Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee Power in the Contemporary Congress

• Date: 01 May 2019
• Author: James M. Curry
• Published date: 01 May 2019
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12219

203

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 44, 2, May 2019

DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12219

JAMES M. CURRY

University of Utah

Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee

Power in the Contemporary Congress

Scholars, practitioners, and observers typically portray committee influ-

ence as rooted in traditional congressional processes and practices, which are

thought to provide committees with powerful opportunities to block and shape

legislative proposals. The erosion of regular order processes suggests these tradi-

tional processes cannot underlie committee power in the contemporary Congress.

Drawing on a mixed-methods approach of interviews with congressional staff

and an original data set of every amendment offered on the floor of the House

of Representatives from 2005 to 2008, I find that absent these traditional process

norms, committees in the contemporary Congress can rely on their specialized

knowledge and expertise to influence the behavior of their colleagues and shape

the legislation that passes.

Scholars, practitioners, and observers typically portray com-

mittee in fluenc e as rooted in traditiona l congressional proc esses

and practice s, which are thought to provide committe es with pow-

erful opportu nities to block and shape legislation. T his perspective

permeate s college-level Amer ican government textbooks1 and is

shared by many members of Congress (see Crespin and Madon na

2016). Scholars conne ct committe e inf luence to the gatekeeping

rights, agenda set ting and proposal abil ities, and conferenc e com-

mittee pract ices of the “regula r order” Congress (Denzau and

Mackay 1983; Ripley 1983; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Snyder

1992; Weingast and Marsh all 1988). Even Krehbiel’s (1991) infor-

mational theory suggests members of Congre ss will not spe cializ e

or develop policy experti se unless c ommittee s have the traditional

process rig hts that allow them to put their exp ertise to us e.

Changes to standa rd legislative practices in the c ontemporary

Congress pres ent a challenge to this understandi ng of committee

inf luence. Today, most traditional pro cesses (often referre d to as

“regular order”) have been replaced by central ized and unor tho-

dox approaches to lawmaking. Formal c ommittee st ages of the

© 2018 Washington University in St. Louis

204 Curry

legislative proces s are frequently bypass ed—includ ing hearings

and mark-ups—as major legislation is negotiated and drafted

in informal, b ehind-the-s cenes meeti ngs (Bendix 2016; Sinclair

2016). Today’s committe es largely cannot rely on gateke eping

rights, monopoly proposal and agend a-setting powers, or confer-

ence comm ittee proces ses to inf luence most legislation.

I argue that absent the se traditional proc ess norms, com mit-

tees and thei r members in the conte mporary Congres s rely on

their spec ialized knowledge and expert ise to influence the b ehav-

ior of their colleag ues and shape legislation passing the cham-

bers. Becaus e rank-and-file lawma kers are typically pressed for

time (Hall 1996; Kingdon 1989), lack substantial knowledge of

most policy issues (Curry 2015), and have limited staff resou rces

(Drutman 2016), they frequently rely on knowledgeable lawmak-

ers—notably the sen ior committee members and com mittee staff

who possess superior knowledge and expert ise—for inform ation

and cues. Thi s, in turn, allows committ ees opportunities to shape

support and opposition to legi slative proposals.

This underst anding of comm ittee inf luence is not new.

Knowledge- and exper tise-based source s of committee inf luence

have been acknowledged for deca des (e.g., Fenno 1966; Gilligan

and Krehbiel 1989; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Krehbiel

1991). However, scholarship previously exa mining exp ertise-

based inf luence d id so in a congres sional era featuring tradi-

tional process nor ms. Drawing on a mi xed-methods approach

of interviews w ith 15 congressional staffers a nd an original d ata

set of the more than 2,100 House floor amend ments offered

from 2005 to 2008, I present evidence that in the conte mporary

Congress sen ior committee members exercise i nfluen ce through

a robust level of deference from their coll eagues. Spe cifica lly,

I find that ran k-and-file lawmakers tu rn to committee leaders

and committe e staff for information and cues on relevant leg isla-

tion considered on the House f loor and that these cues inf luence

the roll-cal l votes they cast. When com mittee leaders indicate

support (opposition) to an amendment, the likel ihoods other

lawmakers vote in favor (against) rise, particula rly among same-

party colle agues. This inf luence on votes subsequently enables

committe e leaders to influence the likelihoods amendments are

adopted or rejecte d.

These fi ndings have importa nt implications. For one, they

indicate com mittee in fluenc e can persist i n the absence of trad i-

tional process nor ms and that even in a contemporary Congress

205Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee Power

character ized by unorthodox approaches to lawmaking, c ommit-

tees and thei r members still play an important role in pas sing leg-

islation. Nonetheless, comm ittee power is dif ferent today. Based

more so in knowledge and exper tise, comm ittee power may be

more centraliz ed in committee leade rs and committee staff to t he

expense of committee rank-and-fi le. These impl ications are con-

sidered in more detai l in the conclusions.

Traditional Processes and Comm ittee Power

Traditional congressional proc esses have long played an im-

portant role in understanding comm ittee inf luence. T he roots

of this tradition tra ce to Wilson’s (1885) description of com mit-

tees as dec isive gatekeepers of leg islation. Later, institutional

features provided a compelling explanation for the deference

lawmakers appeare d to afford committe es (Evans 2011, 401).

Since then, scholar s have identified var ious aspects of the t ra-

ditional “regular-order” legislative process that provide power

to committe es, including the bill referral process, com mittee

gatekeeping rights , monopoly agenda- setting (or proposal)

rights, the use of re strictive ru les, and the conference commit-

tee process.

Gatekeeping is often laude d as “the most import ant tool

possesse d by committe es” (Maltzman 1997, 65)—a source of

negative power allowing comm ittees to stop the con sideration

of legislation after its in itial referral (D enzau and Mackay 1983;

Ripley 1983; Snyder 1992). Monopoly proposal or agenda- setti ng

abilities build on gatekeeping and have likewise been ass erted

to underpin c ommittee i nflue nce (Baron and Ferejohn 1989;

Denzau and Mackay 1983). Under traditional p rocesses, on ce a

bill is referre d, committe es can draft a nd redraft it before ad-

vancing it to the f loor, shaping the policy proposals con sidered

by the chamber. Combined, gatekeepi ng and proposal rights pro-

vide comm ittees with both po sitive and negative agenda powers.

Shepsle and Weingast (1987) assert that committ ees also enjoy

an expost veto under the traditional conference com mittee pro-

cess (cf. Smith 1988). Because senior committ ee members ty pi-

cally dominate the memberships of the c onference com mittees

appointed to resolve bicam eral differenc es on a bill, they have a

second chanc e to amend or kill legislation before the final vote.

This ensures committe e members can re dress what the f loor has

done to their bills.