Legitimizing Military Growth and Conscription: The Yom Kippur Mechanism

• Published date: 01 July 2019
• Date: 01 July 2019
• Author: Mordechai Zvi Safrai
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X18754789
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Legitimizing Military

Growth and

Conscription: The Yom

Kippur Mechanism

Mordechai Zvi Safrai

1

Abstract

By the 1970s, it was clear to the western world that the days of mass armies, based

on broad conscription, were over. In Israel, however, despite the presence of some

elements similar to those which elsewhere were leading to military contraction and

a transition to all-volunteer forces, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) broadened its

conscription model and embarked on massive growth. The effects of this surprising

strategy are evident to this day, with Israel remaining almost the only conscription-

based army in the West. Analysis of the organizational discourse and processes

within the IDF in the wake of the Yom Kippur War reveals that social legitimacy is

not only a prerequisite for organizational growth and boosting of enlistment but

also, simultaneously, a product of the process. The organizational mechanisms used

by the IDF to achieve social consent are relevant for an understanding of the pro-

cesses of militarism and military buildup in our times, too.

Keywords

social legitimation, conscription, mass army, trust

The claim as to the decline of mass armies has been a cornerstone of military

sociology going back as far as the mid-1960s (Haltiner, 2006). “Mass army” is a

1

Herzog College, Alon Shvut, Israel

Corresponding Author:

Mordechai Zvi Safrai, Herzog College, 31 Kaf-Chet BeIyar Street, Alon Shvut 94300, Israel.

Email: motty.ariella@gmail.com

Armed Forces & Society

2019, Vol. 45(3) 491-510

ªThe Author(s) 2018

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X18754789

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term that creates an inherent connection between organizational size, as reflected in

the number of enlisted soldiers and budgetary scope, and the model of mandatory

conscription as a reflection of the social legitimacy enjoyed by the military (Burk,

1992; Van Doorn, 1975). The decline of mass armies thus entails a reduction in the

number of enlisted personnel and in the size of the budget, along with decreased

reliance on mandatory conscription, to the point of its abolishment, and increased

reliance on the model of a professional voluntary force.

The first western state to abolish mandatory conscription after the Second World

War was Great Britain (1963). The discussion surrounding the decline of mass

armies intensified during the 1970s—the period that is the focus of this study. Morris

Janowitz, the leading scholar in the field o f civil–military relations at the time,

announced the decline of mass armies as early as 1972. While the end of the draft

in the U.S. army, in 1974, energized research in this area, Janowitz emphasized the

importance of generalizing the phenomenon beyond the American instance and the

breakdown of trust in the wake of the Vietnam War. He argued that the decline of

mass armies was due not to economic forces forcused on budget contraction and

downsizing, but rather to social forces that led to erosion of the legitimacy of the

mandatory conscription model. These social forces, he posited, consisted of higher

levels of education, higher living standards, and the waning importance of national

values in society (Janowitz, 1972). Since these factors were common to all western

countries, the British and American armies were simply early signs of a global trend

of decline of mass armies.

Indeed, Armed Forces & Society served as a platform for scholars throughout the

world who embraced the argument for the decline of mass armies (Martin, 1977;

McArdle Kelleher, 1978; Van Doorn, 1975). These scholars agreed that the argu-

ment was valid even in those European countries where mandatory conscription

remained formally in place until the late 1990s. Indications of the decline included

reduced scope of forces, shortened durations of mandatory service and of reserves

service, lower percentages of soldiers among the population, and an increase in the

scope and types of exemptions from service. Moreover, these scholars noted that the

mandatory conscription model was coming under intensifying public attack in West-

ern countries. Hence, the forecast was that by the year 1990, most armies in Western

Europe would abolish mandatory conscription or that conscripted personnel would

comprise no more than 30%of the total military force (McArdle-Kelleher, 1978).

In sharp contrast, the Israel Defense Force (IDF), starting in 1973, in the wake of

the Yom Kippur War, embarked on a process of massive organizational growth,

expressed both in the number of enlisted personnel in the regular and reserve forces

(Gal, 1986) and in the military budget. At the same time, steps were taken to

reinforce mandatory conscription and to reduce exemptions, as we shall see below.

This development seemingly flies in the face of the prevailing view of the decline of

mass armies. Notably, the social factors enumerated by Janowitz were clearly pres-

ent in Israeli society: The level of education rose sharply between the years 1968 and

1974 (Argov, 2016), and the standard of living was continuing the steep climb that

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