Land and State Capacity During Civil Wars: How Land-Based Coalitions Undermine Property Taxation in Colombia

• Author: Camilo Nieto-Matiz
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221118813
• Published date: 01 April 2023
• Date: 01 April 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Journal of Conf‌lict Resolution

2023, Vol. 67(4) 701–727

© The Author(s) 2022

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/00220027221118813

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

Land and State Capacity

During Civil Wars: How

Land-Based Coalitions

Undermine Property Taxation

in Colombia

Camilo Nieto-Matiz

1



Abstract

Revenue, especially that from agricultural crops, has been considered fundamental for

the development of state capacity. While existing research has mostly focused on

dynamics of violence, we know less about the impact of commodities shocks on a key

dimension of state power: property taxation. In this article, I explore how and why land-

based coalitions—alliances between landowners and paramilitaries around the ap-

propriation of land—undermine taxation during civil conf‌lict. Focusing on the ex-

pansion of oil palm in Colombia and using a difference-in-differences design, I leverage

the international price of oil palm and municipal variation in crop suitability. I f‌ind that,

in municipalities with higher paramilitary violence and land concentration, the palm

shock was associated with lower taxation, outdated cadastral information, and lower

land values. This article underscores the deleterious consequences of land inequality

for the state’s extractive capacity even in moments of agricultural abundance.

Keywords

state capacity, Colombia, landed elites, civil wars, taxation

1

Department of Political Science and Geography, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, USA

Corresponding Author:

Camilo Nieto-Matiz, Department of Political Science and Geography, University of Texas at San Antonio,

One UTSA Circle, San Antonio, TX 78249, USA.

Email: camilo.nieto-matiz@utsa.edu

Introduction

Revenue is fundamental to the state’s territorial expansion (Levi 1989). In Sub-Saharan

Africa, cash crops and commercial agriculture pushed rulers to gradually build state

presence, while areas without any economic potential were condemned to state neglect

(Boone 2003). Similarly, during Pakistan’s Green Revolution, the substantial increase

in land value and revenue potential led to an incorporation of otherwise marginalized

areas (Callen et al. 2015). And in 19th Century Latin America, state building projects

were particularly facilitated by the availability of natural resources (Saylor 2014).

The role of agricultural resources in promoting state building is also particularly

relevant during civil conf‌licts. In Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) classic formulation, weak

central governments lack strong policing and counterinsurgency capacities. Yet ag-

ricultural booms can presumably build state capacity even during conf‌licts (Bazzi and

Blattman 2014;Blair, Christensen, and Rudkin 2021;Thies 2010). For one, rising

revenue allows governments to buy off opposition, build more capable state institu-

tions, and strengthen their coercive capacity. In addition, rising agricultural revenues

may also indirectly contribute to state capacity by deterring individuals from joining

rebel groups. Since agriculture is a labor-intensive activity, it tends to improve

household income, increasing the opportunity costs of rebellion and offsetting the

‘rapacity effect’(Dal Bó and Dal Bó 2011;Dube and Vargas 2013;Blair, Christensen,

and Rudkin 2021).

How do agricultural resource booms affect property taxation during protracted civil

conf‌licts? While the empirical literature explicitly identif‌ies a state capacity effect,

scholars have mostly focused on conf‌lict-related outcomes. On the one hand, the

literature explains how rising revenues translate into greater state capacity by giving

governments the necessary resources to equip themselves against rebel groups (Bazzi

and Blattman 2014;Thies 2010). The emphasis on counter-insurgency is justif‌iable, but

it tends to overlook how militias and paramilitaries also constitute an irreversible source

of state weakness. On the other hand, the literature provides few expectations about the

politics of taxation, a cornerstone of the modern state and one of the main sources of

revenue for local states. Although the existing research provides important insights into

violence and conf‌lict, we know less about how agricultural booms shape local taxation.

To understand how resource booms affect the state’s extractive capacity during civil

conf‌lict, I focus on a recent setting of agricultural abundance: oil palm expansion in

Colombia. Between 2006 and 2011, when the crop’s international price rose by 135%,

the Colombian state made an unparalleled effort to support its expansion, through a

combination of increased police and army presence to palm areas, coupled with the

allocation of credits, loans, and tax breaks to inf‌luential palm growers. Indeed, the

national government saw in the palm industry a means to bring peace and prosperity

and accelerate economic development in otherwise marginalized areas. However,

evidence indicates that oil palm expansion was often accompanied by land-grabbing,

human rights violations, and forced displacement. Did the oil palm boom in Colo mbia

enhance or undermine property taxation?

702 Journal of Conf‌lict Resolution 67(4)