Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism.

• Author: Easterbrook, Gregg

..And Why our Bombs Missed Qaddafi The literary allusion that provides the title of this book* is slightly off, as the subjects discussed--recent U.S. antiterrorism ifforts such as the Iran rescue attempt, the Libya raid, the Beirut security fiascos, and the machinations of North and company--rarely exhibit the character of "best laid" plans. the content of the book is, however, right on the money. Best Laid Plans is an artfully detailed and highly readable account that draws together the essentials of what has previously been revealed about American counterterrorism, while adding many cojpelling new details uncovered by the authors.

Martin, a pentagon reporter for CBS News and one of the network's rising stars, and Walcott, a national security correspondent for The Wall Street Journal, wisely limit their pages devoted to Oliver North. Mainly they conclude that although North went haywire, "the fact that he was more likely to stand trial than Imad Mugniyah [mastermind of several Beirut kidnappings] is grotesque." I agree.

Beyond North, Martin and Walcott introduce a slew of other characters central to U.S. counterterrorism efforts--too many to mention here, but several having fascinating stories. Though their presentation is in general impartial, the authors evince a mild degree of clientism by subtly siding with the Pentagon in the numerous disputes about whether the military or the White House was most to blame for counterterrorism foul-ups: perhaps a source-cultivation phenomenon, as the political dramatis personae of Reagan administration security planning are all either gone or will be soon, while the Pentagon is a much more permanent institution.

Regarding the Libya and Bekka Valley air raids, in which concentrated U.S. high-tech might produced, at best, nebulous results against Third World targets, Best Laid Plans presents a fairly convincing case that political meddling was the biggest problem. On the Libya attack, Martin and Walcott report that the Air Force originally called for just six bombers flown by top pilots using tactics that would maximize their chance of survival and the chances of their precision-guided munitions (PGM) striking the targets. In addition, the Air Force had no desire to hit Muammar Qaddafi's encampment, because it was too close to civilian areas. Then, about 48 hours beforehand, Washington decided that it wanted 18 bombers, nine of them targeted specifically on Qaddafi. Four months of planning went out the...