior Crimes: Rule 404(b)..............195

1. Prior Domestic Violence Offenses ..........................................195

2. Drug Crimes ..........................................................................197

3. Spoliation: Witness Threats, Intimidation and Cover-up Behavior ..................................................................................199

D. Authentication............................................................................199

E. Defense Applications.................................................................204

1. Self-defense; Awareness of Opponent's Prior, Specific Violent Acts ............................................................................204

2. Prior False Claim of Sexual Assault .......................................205

Conclusion...................................................................................................210

Introduction

How could a prosecutor ever hope to introduce into evidence the contents of a letter that no one can testify was ever sent or read? A letter that may have been the motive for a double-murder, or could just as easily never have been mailed? This quandary is precisely what a prosecutor faced several years ago in the murder trial of Mark Edwards. Trial attorneys should understand the reasoning behind the trial judge's ruling because they will gain valuable insight into a deceptively common evidentiary nuance: conditional relevance.

State v. Edwards ^[1] was a domestic violence double-homicide trial held in Anchorage in August 2002. Edwards was accused of murdering his estranged ex-wife and her roommate. The prosecutor offered evidence that, a few days before the murders, Edwards' ex-wife wrote a letter to Edwards in which she told him that she intended to leave him and Alaska forever.

The prosecutor offered testimony from a woman-a close friend of Mark Edwards' ex-wife-who read the letter just days before the murder. This witness testified that Edwards' ex-wife had written the letter and placed it in a stamped envelope, but had not decided whether she would mail it. The prosecutor's theory was that Edwards' ex-wife mailed the letter and that Edwards received it and read it. The prosecutor argued that the letter angered Edwards and provided his motive for the murders. But the prosecutor faced a daunting obstacle: no witness could testify that Edwards' ex-wife actually mailed the letter or that Edwards actually received or read it.

Given these facts, how could a judge ever admit evidence of the letter's content? What evidence rule governs admissibility? What threshold burden must the proponent sustain to trigger admissibility? How should the judge rule? What findings must a judge make to protect the case from appellate mischief and the specter of reversal? This Article discusses the answers to these questions, which are found in the liberal threshold for admissibility of conditionally relevant evidence in Alaska Rule of Evidence 104(b).

Seemingly obscure, Evidence Rule 104(b) is seldom cited in Alaska street-crime prosecution practice. However, the rule applies to a deceptively wide spectrum of evidentiary issues, many of which arise on a daily basis in Alaska criminal jury trial practice. As this Article explains, Rule 104(b)'s minimal threshold standard - "evidence sufficient to support a finding" - applies to disputed prosecution motive evidence, disputed Rule 404(b) acts, and a defendant's disputed admissions. Criminal trial attorneys frequently encounter all of these situations.

One would think that criminal practitioners-especially prosecutors-would have Rule 104(b) "in their back pocket." One would think that trial judges would be as familiar with Rule 104(b) as they are with the law of hearsay exceptions. But, in the Authors' opinion, this is not the case. ^[2]

Part I of this Article discusses the Edwards trial, which provides a compelling example of conditional relevance and an application of Evidence Rule 104(b). Part II analyzes the doctrine of conditional relevance, explains the rule's relationship to other evidentiary rules, and provides a practitioner's practical, step-by-step guide to using the rule. Part III discusses Rule 104(b)'s common trial applications.

I. Mark Edwards' Trial

A. Factual Background ^[3]

In November 1998, Mona Edwards filed for divorce from her husband, Mark, a man with a history of substance abuse and violent behavior. Mona moved out of the couple's small house in the Fairview area of Anchorage, and moved in with a friend, Maela Crabtree. Crabtree's home was located a few miles away from Fairview in Anchorage's Spenard neighborhood. Mark and Mona saw each other periodically in the weeks following the divorce filing. Mark wanted to reconcile; Mona did not.

on December 15, 1998, Mark spoke with Mona in the driveway of Maela's home. They argued after Mona refused to take a walk with Mark. Mark pushed Mona down on the driveway, spat at her, raised his hand, and extended his thumb and forefinger in an "L" shape. Ominously, Mark pointed his index finger at Mona and said "pop!," as if he had pulled the trigger on a gun, and then walked away.

That evening, Mona drove to the Anchorage courthouse with her close friend, Arlene Sanchez, to seek an emergency restraining order against Mark. Following a hearing, the order was issued and Mona and Arlene returned to Arlene's house in East Anchorage where they sat and talked. As they talked, Mona produced a letter from her pocketbook. Arlene later testified that Mona showed her a handwritten letter folded inside an unsealed envelope addressed to Mark at his Fairview address.(fn4)The envelope was stamped. Mona handed Arlene the completed letter and asked her to read it.

Arlene testified that Mona told Mark in the letter that she "hoped he would get on with his life and be happy, and to leave her alone, and to let her go." Mona wrote that she was leaving Alaska and returning to her family on the East Coast, and that she would stop paying the insurance for Mark's truck at the end of the month-barely two weeks away. Arlene testified that Mona closed the letter by telling Mark "she wanted [her] gun back." ^[5]

Arlene and her daughter both advised Mona that she should not mail the letter because they were afraid that it would anger Mark. Arlene testified that Mona did not say that she had decided to send the letter, but Mona did not say that she had decided against sending it, either. ^[6]

Three days later, on the evening of Friday, December 18th, Mark Edwards drove to Mona and Maela's home with a .22 caliber, two-shot Derringer-the same weapon that witnesses said Mark bought for Mona years earlier. When Maela answered the door, Mark forced his way inside and shot Maela once in the face, killing her. Mark then locked the front door from the inside and walked down to Mona's basement bedroom, where Mona was asleep. Mark shot Mona once in the head, killing her. Mark then re-loaded his...