The keys to the castle: a new standard for warrantless home searches in United States v. Knights.

• Author: Skrmetti, Jonathan T.

THE KEYS TO THE CASTLE: A NEW STANDARD FOR WARRANTLESS HOME SEARCHES IN United States v. Knights, 122 S.Ct. 587 (2001).

The technicalities of the Fourth Amendment have permeated popular culture to such an extent that many Americans are conversant about basic constitutional search and seizure issues. (1) Some of that knowledge may have recently become largely obsolete. In United States v. Knights, (2) the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer's apartment in which the search was based on reasonable suspicion and a condition of probation was that defendant would submit to such searches was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. While the holding in Knights is wholly consistent with prior cases, the opinion introduces a new straightforward standard of reasonability for warrantless home searches that reflects an increased consideration of society's interest in aggressive prosecution of criminal activity. Critics have complained that modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been a "vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely complex and contradictory, but often perverse." (3) With Knights, the Court has offered a streamlined Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with a straightforward test to determine whether a search is constitutional.

1. FACTS

   Mark Knights was sentenced to summary probation for a drug offense by a California trial court. The probation order Knights signed read, in part, that he would "[s]ubmit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, [sic] to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer." (4) In 1996, Knights and his associate Steven Simoneau were identified as suspects in a vandalism spree against Pacific Gas & Electric (PG & E) facilities in Napa County. The spree began shortly after PG & E filed a theft-of-services complaint against Knights and discontinued his service for failure to pay. Detective Todd Hancock of the Napa County Sheriff's Department had noticed that the acts of vandalism coincided with Knights's PG & E-related court appearances. On May 24, 1998, a sheriff's deputy had stopped Knights and Simoneau near a PG & E gas line. Knights and Simoneau could not explain their presence in the area. The deputy observed pipes, pieces of chain, tools, and gasoline in the pickup truck. He asked permission to search the vehicle, but was refused. A few days later a pipe bomb was detonated not far from Knights's residence. On June 1, 1998, after Knights was placed on probation, a PG & E power transformer and a Pacific Bell telecommunications vault were set on fire using gasoline accelerants. Brass padlocks had been pried off to allow the arsonists access. After the arson a sheriff's deputy drove past Knights's residence and saw Simoneau's truck parked in front. He felt the hood of the truck and found it was warm. On June 3, 1998, Detective Hancock ordered surveillance of Knights's apartment. Early in the morning, Simoneau was observed exiting the apartment carrying three cylindrical items He walked across the street to the bank of the Napa River and returned without the cylinders, wiping a glass jar with a cloth. Detective Hancock heard three splashes from the river at the time Simoneau was at its bank. Simoneau drove away, parked his truck in a driveway, and left. Detective Hancock approached the truck and observed a Molotov cocktail and explosive materials, a gasoline can, and two brass padlocks that fit the description of those removed from the PG & E transformer vault. The truck was seized, impounded, and later searched pursuant to a warrant. Hancock then conducted a search of Knights's apartment. Hancock was aware of Knights's probation order and its conditions. Based on the probation order, he believed he did not need a warrant for the search. The search revealed a detonation cord, ammunition, liquid chemicals, chemistry and electrical circuitry manuals, bolt cutters, telephone pole-climbing spurs, drug paraphernalia, and brass padlocks stamped "PG & E." Thereafter, Knights was arrested. A federal grand jury subsequently indicted him for conspiracy to commit arson, possession of an unregistered destructive device, and being a felon in possession of ammunition.

2. DISTRICT COURT DECISION

   Knights moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the warrantless search of his apartment. The district court found that Hancock had reasonable suspicion (5) that Knights was involved with incendiary materials, but nevertheless granted the motion to suppress on grounds that the probationary search was a subterfuge for an investigative search. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had made it expressly clear that the consent of probationers did not extend beyond those searches that the officer believed were related to the interests of effective probation supervision. (6) The court determined that Detective Hancock's search was made to further his arson investigation and was substantially unrelated to the administration of Knights's probation. For such an investigative search to be legitimate, in the district court's view, Detective Hancock needed probable cause (7) to believe that Knights was involved with a crime. The evidence found in Simoneau's truck and the behavior of Simoneau on leaving Knights's house, combined with an officer's earlier observation of Knights and Simoneau with potential explosives, were determined by the court to only rise to the level of reasonable suspicion that Knights was involved in a crime. The evidence did not meet the standard of probable cause for Knights. Even with probable cause, Hancock's search of the house may not have withstood a constitutional challenge under traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because home searches have almost always required a warrant.

3. NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

   The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in an opinion by Judge Fernandez. (8) The court of appeals determined that the proper standard of review was for clear error, on the basis that the contested issue, whether or not the probation search was a subterfuge for investigation, was a factual determination. (9) Couching its decision in language strongly supporting the sanctity of the home, (10) the court of appeals went beyond finding that there was no clear error and roundly endorsed the trial court's holding that the distinction between investigatory and probationary searches demanded that the evidence be excluded. (11) Although the Supreme Court of California had rejected such a distinction based on the common California probation condition, (12) the court of appeals found that the state court's determination of the legality of the search under the state probation condition for Fourth Amendment purposes was unpersuasive and not controlling. (13) The court of appeals cited a line of cases decided by the Ninth Circuit that reiterated the distinction and its importance. (14) The distinction was justified, according to the Ninth Circuit, by a need to advance the goals of probation. The overriding aim of probation "is to give the [probationer] a chance to further and to demonstrate his rehabilitation while serving a part of his sentence outside the prison walls." (15) Detective Hancock, who used the probation condition to justify the search, was "not a bit interested in Knights' rehabilitation." (16) The court "condemned the practice of using a search condition imposed on a probationer as a broad tool for law enforcement." (17) Replying to the government's assertion that the Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United States (18) undercut the Ninth Circuit's probation search jurisprudence, the court of appeals said that the Ninth Circuit has reiterated its rule since Whren, (19) and that the issue here was...