Lessons Unlearned.

AuthorDonnelly, Thomas
PositionAmerican military operations in Panama, the Persian Gulf, and southeastern Europe

A Comparison of Three American Wars

OPERATION Just Cause, code name for the invasion of Panama in December 1989, was the first serious exercise of military power by the United States during the post-Cold War era. It would prove to be everything that subsequent U.S. military operations were not: a rapid, decisive application of overwhelming might that removed a petty tyrant from power, left a lasting imprint on local and regional politics, and brought democracy to an oppressed people. Given the peculiar pattern of U.S. military operations since 1989--whereby military power has been employed in an increasingly halting and feckless manner, producing less and less of enduring political value--one cannot help but wonder why the campaign has not been enshrined as a paradigm for the American way of war.

Just Cause proved to be a minor masterpiece in the art of high command. This is remarkable for two reasons: first, because American strategy and policy in Panama and, more broadly, in Central America have historically been reactive and short-sighted; and, second, because the architects of American military operations have moved cautiously, even timidly ever since. Even those in the Bush administration who oversaw the storming of Panama later lost their taste for boldness. As well as this, in the strictly military sense, Just Cause provided a revealing glimpse of the operational, tactical and technological prowess of the U.S. military. It was in Panama, after all, that the highly competent force, resurrected from the ashes of Vietnam, and trained and equipped through the Reagan build-up of the 1980s, first revealed itself.

Just Cause was fought during the small hours of December 20, 1989, and the combat portion of the operation was essentially completed by noon, though it took until January 3, 1990 to seize Manuel Noriega, who had gone into hiding when the invasion began. The operation was a classic coup de main, an attempt to "take down" not only the Panamanian military but its political base in one swift blow. Success came at a comparatively low cost--26 American deaths (including 23 soldiers) and 500 to 600 Panamanian fatalities--especially given the fact that a substantial portion of the fighting took place in the crowded slums of Panama City. Yet the combat phase of the operation was but one part of the story. The majority of dead Panamanians were civilians, not soldiers, many lost to the indiscriminate fire of the Panamanian Defense Forces. Though the war lasted less than a day, it triggered widespread looting and arson in Panama City, leaving an estimated 10,000 Panamanians homeless, according to the U.S. Agency for Inte rnational Development. The complete pacification of the country took several additional weeks.

The campaign began with nearly simultaneous assaults on twenty-seven targets throughout Panama. Though many of these sites were clustered in and around Panama City and the canal zone, they included a substantial effort at Rio Hato, a Panamanian airfield and military base about seventy miles west of Panama City on the Pacific Coast. While the United States had substantial forces stationed in Panama prior to the invasion, many of these were performing various desk assignments at U.S. Southern Command. A sizeable portion of the combat forces were dispatched directly from the United States, including parachute assault teams from the army's 75th Ranger Regiment and 82nd Airborne Division. The bulk of the force was comprised of army light and mechanized infantry supported with helicopters. As well, Marines, Navy SEALs and a variety of other special operations forces played key supporting roles--along with the F-117 "Stealth" fighter, a large fleet of air force airlifters and tanker aircraft. In all, about 27,000 U .S. troops participated directly in Operation Just Cause, while thousands more supported it.

The Art of Bureaucratic Warfare

STUDYING the events that led up to the invasion of Panama, it is surprising that it all came out so well. In 1989 American policy toward that country was a shambles, the result of years of incompetent and neglectful stewardship. During the later years of the Reagan administration, American policymakers seemed unsure what to make of Noriega. At the same time, Noriega's grip on Panamanian society was weakening, as was the status of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF). Corruption within the PDF, along with a growing desire among Panamanians for more open, accountable and democratic government, had created an increasingly inhospitable environment for Americans living in the country. As his position worsened, Noriega turned to anti-Americanism. To supplement his power base within...

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