Leader Tenure, Genocide, and Politicide During Civil War

• Author: Gary Uzonyi
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211058484
• Published date: 01 December 2022
• Date: 01 December 2022

Article

PoliticalResearchQuarterly

2022,Vol.75(4)1216–1228

©TheAuthor(s)2021

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DOI:10.1177/10659129211058484

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LeaderTenure,Genocide,andPoliticide

DuringCivilWar

GaryUzonyi

1

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Abstract

Whydosomegovernmentsengageingenocideorpoliticideduringcivilwarwhileothersdonot?Iarguethatleader

tenureinfluencesbargainingpossibilitiesbetweentheregimeandrebels.Rebelsfacelessuncertaintyaboutalonger-

tenuredleader’swillingnesstocommittoconcessionstoendtheconflictwithtermsthatbettertherebels’position.This

narrowsthelonger-tenuredleader’sabilitytocrediblyoffertherebelsconcessions.Facingaconstrainedbargaining

environment,longer-tenuredleadersbecomemorelikelytoturntoatrocityinanefforttofullydefeattheopposition

groupanditssupporters.Statisticalanalysisofallgenocideandpoliticideincivilwarsince1946supportsthisclaim.

EvidencefromMilosevic’satrocitiesinKosovohelpillustratethemechanisms.

Keywords

genocide,civilwar,leadership,uncertainty,bargaining,humanrights

Introduction

Whydosomegovernmentsengageingenocideorpo-

liticideduringcivilwar?ConsiderthevariousBurmese-

Rohingyaconflicts.Betweenthe1940sand1960s,var-

iousRohingyagroupschallengedtheBurmesegovern-

mentforindependenceoftheirArakanstateinthewestern

regionofthecountry.Bythemid-1960s,though,the

Rohingyamujahedeenwerelosingmomentumandthe

Burmesegovernmentrealizedadefactovictoryinthe

Arakanstate.Atthistime,GeneralNeWin,whohadled

Burmafornearly60%ofitspost-colonialindependence,

beganestablishingandpromotingtheideaoftaingyintha

(or“nationalraces”)unity.Indevelopingthisidea,Ne

Winimplementedpoliciestoclarifytaingyinthaanden-

forceBurmesecitizenship(Cheesman2017).Againstthis

backdrop,Rohingyasecessionistdesiressimmered.As

RohingyagroupscametounderstandNeWin’svisionof

taingyinthaunity,andrejectit,theyoncemorepushedfor

independencein1978.Findinghimselfoutofnegotiating

roomwiththeRohingyaregardingtaingyinthaunity,Ne

WinorderedthemilitarytoconductOperationDragon

KinginwhichBurmeseforcesengagedingenocidal

violence,indiscriminatelyarresting,torturing,andkilling

theRohingyaenmasseastheysoughttodestroythe

RohingyapresenceinBurma(Smith1999).

Genocideistheattempteddestructionofacommunal

group;whereaspoliticideistheattempteddestructionofa

politicalgroup(HarffandGurr1988).

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Scholarstendto

seetheseatrocitiesasfollowingalogicofopportunity(see

ColaresiandCarey2008).Whenrebellionpresents“big

opportunities”(seeKrain1997),ortheregimeturns

“desperate”(seeDownes2008),suchthattheexpected

efficiencyofgenocideorpoliticidecomestooutweighits

highcosts(seeValentino2004),theregimebecomesmore

likelytoengageinsuchatrocitiesagainstciviliangroups

relatedtotherebelmovement.Whilethebalanceofpower

betweentheregimeandoppositionmayshiftrapidlyand

increasethreat(seePowell2012),mostindicatorsof

opportunityusedinthisliterature—wealth,roughterrain,

ordemocracy—areslowmovingortime-invariantduring

agivenconflict.Forexample,duringNeWin’sreign

through1978,Burmawasanautocracy,didnotalterthe

roughnessofterrainintheArakanstate,andmaintaineda

realGDPpercapitaofroughly$670withonlyastandard

deviationof$35overtheyears.Furthermore,theseverity

oftheRohingyathreatwasmuchlessin1978thanithad

beenpreviouslyintheconflictwhentherebelswere

1

DepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofTennessee,Knoxville,

TN,USA

CorrespondingAuthor:

GaryUzonyi,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofTennessee,

1001McClungTower,Knoxville,TN37996-0410,USA.

Email:guzonyi@utk.edu