Legitimate Authority in Forceful Resistance and the Consent Requirement

Published date01 December 2021
AuthorKevin K. W. Ip
DOI10.1177/1065912920975859
Date01 December 2021
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920975859
Political Research Quarterly
© 2020 University of Utah
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DOI: 10.1177/1065912920975859
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Self-Defense and Other-Defense in
Resistance Movements
Individuals bearing the blunt of injustice may permissibly
engage in a range of dissident activities with an attempt to
change certain practices, policies, or political systems, so
they could better enjoy what they are entitled to as a mat-
ter of justice (Caney 2015, 53). Their actions, which are
morally and politically motivated, should not be treated
as ordinary criminal activities but as a form of resistance.
Gene Sharp (2012) identified nearly two hundred meth-
ods of nonviolent resistance such as marches, walk-outs,
economic boycotts, strikes, and other forms of non-coop-
eration which could be employed to undermine dictator-
ships. However, resisters may sometimes engage in
forceful resistance, which involves the deliberate use of
force to physically threaten, harm, or even kill their oppo-
nents. Examples include political riots, vigilantism, and
armed insurgency.
Resistance campaigns are often divisive among the
people. During the American Revolution, for instance,
“almost certainly a majority of the population [was] peo-
ple who were dubious, afraid, uncertain, indecisive, many
of whom felt that there was nothing at stake that could
justify involving themselves and their families in extreme
hazard [and] suffering” (Shy 1976, 215–16). Empirical
studies have suggested that in recent decades, most
domestic insurgencies have received active support from
only small minorities—ranging from 3 to 20 percent—of
the relevant population. Most ordinary people prefer to
distance themselves from insurgents and to remain neu-
tral, as their very survival is at stake (Kalyvas 2006, 103–
104). In almost every resistance campaign, there are
profound disagreements regarding proper strategies, the
prospect of success, and the ultimate goals of the move-
ment, among other issues. Moreover, many resistance
campaigns are decentralized and internally diverse.
Nonviolent campaigns often have violent subgroups
engaging in violent activities. For instance, during South
Africa’s struggle against the Apartheid, nonviolent mobi-
lization coexisted with uMkhonto we Sizwe, the armed
wing of the African National Congress (Chenoweth,
Perkoski, and Kang 2017, 1954). Furthermore, the insti-
tutions and processes through which the insurgents could
obtain a clear mandate from the population are typically
absent in the circumstances leading to resistance.
975859
PRQXXX10.1177/1065912920975859Political Research QuarterlyIp
research-article2020
1Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
Corresponding Author:
Kevin K. W. Ip, Department of Government & International Studies,
Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong.
Email: ipkawai@hkbu.edu.hk
Legitimate Authority in Forceful
Resistance and the Consent Requirement
Kevin K. W. Ip1
Abstract
Individual victims of injustice may permissibly engage in a range of dissident activities to challenge unjust practices,
policies, or institutions, so they could better enjoy their entitlements as a matter of justice. Resisters typically claim
to engage in resistance for a larger group of victims, but the conditions leading to resistance tend to prevent them
from obtaining a clear mandate from their “constituents.” In recent debates on legitimate authority to use defensive
force, several theorists argue that such authority requires actual and informed consent of the victims on whose
behalf resistance is undertaken. This article argues against that view. Two interpretations of the consent requirement
are examined. In the first, consent of the people is measured by popular support for a resistance movement. In the
second, consent is regarded as a kind of moral resource that can serve to justify defensive force. After refuting the
arguments in support of the consent requirement, this article develops an alternative account of legitimate authority
in forceful resistance which is not based on consent. It identifies a set of criteria for evaluating the insurgents’ claim
to legitimate authority.
Keywords
Injustice, resistance, legitimate authority, armed rebellion, consent, political representation
Article
2021, Vol. 74(4) 1168 –1180

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