Less Developed Countries, Tourism Investments and Local Economic Development

Published date01 February 2013
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12012
Date01 February 2013
AuthorGuido Candela,Rainer Andergassen
Less Developed Countries, Tourism Investments and
Local Economic Development
Rainer Andergassen and Guido Candela*
Abstract
This paper analyzes the forward linkages of a multinational’s investment in a resort that kicks off tourism
activity in a less developed country. We show that, under quite natural assumptions, overnight stays are
increasing in the number of differentiated tourism-related goods and services.These goods and services, if
supplied by the local community,represent forward linkages of FDI in tourism. We investigate the multina-
tional’s incentives to promote, reduce or eliminate these forward linkages and the effectiveness of some
policy instruments available to a local government to leverage on the presence of FDI and to stimulate
domestic entrepreneurship.
1. Introduction
Many policy-makers view foreign direct investments (FDI) as a way to further the
process of wealth creation in the host country and to jump-start the development
process in less developed countries (LDCs). In terms of economic policy this means
creating a favorable economic environment that can attract FDI, for example, with
special tax treatment, exemption from import duties or direct subsidies.1Academic lit-
erature studies the welfare effects of FDI on both the host and the home country,
unveiling potential channels of welfare gains as well as welfare losses.2
In this paper we study the effects of a multinational’s tourism investment on local
economic development. FDI is often considered to be one of the most effective means
for harnessing the development of capital, infrastructure and knowledge and for
gaining access to global marketing in tourism. Therefore, LDCs often view the attrac-
tion of these investments as a leading tourism and economic development strategy;
however, the theoretical and empirical implications of tourism FDI on the host
country have not been fully studied and understood.3
FDI, which is mostly concentrated in hotels and restaurants, is most important for
emerging tourism economies, while it is relatively less important for developed and
mature tourism markets. UNCTAD (2007) documents the strong impact of FDI on
consumer demand in new destinations. For example, FDI played a major role in the
tourism take-off in Tunisia in the 1970s, when investors such as Club Med invented
the beach resort concept. In a similar vein, despite investments in the 1970s by the
Dominican government aimed at creating a tourism industry, the real boom did not
begin until after the massive influx of FDI in the 1980s. UNCTAD (2007) also docu-
ments the cases of Bhutan and the United Republic of Tanzania where sharp
increases in tourist arrival numbers appear to be directly linked to FDI.
* Andergassen (corresponding author): Department of Economics,University of Bologna, P.zza Scaravilli,
2, 40126 Bologna, Italy; Tel:(+39) 0512098666; Fax: (+39) 0512098040; E-mail: rainer.andergassen@unibo.it.
Candela: University of Bologna, P.zza Scaravilli, 2, 40126 Bologna,Italy. The authors would like to thank
Roberto Cellini, Antonello Scorcu and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
Review of Development Economics, 17(1), 16–33, 2013
DOI:10.1111/rode.12012
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
The challenge for policy-makers is to leverage on FDIs to foster domestic entrepre-
neurship. Such policies consist of, for example, minimizing leakages,4improving the
tourism value chain and, more generally, boosting the net value of tourism by increas-
ing tourists’ length of stay.
The role of FDI is more nuanced in tourism than in some other sectors of the
economy, and it is of greater value because it can kick off the tourism industry;
however, it is also feared because of its impact on economic and cultural independ-
ence, and its potential damage to the communities and the environment. The host
country faces the risk of foreign domination such as enclaves and other strategies in
which the multinational limits the benefits for the host country, which is therefore
unable to capitalize on such investments. This is the case, for example, of Punta Cana,
a Dominican Republic island, where transnational corporations built small enclaves
equipped with their own essential services such as power, waste and water manage-
ment and access modes (UNCTAD, 2007). Brohman (1996) argues that foreign domi-
nation and external dependency often seriously reduce tourism’s potential for
generating broadly based growth. Brohman uses the Caribbean as an example, where
a spatial polarization within both the modern tourism industry, based on resort
enclaves in the most desirable coastal locations, and the older agricultural-based
economy emerged. Battilani (2002) documents the investment strategy of a pool of
entrepreneurs led by Karim Aga Khan IV in the untouched Costa Smeralda area of
Sardinia (Italy) during the 1960s, that held the region’s tourism and as well as eco-
nomic development under tight control by acquiring a monopolistic position on the
potentially usable land and controlling the region’s administration.
We consider a multinational that builds and owns a resort in a new destination in an
LDC and study its incentives to let the local community benefit from the tourism
development. We show that under quite natural assumptions, tourists’ overnight stays
are increasing in the degree of diversification of tourism-related products and services.
Therefore, the multinational’s profits are strictly related to the variety of tourism-
related goods and services supplied. As a consequence the multinational has an incen-
tive to control the degree of product differentiation. In particular, the multinational
faces two options. On the one hand,the multinational can try to control the variety of
goods and services supplied by local firms; on the other, it can create an enclave and
directly supply the preferred variety. In the former case, in which tourism is based on
culturally authentic goods and services, we assume that each differentiated product is
produced by a single firm, and hence the number of tourism related products supplied
is a proxy for the local economic development induced by the multinational’s invest-
ments. In the latter case, in which tourism is based on a fake but authentically staged
local variety, the local community does not benefit from the tourism activity.
Our analysis focuses on these forward linkages of FDI, that is, the creation of new
markets in an LDC through the tourism product, and we neglect backward linkages
created by the multinational’s activity, that is, the effects on suppliers of intermediate
consumption goods.
In section 2 we characterize the representative consumer’s demand function for
overnight stays, consumption of differentiated tourism related products and non-
tourism related products. We show how the multinational’s profits from overnight
stays and the supply of differentiated products are related and that there exists an
optimal degree of product diversification from the multinational’s viewpoint. There-
fore, if tourism products are supplied by the local community, where the local variety
is determined by a free entry condition, then there may be too many or too few prod-
ucts from the multinational’s viewpoint. As a consequence, the multinational may
LDC, TOURISM INVESTMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT 17
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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