Legislators as Lobbyists

• Author: Hye Young You,Melinda N. Ritchie
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12221
• Published date: 01 February 2019
• Date: 01 February 2019

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LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 44, 1, February 2019

DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12221

MELINDA N. RITCHIE

University of California, Riverside

HY E YOUNG YOU

New York University

Legislators as Lobbyists

Public policy is produced by elected and unelected officials and through

the interactions of branches of government. We consider how such interactions

affect policy implementation and representation. We argue that legislators try

to influence bureaucratic decisions through direct communication with federal

agencies, and that such contact is effective and has consequences for policy out-

comes. We provide empirical evidence of this argument using original data about

direct communication between members of Congress and the U.S. Department

of Labor (DOL) along with decisions made by the DOL regarding trade and

redistributive policies. We find that direct contacts influence DOL decisions, and

the agency is more likely to reverse previous decisions when requested to do so

by legislators. Our results challenge key assumptions and findings in the previous

literature and have important implications for interbranch relations and informal

means of control over the implementation of national policy.

My constituents don’t need a go-between to get my atten-

tion. Why do you waste your money on a lobbyist when I’m

being paid to be your senator? I was for anything that bene-

fits West Virginia, and I was always going to be supportive.

(Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), 1989)

The conventional understanding of representation focuses on

the relationship betwe en legislators and their constitu ents. Yet, pub-

lic policy is made and implemented by both elected and unelected

officials and through the interactions of institutions and branches

of government. Congress, for example, is dependent on federal

agencies to implement legislation (Dodd and Schott 1979; Eskridge

and Ferejohn 1992; Lowi 1969), but agencies also have the incentive

to build support among the m any diverse intere sts within Congress

to safeguard their budgets and programs (Arnold 1979; Carpenter

© 2018 Washing ton University in St. Louis

66 Melinda N. Ritchie and Hye Young You

2001; Fiorina 1977). Does this i nterdependent relationship inf luence

policy outcomes and, consequently, the quality of repre sentation?

The question of whether representatives in Congress are re-

sponsive to constituents also depends on the responsiveness of

bureaucrats to legislators. However, previous literature has largely

focused on a single institution in isolation and less on how the in-

teractions or linkages between institutions effect representation.1

One critical r eason for this oversight is the diffi culty of establishing

the linkage s between elected off icials, federal agencie s, and output.

The ability to establish such linkages is important for eval-

uations of representation and democratic accountability. The

federal bureaucracy has a wide-reaching role and discretion in

the policymaking process. Policy is now overwhelmingly made

through agency regulation more than through statute (Warren

2004). Moreover, policies are often complex, requiring several

agencies, levels of government, and programs in order to be fully

promulgated as intended. This presents a costly but critical chal-

lenge for our understanding of how the interactions between in-

stitutions affect representation but also the ability of citizens to

hold elected officials accountable.

In this article, we take a step toward advancing the study of

these complex li nkages using novel data that allow us to study the

links between elected officials, agency behavior, and policy out-

comes. We examine, first, whether members of Congress directly

lobby the bureaucracy to represent their constituents. Second,

we evaluate agency responsiveness to legislators’ requests.

Examining these linkages allow us to test theoretical arguments

about interbranch interactions and representation.

We theorize about the role of direct communication within

the interdependent relationship between leg islators and agencies.

Legislators act as lobbyist s for their constituencies by repre senting

their distr ict’s and state’s interests through d irect communication

with agencies. Agencies have an incentive to respond favorably

to legislators because they want support in Congress to protect

their budgets and priorities. Agencies also want to avoid anger-

ing legislators by appearing unresponsive. Thus, agencies favor

legislators who signal strong preferences over decisions made by

the agency via direct contact. Consequently, this interdependent

relationship affect s policy outcomes, advantaging intere sts repre-

sented by legislators’ contact with agencies.

Using original data we obtained by submitting Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA) requests, we offer systemati c evidence of