ABU MUSLIM'S CONQUEST OF KHURASAN: PRELIMINARIES AND STRATEGY IN A CONFUSING PASSAGE OF THE AKHBAR AL-DAWLAH AL-[ABBASIYYAH.sup.[subset]].

• Author: AGHA, SALEH SAID
• Position: Bibliography included

The Akhbar al-dawlah al-[Abbasiyyah.sup.[subset]] is a major source of information in any understanding of the [Abbasid.sup.[subset]] revolution. However, one critically important passage in it that describes the initial eruption and the steps leading up to it has been misunderstood and has given rise to an erroneous perception of the exact strategy of Abu Muslim in regard to the role Marw played vis-a-vis the outlying districts of Khurasan. Once the meaning of this key section of the text is clarified, a proper appreciation of the precise sequence of events follows and the highly significant role of the Iranian populace in this revolt becomes quite obvious.

THE AKHBAR AL-DAWLAH AL-[ABBASIYYAH.sup.[subset]] [1] is probably the most important source [2] for our knowledge of the so-called "[Abbasid.sup.[subset]] revolution" to have been discovered and published since Tabari's [Ta.sup.[contains]] rikh. [3] This source, however, is not without its own share of difficulties and shortcomings. Its most distressing flaw is the superimposition of an apocryphal [Abbasid.sup.[subset]] presence on what would otherwise have been a coherent and tenable sequence of historical events. Once these [Abbasid.sup.[subset]] interpolations are isolated and eliminated, however, the fundamental veracity of the historical material is restored, and the material it contains can, henceforth, be subjected to the rigorous standards of the historical-critical method. [4]

Other difficulties, which exist in many classical Arabic historical texts, also exist in the Akhbar--such difficulties may stem from digressions; from erroneous inclusions, omissions, or misplacements of segments of a text by careless or confused scribes; and from syntactical subtleties, awkwardnesses, and potentially confusing pronominal or implied and interpretable references. Naturally, difficulties of this kind always call for extreme caution in reading and interpreting such texts, but no-where more so than in instances where a specific passage is employed as a cornerstone in the understanding, and in the reconstruction of a coherent sequence, of historical events whose significance goes beyond the minute details of the specific text. One such instance is the focal point of this article.

I

The historical juncture on which the passage in question reports is the first eruption of the revolt, as it passed from its clandestine into its open phase. As a consequence, a correct or an incorrect reading of the text in this instance tends to shape, over and above our understanding of the sequence of events, the fundamental understanding of Abu Muslim al-Khurasani's successful strategy--a strategy which, by virtue of the fact that it was successful, reflects the true demographic landscape of the revolutionary forces it was designed to respond to and on whose geographical configuration it capitalized.

An errant reading of the subject text shaped Moshe Sharon's reconstruction of the events reported in it, [5] and contributed to his missing the crux of Abu Muslim's strategy, and led to erroneous conclusions regarding the composition of the revolutionary forces. But it was not entirely Sharon's fault. The proper placement of this passage, within its textual environment, eluded also the careful editors of the Akhabar, [A.sup.[subset]]. [A.sup.[subset]]. Al-Duri and [A.sup.[subset]]. J. al-Muttalibi, who have not commented on the problem at all.

The wider textual environment within which the subject text is embedded extends over six pages. [6] The problematic portions themselves (underlined below), and the most vital of its immediate tetual environs, are as follows:

THE KEY PASSAGE

[p. 274: 1. 3] Wa amara-hum Abu Muslim bi-[liqa.sup.[contains]]I ikhwani-him wa al-[bi.sup.[subset]] thati ilay-him li-[yajtamai.sup.[subset]] u wa yuqimu bi-[mawdi.sup.[subset]]i-him lia [1. 4] dukhul al-Muharram. Wa kana alladhi [da.sup.[subset]]a Aba Muslim wa [da.sup.[subset]]a Sulayman ila al-[ijtima.sup.[subset]] anna-hu balagha-hum [1. 5] anna Nasr qad [ajma.sup.[subset]] a [ala.sup.[subset]] al-[bi.sup.[subset]] thati ilay-him wa iltiqati-him qabla khuruji-him, wa kana alladhi [1. 6] ashara [alay-hi.sup.[subset]] bi-dhalik Salm b. Ahwaz fa-qala la-hu: "badir al-qawm wa-hum mutafarriqun taqwa [alay-him.sup.[subset]] [1. 7] bi-[jama.sup.[subset]] ati-k qabla an [yata.sup.[contains]] allafu fa-taruma-hum fa-[yamtani.sup.[subset]] u [alayk.sup.[subset]]." Fa-tafarraqat al-[du.sup.[subset]] at alladhin hadaru [1. 8] [ra.sup.[contains]]y Abi Muslim, fa-laqiyat al-[shi.sup.[subset]]ah, wa [ba.sup.[subset]]athat al-rusul ilay-him li-[yajtami.sup.[subset]]u, fa-aqbala [1. 9] alnas ilay-him wa Abu Muslim bi-Sha nfir [read: Saqudunj or Saqidhanj] qaryat Sulayman b. Kathir [p. 274: 1. 10-p. 275: 1. 4 lists some of the partisans who came to them in this village.]

[p. 275: 1. 5] Wa balagha Nasr b. Sayyar [ijtima.sup.[subset]] [alshi.sup.[subset]]ah wa-huwa mushtaghil bi-muharabat [Aliyy.sup.[subset]] b. al-Kirmani [1. 6] fa-[jama.sup.[subset]]a thiqati-h fa-shawara-hum fi-ma balagha-hu [an.sup.[subset]] ahl al-[da.sup.[subset]]wah ... [11. 7-16, deliberations in Nasr's council]. [1. 16] ... fainqada al-majlis [ala.sup.[subset]] dhalik wa-lam yubrimu fi-hi [1. 17] [ra.sup.[contains]]yan. Wa balagha ma kana min nahiyati-him fima aradu bi-hi Aba Muslim wa-man [1. 18] [ma.sup.[subset]]a-hu, fa-laqiya Sulayman b. Kathir fa-shawara-hu fi dhalki [their deliberations and resolutions].

TRANSLATION:

And Abu Muslim ordered [the members of his council] to meet their brethren [the partisans] and to communicate to them [the instructions] to gather and dwell in [the council members'] locality until the advent of Muharram. What had motivated Abu Muslim, and what had motivated Sulayman, to convene the meeting was that they had learned that Nasr had resolved to crack down on them and apprehend them before they revolted. The one who had counseled [Nasr] to do so was Salm b. Ahwaz [who] had said to him: Rush them with an assault [now] while they are dispersed; you [would] overcome them with your wait until then,] you [might] want [to get] them, but they [would have become] immune from you. So the propagandists (al-[du.sup.[subset]]at) who winessed Abu Muslim's [deliberations and] decision, dispersed; they met [some of] the partisans, and sent messengers to [the rest of] them [with the instructions] to come together. So people came to them when Abu Muslim was in Saqidunj (or Saqidhanj), Sulayman b. Kathir's village . ...

Nasr b. Sayyar learned of the partisans' gathering while he was occupied with fighting [Ali.sup.[subset]] b. al-Kirmani; so he gathered his confidants and took counsel with them in what he had learned about the constituents of the [da.sup.[subset]]wah. ... The council adjourned on that [note], and they did not reach a resolution. Abu Muslim learned of what came to pass [in Nasr's council] and of their intentions against him and his comrades, so he met with Sulayman b. Kathir and took counsel with him in regard to that [matter].

Accepting the textual flow and sequence at face value would produce an extremely confused, and confusing, narrative. Starting with wa kana alladhi [da.sup.[subset]]a (274: 4), [7] which involves in this context an undisputable Arabic counterpart of the English past perfect tense, the reader would be lured into an exquisitely, albeit inadvertently, camouflaged textual trap. This is buttressed by similar usages all through the problematic segment of the text: anna-hu balagha-hum (274: 4), qad [ajma.sup.[subset]]a (274: 5), and wa kana alladhi ashara (274: 5-6). Combined with a relaxed and self-confident approach to the linguistic context, this indisputable past perfect would leave no doubt in the mind of the reader that the word [al-ijtima.sup.[subset]], i.e., "the meeting" (274: 4), refers to a meeting the reporting about which has been concluded. [8] Actually, moreover, the Akhbar, immediately before this problematic segment of the text, had been reporting on a meeting--probably the most strategically pivotal meeting at that juncture. Thus, a relaxed reader would be lured into a false sense of having understood the passage correctly. But, two considerations must arrest his attention: (1) when the problematic segment of the text started, the ongoing reporting on the supposed meeting and its immediate aftermath has not been concluded as yet. In reality, the remainder of the narrative continues to flow naturally, immediately after the end of the problematic segment (274: 7ff.), as if it had not existed; (2) the problematic segment purports to explain why the meeting took place at all, but the reasons advanced have nothing to do with the meeting being reported on at that point in the text. They explain why an entirely different meeting was held later. And this raises an awkward point.

It soon becomes clear that something is essentially wrong with the textual sequence. The meeting to which the problematic segment appears to refer cannot be the one it actually refers to. This latter [ijtima.sup.-[subset]] came on the heels of, and as a reaction to, a governmental meeting in which Salm b. Ahwaz, the chief of police in the province, had urged its governor, Nasr b. Sayyar, to attack the revolutionaries before they got their act together. This characterization applies literally to the meeting between Abu Muslim and Sulayman b. Kathir, the report concerning which (275: 17-276: 6) comes twenty-four lines down in the text, in natural textual flow, immediately after the report (275: 5-17) about the relevant governmental meeting to which it was a reaction. It is also amply clear that the problematic segment of the text is intrusive--interjected between Abu Muslim's orders to the members of his council (274: 2-3), with which the current meeting culminated and with the way the members relayed these or ders to the partisans (274: 7-8), and the logistics of the partisans' response (274: 8-275: 4).

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