“Kill the chicken to scare the monkey”: Heavy penalties, excessive COVID‐19 control mechanisms, and legal consciousness in China

• Published date: 01 July 2023
• Author: Qian Liu
• Date: 01 July 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12202

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

“Kill the chicken to scare the monkey”: Heavy

penalties, excessive COVID-19 control mechanisms,

and legal consciousness in China

Qian Liu

Department of Sociology, University of

Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Correspondence

Qian Liu, Department of Sociology, University

of Calgary, 2500 University Drive NW,

Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, Canada.

Email: qian.liu2@ucalgary.ca

Funding information

Faculty of Arts, University of Calgary, Grant/

Award Number: 10034759

Abstract

This study analyses the legal consciousness of Chinese

citizens during the COVID-19 pandemic when the

authoritarian state invoked heavy penalties to deter

noncompliance with its excessive COVID-19 restric-

tions. China used the approach of “killing the chicken

to scare the monkey,”publicly punishing those who

violated restrictions in order to deter noncompliance. This

article explains why ordinary citizens supported this selec-

tive application of the law, as well as how the possibility

of being the “chicken”contributed to their compliance

(or noncompliance) with excessive COVID-19 restric-

tions. It suggests that the uncertainty and unpredictability

of law in the authoritarian state bred fear, which then led

to compliance, regardless of the lack of procedural fair-

ness. People’s dissatisfaction with the rules, however, led

them to tolerate and even support the noncompliance of

people they trusted.

1|INTRODUCTION

While the significance of law and regulation in the emergence and management of the COVID-19

global pandemic has not received much attention in academic and public debates, recent studies

have demonstrated that a country’s failure or success in the fight against COVID-19 is closely

related to its legal responses (Atiles, 2021a,2021b;Ramraj,2021). This article uses the example

of China to illustrate therole of law in an authoritarian state during a pandemicfrom the perspec-

tives of ordinary people whose everyday lives were directly affected by the country’slegal

responses. My findings show that people welcomed the Chinese state’s invocation of criminal law

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the interviewees who participated in the in-depth interviews during this difficult time. I

would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions.

DOI: 10.1111/lapo.12202

©2023 University of Denver and Wiley Periodicals LLC.

292 Law & Policy. 2023;45:292–310.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/lapo

and administrative detention to punish “troublemakers”as a way to deter noncompliance. They

referred to this approach as “kill the chicken to scare the monkey”or “kill one to deter one

hundred,”which entailed making a public demonstration of punishing a wrongdoer in order to

deter the public from future wrongdoing. The emphasis on “kill the chicken”or “kill one”also

implies that the state lacked the resources to punish every transgressor, and therefore had to rely

on disciplining a handful of exemplars to keep the rest in line (Cain, 2014). The “killing”of an

individual to deter others involves the selective application of the law, a process that is at odds

with legal transparency, certainty, and predictability.

How do we understand ordinary citizens’support for the selective application of the law?

How did the selective application of heavy penalties affect the citizens’thoughts and behavior?

What were the factors contributing to their compliance (or noncompliance) with COVID-19

restrictions that imposed unreasonably heavy burdens on them? To answer these questions, I

draw on in-depth interviews and online observations to discuss ordinary citizens’legal con-

sciousness. I argue that ordinary citizens’support for “killing the chicken”during the pandemic

primarily resulted from their prioritization of the interests of the larger community and the

nation-state over individual rights, rather than from a lack of rights awareness. Sacrificing indi-

vidual rights for collective interests, however, had consequences for all citizens—anyone could

be selected as a “chicken”due to the uncertain and unpredictable nature of the law. As a result,

those who were afraid of crossing the red line tended to be extremely cautious and often went

beyond the legal requirements to reduce the chance of being selected as the “chicken.”In this

sense, uncertainty, non-transparency, and unpredictability regarding the law and its implemen-

tation bred fear, and fear led to compliance in China during the pandemic.

This finding, however, should not be understood as a lack of concern for legitimacy among

ordinary citizens in China. It is true that there was little room for ordinary citizens to negotiate

with the government’s excessive COVID-19 restriction rules, which were backed by heavy

penalties—people were aware that there was not much they could do to argue with the authori-

ties if they were wronged. Nevertheless, one should not assume that concerns about legitimacy

were entirely irrelevant in shaping how people understood and engaged with the COVID-19

restriction rules. My data suggest that people questioned the legitimacy of these rules and

tended to show sympathy toward and even support those who had valid reasons to violate

them, as long as the transgressors were people they trusted. This article emphasizes that in an

authoritarian state where the law and legal implementation are unpredictable, trust and

established relationships are of great importance in shaping ordinary citizens’evaluation of

how they should react to other people’s noncompliance.

Drawing upon narratives of people whose everyday lives were affected by the Chinese state’s

threatening of heavy penalties to deter noncompliance, this article contributes to law and society

scholarship in the following ways. First, it discusses how citizens’prioritization of collective inter-

ests over individual rights may offer support to repressive governance under an authoritarian

regime during a time of crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, it stresses the need to

revisit the relationship between deterrence and compliance in authoritarian regimes and investi-

gate how it differs from Tyler’s(

2006) renowned theory of why people obey the law, with a focus

on everyday life beyond courtrooms and police offices. Third, it calls attention to the importance

of relationships and trust with respect to the legal consciousness of people in authoritarian states,

where there is generally a lack of legal transparency, certainty, and predictability.

2|CHINA’S RELIANCE ON HEAVY PENALTY-ISM, MASS

MOBILIZATION, AND COVID NATIONALISM

Soon after the first known COVID-19 outbreak, the Chinese state quickly drew on its experi-

ence from the 2003 SARS pandemic to contain the spread of the virus (Xu & Liu, 2021).

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