Lebanon's divisive democracy: the parliamentary elections of 1992.

• Author: Harik, Judith P.

INTRODUCTION

RECENT ELECTIONS IN SEVERAL ARAB COUNTRIES have stirred debate over the meaning of Arab democracy and the possibilities of its taking root in Arab societies where liberal traditions previously had been lacking.(1) It is more than a little ironic, and perhaps prophetic, that the Arab state which was considered most democratic and which had an established electoral system--Lebanon--should be the one to suffer from a heated debate over the feasibility of holding elections at this time. The Ta'if agreement of 1989, which theoretically ended the Lebanese civil war, called, among other things, for electing a new parliament. The previous parliamentary elections were held in 1972, three years before the eruption of the civil war which made it impossible for the normal political process to continue. Until recently, nearly all Lebanese factions agreed on the need to elect a new representative parliament to replace the 20-year old one which was no longer viewed as legitimate. But when the current government's efforts to arrange for elections appeared serious, considerable opposition was voiced against them mainly by the Lebanese Maronite community, which feared that a new parliament would enact laws to end its privileged position in Lebanese society and politics. New regional political trends as well as the ongoing peace talks, with the possibility of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Israel, have focused international attention on the debate over the electoral process which took place during the summer of 1992.

Was it the form or the predicted results of the electoral process that again emphasized the differences between the Lebanese communities? And how would the elections affect the health of Lebanese democracy, its future stability and regional pacification? This study is important because it attempts to understand the opinions of Lebanon's war generation on several contentious issues involving the parliamentary elections. These young people were raised in fear of bombardment, and in sectarian isolation.(2) Some carried guns and will do so again if the situation demands it. They also constitute Lebanon's hope for eventual national reconciliation and productive social and political change. The attitudes of the younger generation are thus an important indication of the direction in which the country is moving politically. Therefore, this study will investigate the following relevant topics: 1) their awareness of the democratic process in the Lebanese context; 2) respondents' views as to whether the elections should be held on schedule; 3) their expectations on whether elections can be held under democratic conditions; 4) their views on the candidates they prefer to represent them in parliament, and 5) the actual expectations of respondents concerning the results of the elections. The data came from a national survey the daily al-Safir conducted during the summer of 1992. The sample consists of 1,436 respondents between 19 and 39 years of age. All regions in Lebanon were included in the sample in proportion to the size of the population. Two-thirds of the respondents were Muslim and one-third Christian, and one-third of the sample were women. Non-reliable responses were deleted from the analysis of the findings.

THE LEBANESE ELECTIONS OF 1992 IN FOCUS

Local observers and scholars have repeatedly decried the impotence and subservience of Lebanon's legislative body to the executive branch.(3) In fact its major function has been as a means through which members peddled influence at the state level by supplying local constituencies with the services they exchanged for allegiance. Thus, as in many other developing countries, patronclient relationships played a key role in influencing the public-oriented policies of the legislature. Parliamentary activity was usually marred by deep-seated acrimony that manifested itself in heated and, often, inconclusive debates. As the Lebanese civil war went on unchecked, the arbitrational role of the parliament in national politics was virtually neutralized. The conclusion of the Ta'if agreement, however, required the reactivization of parliament's role since implementation of Ta'if hinged on passing new legislation that included, among other things, amending the constitution. Therefore, the government's intention to go ahead with parliamentary elections in the summer of 1992 created a major outcry by the forces that were reluctant to proceed with the implementation of the Ta'if agreement, particularly the Maronites.

The general thrust of the agreement aimed at the redistribution of Lebanon's political and economic resources in a fashion that recognized demographic shifts that favored the Muslims (especially the Shiites) at the expense of the Christians (especially the Maronites). Parliamentary elections would constitute and legitimize a new body politic to be followed by the withdrawal of the Syrian forces, that had been installed in the country since 1976, to eastern Lebanon. Hopefully, the Israelis would then reciprocate by pulling out from their area of control in southern Lebanon.

The Maronites wanted the Syrians out of Lebanon, and believed that elections held before they left might be unduly influenced by Syria at their expense. The Ta'if Accord was immediately opposed by a faction of the Maronite community headed by General Michel A'un who was appointed prime minister by President Amin al-Jumayyil, without parliamentary approval. Most Muslim leaders viewed the appointment of A'un as unconstitutional. Thus, for the first time in Lebanon's modern history, the country had two functioning governments, one in East Beirut, the other in its western half. It is noteworthy that A'un was extremely popular with Lebanese respondents of all sects who saw his stance as anti-Syrian more than pro-Maronite and viewed him as a national leader bent on reconstructing Lebanon along modern lines instead. The A'un current remained vigorous in its opposition to the Ta'if Accord although A'un himself went into exile in France after his military defeat by combined national and Syrian forces in 1991.

Since the last parliamentary election was held in 1972, vacancies due to death or other circumstances were not filled until appointments were made in 1991.(5) This process was bitterly criticized by the Maronite community as a sham engineered by Syria to load the parliament with its supporters. From their perspective, this did not bode well for their chances in forthcoming elections. Thus a collection of Maronite and other Christian groups, coordinated by the Maronite Patriarch and representing tendencies in their communities, joined together to oppose the elections.

Fearing loss of identity and domination by the growing Muslim population,(6) and as the largest single sect at the time of Lebanon's independence in 1943, the Maronite Christians demanded and received political hegemony in the State according to an informal national pact worked out between the various communities.(7) Nevertheless, the foundations of the precarious republic that ensued were repeatedly challenged by the growing Muslim communities and others who claimed political and social justice.(8) The fears of the Maronite community were thus not allayed and to a certain extent they adopted a siege mentality, which, combined with the rise of militant Palestinian groups on Lebanese soil in the 1960s and 1970s, led to the explosion in 1975. Basically, they felt that as a result of the Ta'if Accord the new parliament would most likely not be under the control of the traditional leadership which in the past had supported Maronite goals and hegemony. Further, it might proceed to amend the constitution allowing for closer political ties to Syria, or in the extreme case, even political and economic union. Since the Maronites had always vigorously pursued and sought to protect Lebanon's special identity so as to assure protection of their perceived cultural distinction from other Arab groups, especially Muslims, such an occurrence was considered nothing short of communal suicide.(9) The scope of the proposed structural and legal changes, especially the drive to end political confessionalism, alarmed many Maronites. The specter of electing a pro-Syrian parliament, before the re-deployment of Syrian troops outside Beirut and Mount Lebanon, haunted a broad sector of the Maronite community, and mobilized them against holding elections. They hoped elections would be postponed long enough for conditions on the ground to change, allowing a better deal for them and their allies; or not holding them at all and postponing the issue until 1996, hoping for a change in the political mosaic of the Middle East after the mechanics of the peace process had taken their course.

On the other side, the government and most groups involved in the civil war on the side of the opposition national forces, were convinced that there was a new mood in the country that would allow them to gain control of the legislative branch; as to a large extent they had done with the executive with Syrian help.

The battle lines over the venue of elections were as sharply drawn and remained as consistent as they had during the war years. The basic political issue, nonetheless, was masked in a debate over the likelihood of a fair and democratic outcome. To what extent...