Left-out legislature.

AuthorLieber, Robert J.

FOR THE first time since 1994, the Democrats control both houses of Congress. Expectations run high among members of the new majority as well as their supporters and commentators at home and abroad. Their hopes for fundamental change are fed not only by genuine policy agendas, but also by political rancor and a partisan polarization more pronounced than at the height of the Vietnam War. Yet the role of Congress in foreign policy remains relatively limited, and aspirations for fundamental change greatly exceed what political, institutional and geopolitical realities will allow.

In many quarters a visceral antipathy toward President Bush and Vice President Cheney has prevailed. This finds expression in a certain narrative about foreign policy. Versions of this narrative differ, but they tend to share common elements.

The Cold War and the decade that followed it are depicted as an era when the United States pursued policies of multilateralism, collaboration with allies and respect for international law and institutions. America was widely admired or at least respected abroad until the presidency of George W. Bush. The former Texas governor took office with a swagger, a shoot-from-the-hip mentality and an aggressive unilateralist approach to foreign policy. America discarded its past habits of restraint, commitment to common institutions and deference to international partners' views. The 9/11 attacks gave full rein to these belligerent instincts and provided a pretext for ignoring the United Nations, violating international law and launching an aggressive war in defiance of wise voices calling for restraint.

This narrative implies guidelines for foreign policy, not only in Iraq but more broadly, that emphasize bipartisanship, multilateralism, re-engagement with international institutions and the UN, and aversion to pre-emption, thus regaining the international community's respect.

To be sure, discontent over Iraq had much to do with the Democratic victory in the November 2006 elections. But the above narrative is flawed, and the latitude for Congress to change foreign policy is constrained. It may surprise internationalist and realist critics, but the future demands something like the current administration's strategies.

Myths about Past Policy

HISTORICALLY, THE United States has been far more unilateral and assertive than commonly assumed, as Robert Kagan recently reminded us in reference to the early years of the republic and the 19th century. Hemispheric neighbors and Europe saw America as aggressive, expansionist and possessed of an unwelcome liberal, commercial and revolutionary ideology. (1) Even post-World War II America wasn't the place for the consistent alliance cooperation some make it out to be. Throughout the Cold War, there were numerous and often acrimonious disputes with allies and adversaries over security, economic, political and even cultural issues. German rearmament, the Suez crisis, the Vietnam War, Middle East policies, the Arab oil embargo following the October 1973 Yom Kippur War and the decision to station intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe in the early 1980s are just a few examples of these quarrels.

Past American policy was by no means consistently multilateral. In 1950 President Truman dispatched...

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