MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING: KUMARILA, SANTARAKSITA, AND DHARMAKIRTI ON THE COGNITION OF NON-BEING.

• Author: TABER, JOHN
• Position: Nichts bleibt nichts: Die Buddhistische Zuruckweisung von Kumarila's Abhavapramana; Ubersetzung und Interpretation von Santaraksita's Tattvasangraha vv. 1647-1690 mit Kamalasila's Tattvasangrahapajika sowie Ansatze und Arbeitshypothese zur Geschichte negativer Erkenntnis in der indischen Philosophie

Birgit Kellner's translation and study of the Abhavavicara section of Santaraksita's Tattvasangraha, while historically sophisticated and philologically sound, ignores the broader philosophical significance of the problem of the cognition of non-being (abhava) in classical Indian philosophy. In this review article, I attempt primarily to rectify that deficiency, while at the same time showing how a clear grasp of the philosophical issues leads, in certain instances, to a more correct understanding of the texts. I also address the matter, raised by Kellner in relation to the apparent critique of Dharmakirti's theory of anupalabdhi by Kumarila, of the historical relation of Kumarila and Dharmakirti.

WE CANNOT THINK or talk about that which is not, declared Parmenides' goddess, rather paradoxically, at the dawn of Western philosophy. "Come now, I will tell you.., the only ways of inquiry there are for thinking: the one, that it is and that it is not possible for it not to be, is the path of Persuasion; the other, that it is not and it is necessary for it not to be, this I point out to you to be a path completely unlearnable, for neither may you know that which is not... nor may you declare it.,, [1] How, indeed, can one deny the existence of something without at the same time implying that it exists, in some sense, by referring to it? This problem, to which Plato dedicated one of his dialogues, the Sophist, was not satisfactorily solved until the twentieth century, when Bertrand Russell, applying concepts of mathematical logic, devised a new theory of denoting expressions. [2]

A closely related problem arose in classical Indian philosophy, in the form of the question: How do we know that something is not there? How do I know, for example, that there is not a pot before me on the ground (the standard example), that there is not a zebra here with me in the room, or that my keys are not on the table where I thought I left them? Valid cognition must have some object, but how can the absence of something be an object? Conversely, if it is an object, how can it really be an absence? The Mimamsa philosopher Kumarila, perhaps influenced by the Nyaya Sutra commentator Vatsyayana, held non-being (abhava) to be a real thing (vastu), i.e., a real aspect (amsa) of that which is present. A thing both is what it is and is not what it is not; the non-being of a cloth, i.e., not-being-a-cloth, is a real aspect of a pot, as indeed are the non-being of a table, a proton, a mouse trap, a Porsche, etc., for a pot is not all of these things. Thus, non-being, in a sense, is or has reality and so can pro perly be cognized by a pramana, a valid means of knowledge. The difference between the Nyaya and Bhatta Mimamsa traditions in this matter had to do with which pramana cognizes it. According to Nyaya it is perception; according to Bhatta Mimamsa it is a pramana separate and distinct from the other five pramanas that Mimamsa recognizes (perception, inference, testimony, comparison, and implication), that is, a sixth pramana. This pramana is itself referred to as nonbeing or absence (abhava); for it consists in the absence or non-functioning of any of the other pramanas in regard to the missing object when one would expect or desire it to be present. [3]

The Buddhist position in regard to abhava is roughly the Parmenidean one: there is no abhava; certainly, non-being is not a real aspect of an entity. The problem of non-being, rather, is to give an account of how negative judgments arise from cognitions of real particulars, that is to say, on what grounds we are justified in considering something as non-existent. According to Dharmakirti, it is the "non-perception" (anupalabdhi) of a thing that serves as the reason (hetu) for "treating it as nonexistent" (asadvyavahara); thus, the appropriateness of considering something to be non-existent is, in the Buddhist account, inferred. Here, "non-perception" is taken as the perception of something other than the object in question; in perceiving an empty area before me I ipso facto apprehend the non-existence of a pot. I certainly do not apprehend some real thing (vastu) different from the ground that is the non-existence of the pot. While it is said that non-perception by itself directly establishes the non-existen ce of the object, the inference based on non-perception--or, more specifically, on the non-perception of a thing "that meets the conditions of perception" (upalabdhilaksanaprapta), i.e., that would have been perceived had it been present--serves to bring clearly to awareness the fact that the object should be thought, spoken of, and acted toward as non-existing, just as one is made aware that a certain thing should be called a "cow" because it possesses horns, dewlap, and udder. Negative judgments can arise in many other ways than simply from the non-perception of the thing itself (referred to as svabhavanupalabdhi). They can arise from seeing something opposed in nature to that which is to be judged as non-existent (e.g., from seeing fire one can infer the non-existence of cold) or from seeing an effect of something opposed to the thing to be judged as non-existent (from seeing smoke one can infer the non-existence of cold), and so on. These different kinds of judgment are detailed by Dharmakirti in Nyayabin du II, where he presents anupalabdhihetu alongside svabava- and karyahetu as one of the three types of valid inferential mark (linga). [4]

The work under review is a study of an important chapter in the controversy over abhava in classical times--the section of Santaraksita's Tattvasangraha (TS), known as the Abhavavicara (TS 1647-90), that is devoted to refuting Kumarila's theory of abhava. As is well known, the Tattvasangraha is an elaborate defense of the teachings of the logical-epistemological school of Yogacara Buddhism. It exhaustively refutes the doctrines of competing systems, Hindu and Buddhist alike (though Madhyamaka is spared), but devotes particular attention to--one could even say, is obsessed with--Mimamsa as represented by Kumarila. Especially in the latter sections of the work, where Mimamsa doctrines such as the eternality of language, the authorlessness of the Veda, the intrinsic validity of cognitions, and the impossibility of an omniscient person come under attack, Kumarila is quoted at great length. Since many of the verses that are cited are not found in the Slokavarttika, it seems, as Frauwallner originally suggested, t hat Santaraksita must have had before him Kumarila's other much longer, now lost commentary on the Sabarabhasya, the Brhattika. The purpose of the Abhavavicara is to disprove that abhava constitutes a distinct pramana, for the Yogacara recognizes only the two pramanas perception and inference. Several verses from Kumarila's chapter on abhava in his Slokavarttika, the Abhavapariccheda (AP), are cited in the purvapaksa of Santaraksita's discussion; there are at least one-and-a-half verses of Kumarila's cited there that are not to be found in the Abhavapariccheda and so, presumably, derive from the Brhattika.

Birgit Kellner offers a careful, yet quite readable, translation of the Abhavavicara, along with Kamalasila's Panjika commentary thereon. In an accompanying study she reconstructs and analyzes the arguments of the text and also discusses some of the historical background of the debate--in particular, early Vaisesika and Nyaya passages that seem to lead up to Kumarila's position. The translation is supported by explanatory footnotes that deal with matters of interpretation and related passages in other classical sources and philological endnotes that assess variants and justify the translation. There are several helpful appendices: two in which the variants from the printed editions of the Tattvasangraha, as well as from the manuscripts cited by Swami Dvarikadas Shastri in his edition and a manuscript owned by the Institut fur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde of the University of Vienna, are perspicaciously arranged; another that lists the citations of Kumarila's Abhavapariccheda in other Sanskrit works; and y et another that displays the variant readings of the Abhavapariccheda. Finally, there is an appendix in which Kellner discusses the question whether in his Abhavapariccheda Kumarila is attacking the views of Dharmakirti, a matter that has implications for the historical relationship of Kumarila and Dharmakirti. Certainly, this volume represents an extraordinary achievement for a "reworked Magisterarbeit."

I shall have little to say here about the translation, which is well executed, or the critical apparatus, which reflects considerable scholarly labor (it includes, among other things, references to Tibetan translations of the Tattvasangraha and the Japanese secondary literature). My main concern, rather, is the proper understanding of Kumarila's theory of abhava and the significance of the problem of abhava in Indian philosophy. While Kellner, in her interpretive study, provides an accurate account of the details of the debate between Santaraksita and Kumarila, one misses the big picture. What is really going on here? What is at stake? Why would Kumarila and Santaraksita take up the positions that they do? In order to see that, one must understand their positions in relation to other doctrines of their systems, and one must also, at least to some extent, reflect philosophically on the problem of non-being itself. Then, in the second part of this review I shall address the matter of the relation of Kumarila a nd Dharmakirti and the related issue of the sequence of Kumarila's works.

Since Santaraksita in his Abhavavicara is mainly concerned only with the opening arguments of Kumarila's Abhavapariccheda--or, as the case may be, the passages of the Brhattika that correspond to the beginning of the Abhavapariccheda (Santaraksita cites slokas corresponding to AP 1, 2cd, 3-4, 7-9, 11-12, 17, 45, 54, and 55)--it will be...