Legal control and resistance post-Seattle.

• Author: Starr, Amory

Introduction

SINCE THE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 2001, FEARS OF TERRORISM HAVE BEEN USED TO justify loosening regulatory restrictions on law enforcement activity (Fernandez, 2009). Before September 11, activists in the alterglobalization (1) movement were laying siege to global governance (2) meetings around the world, threatening the credibility of the Washington Consensus. These festive mobilizations, espousing "nonviolent direct action," but taking varying forms in countries with different traditions of political struggle, were exposing the undemocratic nature of global economic governance.

Concerns about terrorism provided a convenient framework in which to increase repression of nonviolent movements, not only of the alterglobalization movement, but also connected movements such as the eco-defense and antiwar movements. In late 2005, the U.S. media began to report that federal agencies were engaging in broad-based investigative activity targeted at avowedly pacifist peace organizations composed of religious people, veterans, and elders, who had opposed the Iraq War using quite tame and lawful means.

As scholars of these movements, we found ourselves increasingly aware of the complex dimensions of repression and of the creative resistance happening in the face of that repression. Yet, as we examined the literature on repression we recognized several limitations. First, we discovered that the literature on the policing of protest had simply not kept up with events since the emergence of the alterglobalization movement in 1998. Second, we recognized that the literature on policing of social movements did not address the wider social control of dissent. Third, we realized that the protection of global economic governance meetings involved dimensions of state organization that have not been considered in earlier studies of state repression. Fourth, we recognized a new component of state repression, cross-border collaboration on tactics for protest policing.

To begin to address these shortcomings, this article reviews the previous literature on the relationship between the state and social movements and draws on extensive ethnographic data on the alterglobalization movement as the basis for outlining a new framework for studying the social control of dissent. It is important to note that the literature review here is limited to United States and Europe, and our data reflects ethnographic work in the U.S., Mexico, and Canada, with secondary sources from Western Europe. The analysis draws on seven years of ethnographic work, (3) independent media reports, activist discussions in several forums, and public texts such as activist videos.

Seattle and the Aftermath

On November 30, 1999, nonviolent protesters in Seattle successfully shut down the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings for a full day due to a combination of creative direct action, the presence of massive numbers of people in the streets, and police disorder (de Armond, 2001). Reeling from defeat, police agencies in other cities rapidly geared up to face anti-corporate and anti-globalization protests. The response was not merely quantitative. Drawing on 35 years of observation of First Amendment activity, the National Lawyers Guild (2004: 19) concluded that post-Seattle protest policing manifests "a noticeable shift from reactive law enforcement to preemptive law enforcement."

Four years after the victorious Seattle WTO protests and two years after September 11, the Seattle coalition of unions, antipoverty groups, environmentalists, and students gathered to oppose the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) meetings in Miami. No fewer than 40 law enforcement agencies, seven of them federal, organized to "limit" protest so as to "prevent violence" in what was described by Miami Mayor Manuel Diaz as "the model for homeland defense." The U.S. Congress provided $8 million to help with "security" in Miami; this money was provided as a line item in the Iraq War appropriations bill.

The "model" included extensive public relations, including a PowerPoint presentation given by the police in press conferences and community briefings that sought to criminalize and marginalize activists in advance, as well as to secure cooperation and support for turning downtown Miami into a police state for several days. The public relations offensive sought to psych up law enforcement personnel to abuse the rights of protesters. This included weaving fabulous rumors that involved exotic weapons composed of excrement, none of which had been used before by this social movement. City officials threatened a church interested in housing visiting activists and hosting educational events.

In what had become standard procedure, Miami redrew its downtown geography in the face of a security state while hosting the FTAA meetings. It secured millions of dollars to rent an impressive fence. Nearby businesses were entreated to close for the week, residents were warned against violent visitors, streets were blocked so that registered guests were unable to access hotels, and public transportation mutes were suspended. Eventually, the police operation made certain neighborhoods into occupied war zones.

Despite the absence of a genuine "terrorist" threat, breaches of the fence, any blocking of roadways not already preemptively closed by police, broken windows, or other property crime directed at corporations, a police representative used a bullhorn at 3:53 p.m. to tell activists remaining in the streets after the end of the union march that the demonstration could continue "until there is violence." Within seven minutes, a wall of police moved on the protest, fired rubber bullets and teargas, and proceeded to "hunt" (4) activists indiscriminately and violently for over 30 blocks from the actual meeting site. Protesters were systematically driven into the Overtown neighborhood, where police had encouraged residents to rob protesters with impunity (several cameramen with extensive footage of the brutality had their equipment confiscated by police). (5)

The presumption was that if you were in the street or on the sidewalk in the downtown area of Miami, you were an activist, and therefore a criminal. Justified on the grounds that the AFL-CIO refused to exclude nonmembers, they were restricted entry to and egress from their permitted rally area, agreements for bus access were revoked, the march route was changed after it had begun, and union members and AFL retirees were brutally arrested. Other groups were also denied use of permits. Unitarians attempting to attend an educational workshop at a Methodist church were barred entry by dozens of riot police and bomb squad personnel from several agencies (local, federal, ATF, and others unspecified) and the event was cancelled. The indiscriminate criminalization of activists included the targeting and arrest of clearly marked safety personnel, such as medics, union marshals, and legal observers.

There was no protester violence. Doing their best to assist in establishing probable cause, the local media chanted "anarchist" and "violence" over the best images they could find: a lightweight orange plastic construction fence being torn down and a few cardboard fires burning safely in the middle of wide streets. There was no evidence of intended violence. Incessant (and illegal) searches of activists in the week before the day of action had only turned up gas masks (used to portray activists as "thugs" despite being legal in Miami) and one controlled substance, a prescription medication (leading some to argue that this was the most upstanding collection of citizens in the country). There was no nonviolent militancy. The "padded bloc" (a proposed U.S. version of Tute Bianche, or white overalls) never appeared.

Despite the lack of evidence and the City of Miami's eventual failure to secure a single conviction of an "FTAA-related" arrestee, police and jail operations were "vicious, unnecessary, and vindictive," (6) involving rubber and plastic bullets, beanbags, a new weapon containing metal pellets that explode on contact and leave shrapnel in the body, tear gas, pepper spray, and tasers. Many of these weapons were used counter to the prescribed methods (to the extent they are known), thereby voiding their status as "non-lethal weapons." The medics reported dozens of serious injuries, including at least five head wounds caused by projectiles shot directly into the face (a contravention of non-lethal use).

Still in shock from Thursday, activists held a press conference and vigil outside the courthouse/jail on Friday. Police initially informed 200 activists that they could demonstrate in an adjacent parking lot, but then suddenly issued a three-minute dispersal order. As people attempted to disperse, and to the amazement of courthouse staff, the 680 riot cops on the scene surrounded, pepper sprayed, and arrested about 70 people, including a retired Miami attorney, three other legal observers in distinctive hats, and a lawyer acting as police liaison.

In custody, the arrestees (none of whom would be convicted of a crime) were processed slowly, paperwork was lost, access to counsel and phone calls were denied, public defenders were frustrated by constantly changing procedures in jails and courts, excessive bail was set (such as $5,000 for the misdemeanor "resisting arrest without violence"), and bond release was delayed for up to 12 hours. Arrestees charged with "unlawful assembly," "failure to disperse," and "resisting without violence" were held on average $1,500 bail, denied food and water for eight to 16 hours, and some were strip-searched. (Several of the strip searches were done by or in front of the opposite gender.) There were five cases of denial of medical care in custody, 30 cases of serious handcuff abuse (keeping people in handcuffs for 13 hours with cuffs so tight that their hands turned purple), four cases of sexual assault, 10 death threats...