Legislative Research Reports

Date01 November 2005
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.3162/036298005779702681
AuthorSUNIL AHUJA
Published date01 November 2005
625Legislative Research Reports
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XXX, 4, November 2005 625
Edited by
SUNIL AHUJA
Youngstown State University
Legislative Research Reports
LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR
“Strategic Timing, Position-Taking, and Impeachment in the House
of Representatives.” Gregory A. Caldeira (Ohio State University)
and Christopher Zorn (National Science Foundation). Political
Research Quarterly 57:4 (2004), pp. 517–27.
In this study, the authors examine the timing of members’ position-
taking in the House of Representatives’ decision to impeach President
Bill Clinton. Based on their understanding of the goals of members and
leaders, the authors expect members whose constituencies, interest
group influences, and partisanship are in alignment to make their positions
known quickly, and those with conflicting or ambiguous signals to delay.
The authors further expect members’ electoral circumstances within
their own party (the potential for a primary challenge) to condition the
impact of interest-group connections on that timing. The findings indicate
that, while the influence of cross-pressures on timing was universal,
Republicans who faced primaries in 1998 were more sensitive to the
concerns of their political “base,” and less susceptible to cross-pressures,
than were those unopposed within their own party. It is also shown
that, over and above the effects of ideology and partisanship, Republican
members who delayed their announcements were more likely to split
their votes between yeas and nays than those who took early positions.
“Legislative Agendas and Interest Advocacy: Understanding the
Demand Side of Lobbying.” Virginia Gray (University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill), David Lowery (University of Leiden, The
Netherlands), Matthew Fellowes (Brookings Institution), and
Jennifer L. Anderson (University of North Carolina at Greensboro).
American Politics Research 33:3 (2005), pp. 404–34.
Efforts to understand the mobilization of organized interests have
turned away from focusing on their internal traits to assessing the
environmental forces that influence the supply of lobbying organizations

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