Lessons Learned from U.K. Efforts to Deradicalize Terror Offenders.

• Author: Weeks, Douglas

The attack by Usman Khan that killed Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones during a conference at Fishmongers Hall in the vicinity of Westminster Bridge in London on November 29, 2019, restarted an avalanche of debate over whether convicted terrorists could be 'deradicalized.' His two victims were involved with the organizers of the conference, Learning Together, "a trailblazing prison education program developed by academics at the University of Cambridge's Institute of Criminology." Khan had been invited to the event as an alumnus of the program. (1) The debate was further fueled when Sudesh Amman carried out an attack in London on February 2, 2020, stabbing two before he was shot and killed by police. Both offenders had previous terrorism convictions: Khan for his role (before his arrest in 2010) in a group that planned to bomb the London Stock Exchange, and Amman for possessing documents containing terrorist information and disseminating terrorist publications. (2)

Following the attack by Khan, questions began to emerge regarding the early release of terrorism prisoners, and in the aftermath of Amman's attack, the U.K. government passed emergency legislation ending early release (a) and requiring all terror-related prisoners to serve at least two-thirds of their prison sentence. (3) Currently, the House of Lords is completing its review of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (HL Bill 175), which in part increases prison sentences, increases notification requirements, increases the time prisoners spend on license, sets stricter standards for release, requires offenders to submit to regular polygraph tests, removes the two-year restriction on Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, and increases the oversight and management of terrorism offenders upon release. (4)

Although the attacks by Khan and Amman prompted rhetoric from the U.K. government to once again 'get tough on terrorism,' the response had little to do with 'deradicalization.' Rather than seek informed and inventive ways to minimize the threat of 'extreme reactionary absolutism,' (b) the response became a blunt tool that mostly focused on increased sentencing to keep extremists off the streets.

Khan asked for deradicalization help as early as October 2012 but was not able to access a mentor. (5) The policy at that time was to wait until incarcerated terrorist offenders got closer to their release date before authorities would grant them access to a 'deradicalization' mentor. The rationale for managing terrorism offenders that way during that period was that any progress made too early would likely be lost as the individual continued to associate with other radicalized inmates in prison. (6) Thus, it was better to wait until the end of their prison sentence before making any attempt to 'deradicalize' them. In Khan's case, he did ultimately participate in two deradicalization programs: the Healthy Identity Intervention Programme while he was in prison and the Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) upon his release. (7) However, despite assessments that he was positively reengaging in society, those programs were insufficient in the long term to immunize him from violence.

Amman, on the other hand, rejected the opportunity to participate in a 'deradicalization' program of any kind or have any engagement with a mentor. (8) As a result, Amman was assessed to have a high likelihood for violence, which is why he was under constant surveillance by the authorities following his release. (9)

Thus, although both Khan and Amman ultimately went on to commit violent acts, their cases are quite different. Khan's attack was widely reported initially as an anomaly by the press whereas Amman's attack was considered predictable by the authorities. In the aftermath, no one explained what triggered Khan's murderous violence or what interventions could have been implemented to mitigate the threat. However, with two attacks in just over two months, the narrative changed after Amman's attack to one that supported the idea that Amman and Khan were simply the latest examples that terrorist offenders cannot be 'deradicalized.'

The first part of this article provides an overview of U.K. deradicalization efforts. To understand 'deradicalization' efforts in Britain, appreciation of its fundamental architecture is needed. Through that lens, a better understanding of both the Khan and Amman cases is possible, as well as the highly complex environment that terror offenders and mentors alike must navigate. The next part of the article provides perspective on the recidivism rates of terrorism offenders, and the arguments by some that 'deradicalization' does not work, therefore longer prison sentences are warranted. It next provides some understanding about what leads to failure and what leads to success when it comes to the relationship between a 'deradicalization mentor' and mentee. It then provides some insight through the lens of one of the United Kingdom's longest-running and most successful mentoring companies, The Unity Initiative, about Usman Khan, its relationship with the Home Office, and why it chose to sever its ties with the government, before offering some concluding observations.

An Overview of U.K. Deradicalization Efforts

Since 2005, the U.K. government has attempted to identify and intervene with individuals considered at risk of radicalization, those considered radicalized extremists, and those convicted of terrorism-related offenses. (10) Although different schemes have been implemented over the past 16 years, currently those considered 'at risk' are managed under The Channel Programme while those in prison or on license are managed under the Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP), which supplements a deradicalization program called Healthy Identity Intervention (HII). (c)

In brief, The Channel Programme was first introduced in 2012. (11) The program is voluntary, typically operates in the pre-criminal space, and is administered as a safeguarding tool. Those managed under Channel are provided bespoke 'interventions' designed to divert 'vulnerable people' away from whatever influence might be drawing them toward radicalization or terrorism. (12) Examples include education, job training, sports, housing assistance, and drug and alcohol support. (13) In short, the program provides personalized enticement designed to encourage those deemed at risk to choose a path away from potential violence to one that is more attractive to the individual based on his/her self-interest.

The Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) was first introduced in 2016. DDP is a mandatory program that bridges the Prevent/Pursue (d) workstreams and is designed to reduce the risk posed by individuals involved in terrorism or suspected terrorism related activities. (14) The idea behind DDP is that it attempts to dissuade individuals from participating in whatever terror-related activity they are involved in (desist) and to abandon (disengage) whatever radical ideological beliefs they might have. (15) To accomplish that task, DDP relies on a three-pronged approach that includes psychological, theological, and ideological mentoring. (16) In other words, DDP attempts to have individuals develop an identity that is more accepting of others, understand their religion in a more mainstream way, and reject any ideology that is inconsistent with British values. (e) During the time individuals are receiving psychological, theological, and ideological mentoring, they are also provided with practical mentoring (job hunting, housing assistance, filling out forms, etc.) to support an individual's reintegration into society. Like The Channel Programme, DDP is conceived as an individual support mechanism for individuals but with added teeth because it is mandatory.

Both Channel and DDP are not without criticism. Although government sources are quick to point out that both programs work, quantifying that assessment has been elusive. (17) Government statistics from 2018 to 2019 demonstrate that only a small number (just under 10%) of all referrals to Channel are ultimately provided Channel support. Many (28%) are not deemed to be at risk, most (49%) are referred to other agencies (education, family, friends, police, health, community services, etc.), and roughly half of those who are offered support reject it. (18) Despite the low numbers, the U.K. government's claim of success is not wholly unwarranted. For those that willingly...