Lebanon's conundrum.

• Author: Norton, Augustus Richard
• Position: Peace situation in Lebanon

Lebanon's civil war came to an end in the autumn of 1990, when, with silent approval from Washington, Syrian forces assaulted the presidential palace in Ba'abda and brought the rebellion of General Michel Aoun to an end. Aoun had resisted implementing the Ta'if Accord of 1989, which he and his followers viewed as a legitimation of Syria's occupation of Lebanon. Aoun's objections notwithstanding, many Lebanese were understandably relieved that the sixteen-year civil war was finally over.(1) Unfortunately, nearly ten years after the agreement to end the war was signed in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon is still wracked by problems, especially because Lebanon continues to be a site for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

On the positive side, most of the war's detritus has been carted away and the landscape of destruction is being transformed throughout Lebanon. Even in the south, where the Israeli occupation zone continues, to be a magnet for resistance attacks, the pace of construction is impressive. The potential for Lebanon to rebound financially is reflected in the international financial markets. Two Lebanese offerings on the Eurobond market were snapped up by investors. The result is that Lebanon has been able to capitalize its postwar rebuilding of infrastructure with deficit financing. The plans are ambitious and include state of the art telecommunications, a world class airport, and extensive renovation of port facilities in Beirut and in Sidon (former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri's home town). The reconstruction project, called Horizon 2000, has cost three quarters of a billion dollars annually since 1993, and is projected to cost a billion dollars a year through 2001, large expenditures in a country of three million citizens.

In Beirut, the commercial center of the city is being recreated in a mammoth project by Solidere, a private company created for the purpose in 1993. Solidere, described by the Middle East Economic Digest as the most ambitious construction project in the world, is the brainchild of billionaire and former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. Hariri stands not only to leave a magnificent legacy in Beirut, but, as a major stockholder in Solidere, to see his personal fortune grow as well. As a result, Lebanese have commonly complained that he acted as though he were a CEO and Lebanon his company.

Although it would be hard to discern so judging from the conspicuous consumption of some well-to-do Lebanese, the domestic economy has only grown modestly since 1990. The General Confederation of Labor, which is the umbrella for most of Lebanon's unions, has mounted several nationwide strikes to protest low wages and a galloping cost of living, most notably in 1992, when labor protests precipitated the fall of the government of Prime Minister Omar Karami, and again in 1995, when the Labor Confederation defied a government ban and organized protests against large increases in the price of gasoline. The construction boom has benefited some Lebanese, but it has also attracted about 500,000 Syrian workers. Only a tiny fraction of the Syrian workers' wages is spent in Lebanon; most of it is repatriated to Syria. Since the Syrians habitually perform menial jobs that Lebanese spurn, as they did before the civil war as well, it is hard to argue that they are stealing jobs from the Lebanese. This does not stop the issue from being a source of angry, if muted complaint.(2) Many members of the middle class have only been able to stave off a deep decline in their standard of living by selling off real estate and other fixed assets. In fact, many members of the middle class have left Lebanon, seeking opportunity elsewhere. The emigration flood has been especially heavy among the Maronites and other Christians, to the effect that the Christian communities are now estimated to account for a third or less of Lebanon's total population of three million. The human drain has been propelled not only by a quest for the good life, but by ominous limitations on personal freedom, including heavy government tampering with elections and a growing intolerance for dissent.

Syria's influence on Lebanon has grown tremendously since the late 1980s, just as Michel Aoun and his supporters feared. Few political decisions are made without consulting Damascus, and it is widely understood that Syria routinely intervenes in the Lebanese government. Decisions are tailored to suit the preferences of President Hafez al-Asad and his lieutenants, and no decision is taken that would have even the remote likelihood of offending Damascus. Lebanon has basically tied its destiny to Syria in the peace process and, since 1993, President Elias Hrawi has repeatedly emphasized that there will be continued cooperation between Lebanon and Syria. While many Lebanese privately express their distaste for Lebanon's cheek to jowl relationship with Syria, many others argue that Lebanon has little choice. Were Lebanon to try to make its own way, independent of Syria's wishes, it would not only provoke Syria, but it would also be in a weaker position vis-a-vis Israel. For their part, after their own unhappy attempts to shape events in Lebanon during the 1980s, both Israel and the United States have been content to let Syria call the shots in Lebanon.

RESHAPING THE PARLIAMENT

After a twenty-year hiatus as a result of the civil war of 1975 to 1990, parliamentary elections were resumed in Lebanon in 1992.(3) Ordinarily, the resumption of elections would be an occasion for celebration, but the 1992 election law was ramrodded through the parliament, and protections provided in the Ta'if agreement, including a Constitutional Council, were not implemented in time to function for the elections that were hastily scheduled for August 1992. Given the short time available to confirm lists of voters and otherwise monitor the conduct of the election, many Lebanese viewed the 1992 elections as a ploy by Syria to increase its control over the Beirut government. By ensuring the election of a majority of pro-Syrian parliamentary deputies, Syria could avoid the inconvenience of a recalcitrant legislature that might insist on the enforcement of the Ta'if Accord. That agreement required Syria to withdraw its 40,000 soldiers to positions in Lebanon's Biqa' valley two years after implementation, that is, by September 1992, but this aspect of the agreement was suspended by the Lebanese parliament.

Sensing a fixed election, many Lebanese, especially Christians, mounted a boycott. As a result, in several electoral areas fewer than five percent of eligible Christians voted, and no area had an overall participation higher than 37 percent. In one district (Jubayl), only one Christian vote was cast for every 200 eligible Christian voters. The rates of participation among the Muslims were higher but still well below the customary voting rates.

Arguably the most authentic result of the 1992 elections was in the Shiite Muslim community, where a number of the traditional political bosses were shunted aside by the voters in favor of candidates from Hizballah (the Party of God) and Amal (the Shiite reformist movement).(4) Although the Shiite Muslims account for at least a third of Lebanon's population and are the largest single confessional group in the country, they have been habitually impoverished and poorly represented in government. In many ways, the long process of politicization and political mobilization among the Shiites that began in the 1950s and culminated in the 1990s has been the central challenge facing Lebanon for some time. After generations of marginalization and being kept outside the system, the Shiites now found themselves in the halls of parliament. Counting victories by its non-Shiite allies, Hizballah won a total of twelve seats in the 1992 elections, making it the largest bloc in parliament. Of course, Hizballah gained notoriety and international opprobrium in the 1980s for its complicity in the kidnapping of foreigners and the devastating 1983 attacks on French soldiers and...