Lack of Mental Capacity to Intend a Unique Rule

• Author: By Lt. Col. Peter C. Manson
• Pages: 03

Insanity is a complete defense to an otherwise criminal act because criminal responsibility implies an ability to chooae hetween lawful and unlawful acts. In fact, the fundamental basis of criminal law is that human beings have the power to control their actions. Notwithstanding the deterministic views of 8ome psychiatrists which are incompatible with the idea of free will, the criminal law clings steadfastly to the notion of "a separate little man in the top af one's head called reason whose function it is to guide another unruly little man called instinct, emotion, or impulse."' Old fashioned as it may seem, and regardless of its theoretic validity, this concept of reasoned behavior is essential to the practical ad-ministration af justice. The law "is obliged to proeeed on more or less rough and ready judgments based on the assumption that mature and rational persons are in control of their own conduct."Z Although it is realized that individuals vary in the amount of self-control they possess, the criminal law cannot be made to fit the individual weaknew of each individual wrongdoer. Any attempt to do so would make the law impossible to administer. Fine distinctions muat give way to practicality, and the criminal law can describe only in somewhat arbitraq terms that small class of in. dividuals who are so lacking in self-eontrol that they should not be held responsible for their acts.

Except for infants, the only class of individuals who are free from criminal responsibility are those who lack mental ra4ponsibility. A majority of the States define a lack of mental respensibility in terms of the M'Naghten rules, that is, knowledge that the act is A minority of the States and a majority of the Federal jurisdictions combine the X'Naghten rules with some form of "irresistible impulse test."4 The long establiahed military definition of mental responsibility is in this latter gmup.6 It is

' Chief, Military Justice Division, Academic Department, The Judge Advocate General's School, U. S. Amy, Charlotteaviile, Virginia; member of the Virginia Bar: graduate of the Uniaeraity of Virginia Law Sehml. The *ewa herein expressed are those of the author and do not neeel-sarUy represent the view. of The Judge Adroeate General's School ormy ether pYernmentni agenoy.1 Hailorsay v. U. S., 148 F.Zd 665, 667 (D. C. Cir. IS46),2 Gregg Caeage & Storage Co. V. U. S., 316 U.S. 74,79-80 (18421, SWeihofen, Mental Disorder aii a Criminal Defense 61 (1964);

4 Ibid.

6 Wlnthrep, Military Law and Precedents 294 (Zd ed. 1920 reprint).

M'Nsghtan'a Case, 10 Clark BFm. ZOO (1843)

*M BBl2B 19

phrased in terms of whether the accused was, at the time of the offense, so far free from mental disease, defect, or derangement as ta be able concerning the particular act charged to distinguish right from wrong and to adhere to the right.' This combination of the M'Naghten rules and the irresistible impulse test conforms rather closely to the modern psychiatric view that human conduct ie based upon an integration of cognition (knowledge), volition (free will), and emotion.' The Jl'Xaghten rules (knawl-edge of right and wrong) take into consideration cognition and the irresistible impulse test (inability to adhere to the right) relates to volition and, possibly, emation.8 It is obvious that this combination provides a more liberal test than that in force in the majority of the States Nevertheless, it is subject to criticism in its requirement that the individual must be COmplEtdy deprived of his ability to distinguish right from wrong and adhere to the right. A partial deprivation is insufficient.O It is doubtful that this rigid requirement rests on a sound medical foundation. Psychiatrists have observed that even a most psychotic person responds to orders given by his attendant and, thus, could not be said to be completelr unable to know right from wrong and adhere to the right. It is this aspect of the legal test of insanity which gives psychiatrists the most difficulty?0 It may be that this strict requirement also influenced the Court of Military Appeals in its development of the rule of partial mental responsibility or, as it is now called, iock of niental capaeity to intend."

Lack of mental capacity to intend meana simply that an individual who is suffering from a mental condition may be able to know right from wrong and adhere to the right in a general criminal sense, but may not have the mental capacity to premeditate or entertain a specific criminal intent. Thus, it may have the effect of reducing premeditated murder ta unpremeditated murder, and it is B complete defense to those offenses which are based upon a specific criminal intent. The rule is not widely accepted in civilian jurisdictions. About one-fourth of the States have adopted the rule

GPu. 12Ob, MCM, 1951.7 Overholrer, The Role 01 Psgchiatry m the Admmstration ai Cntn;nol 8 Model Penal Code, Art. 4 (Tent. Draft No.

Justice. 93 J. Am. bled. Aasn.830 (1828).

l O L C i

Miili Penal Code, Art. 4 (Tent. Draft KO.

4,1951).

II This latter term is mow descriptive but it should not be eonfved with the tern ''lack of mental capacity" which is Used in MCM, 1811, 8s meaning a laek of capacity "to underatand the nature of the proceedings against him and intelligently to eonduet 01 cooperate in his defense." Par. 120~.

MCM, 1951.

4, 1066).

I Par. 12Ob, MCM, 1851. The military test 11 not alone I" this respect. I:appears that most jurisdictions have the lame rigid requirement of complete incapscity. See hIodel Penal Code, Art. 4 (Tent. Draft KO,

4,

LACK OF MENTAL CAPACITY...