Kenya's unfinished agendas.

• Author: Klopp, Jacqueline M.
• Position: National Accord and Reconciliation Act - Report

Kenya is a critically important East African country at a crossroads. In the coming years, it will either chart a way through to democratic reform and state building, or it will join the ranks of the so-called collapsed of failed states. Much hinges on which way Kenya moves: the late of 37 million Kenyans hangs in the balance. In the best-case scenario, Kenya moves toward greater prosperity and freedom and becomes a genuine force for transformation in Africa in the 21st century. With the largest and most dynamic economy in the region, key infrastructure and institutions of higher education, a vibrant press and civil society, political space and abundant human capital, creativity and entrepreneurship, it has many resources with which to achieve this future.

Yet in 2007 and 2008, in the aftermath of Kenya's contested election, the world glimpsed another terrifying future, in which Kenya could succumb to violence, illicit accumulation of public wealth and political fragmentation, the elements that have led to civil wars in neighboring Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan. From December 2007 to January 2008, brutal killings by the police, massacres, refugee flight from the country, massive regional economic dislocation and blatant electoral manipulation and deceit suggested Kenya was a razor's edge away from such an outcome. (1) Indeed, violence was only stopped through the concerted effort of civil society groups and global diplomacy, which culminated in Kenya's National Dialogue and Reconciliation process and the current power-sharing agreement, or National Accord. (2)

Kenya's future now depends on its ability to navigate the great contradictions of the National Accord, which are symptomatic of the deep structural problems of Kenyan state and society. To curb the violence in the short-term and create space for negotiation, the power-sharing agreement, like others of its kind, entrenches the key culprits of violence and corruption in very high levels of government. Indeed, the Accord has worked by using the lure of joint access to state resources to bring opponents into an agreement. This short-term diplomatic purchase of time also creates conditions, if not incentives, for future conflict. (3) These same resources can and will be used--through corruption--for the next round of conflict in the election scheduled for 2012. Finally, since both parties include people guilty of corruption and violence, the grand coalition creates a common interest in perpetuating impunity and opposing the forces of accountability and transformation.

We cannot blame the recent diplomatic efforts for these difficult dilemmas; they were unavoidable. If the Accord was to stop the violence, it had to involve the key culprits. In the short-term, the Accord created some key opportunities by providing a brief time period for a cooling down of emotions and a broader, more measured public reflection on the country's problems. It has also put critical structural issues, including land reform, unemployment, poverty and constitutional change back on the table. Further, it created a focused set of targets to rally Kenya's civil society, media and parliament, as well as rousing global diplomatic, solidarity and aid efforts. The challenge will be to fully utilize the limited time available and take advantage of the new opportunities for change.

Can Kenya's transformative forces regroup, swell in numbers and prevail over entrenched politicians and the deep conservative interests they represent? Can they prevail over deep divisions and fractures created by violence and corruption, not only in the last election, but over the last decades as well? Finally, can international intervention play a positive, supportive role in this struggle for reform? With Kenya at what appears to be a tipping point, this article aims to answer these key questions. As violently contested elections turn into power-sharing agreements in other places, most recently in Zimbabwe, this paper speaks to an important debate about whether such agreements bode poorly for democracy on the African continent. (4)

This paper begins with a brief overview of what led to the recent violent crisis in Kenya and shows that it is understandable within the context of Kenya's problematic past. Next, it focuses on the National Accord's four agenda items and how they play into forces for of against change. This analysis suggests that more violent struggle is likely in the next election unless key mores toward structural reform--including making inroads against impunity, working toward a more transparent electoral process and intensifying peace-building interventions at a local level--have some degree of success before 2012. Finally, the paper concludes with broader reflections on the National Accord process, Kenya's democratic future and the way forward.

THE NATIONAL POST-ELECTION CRISIS

In Kenya's election on 27 December 2007, people by and large voted peacefully and with great enthusiasm, especially young Kenyans, many of whom were voting for the first time. Early reports talked about unprecedented, orderly voting lines. Most Kenyans showed a strong faith in the electoral process, legal procedure and the ideal of democracy. One reason for this faith was that only five years before, through a peaceful, cathartic election, Kenya successfully ended the repressive rule of President Daniel arap Moi and the Kenya African National Union (KANU)--the party that had dominated the state and ruled Kenya with a bloody fist since independence. (5) In that historic election, Mwai Kibaki became the new president.

While expanded political space over the ensuing years gave birth to some minor but encouraging reforms in Kenya, the Kibaki government failed to make serious inroads in restructuring Kenya's highly inequitable economy and the deeply flawed colonial constitution that enabled it. (6) One reason for this is that Kenya's transition to democracy was not a definitive defeat of KANU, but rather a negotiated one, with the new government protecting Moi and recycling KANU's elites--including Kibaki himself--into the coalition. This dynamic put fundamental constraints on how much change could occur. Indeed, very soon after the new government took office in 2003, it disappointed Kenyans with a string of corruption scandals and a failure to move on constitutional change; truth, justice and reconciliation for past crimes; and assistance for the victims of the Moi period, including 350,000 displaced persons. (7)

In the months leading up to the December 2007 election, opposition leader Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), capitalized on the anger and disillusionment of many Kenyans. He campaigned on a reformist, populist, anti-corruption platform that promised radical change, including the devolution of power. (8) However, the unofficial ODM campaign strategy appeared to be in partan ethnic one. At rallies, ODM politicians often insinuated that Kibaki's ethnic community--the Kikuyu--were responsible for the corruption and exclusionary politics that characterized much of Kibaki's first administration. They also suggested that the Kikuyu were collectively responsible for historical injustices from the beginning of independence, when Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, became president. The idea of devolution of power to the provincial level--or majimboism--was interpreted as the right to evict Kikuyu from the Rift Valley, as was done in the 1990s under Moi. (9) The overarching idea was to unite all of Kenya's minority ethnic communities against its largest ethnic community, the Kikuyu.

On the other side, the party of incumbent Mwai Kibaki, the Party of National Unity (PNU), officially attempted to campaign on Kibaki's achievements. However, like their ODM counterparts, many PNU politicians used hate speech in their rallies and reinforced the notion that Kikuyu should vote as a bloc and not let the state slip from what they claimed was their communal grasp. (10) They used derogatory language about uncircumcised men to refer to Raila Odinga, whose Luo ethnic group did not engage in the practice of circumcision. The impact of this rhetoric was later reflected in post-election violence by Kikuyu gangs, who killed innocent Luos by forcibly circumcising them and letting them bleed to death. (11) In sum, this form of campaigning from both sides helped foster the deep polarization that developed around the election and created an environment where violence was sanctioned by many in political authority.

On top of these ethnic mobilization strategies, both sides distorted the electoral process, which was extremely vulnerable to manipulation. Given that the incumbent had tremendous influence over the Electoral Commission of Kenya, the PNU had the upper hand in rigging the election results. To this day, it remains a controversial issue. Many PNU operatives insist that Kibaki won the election, while the ODM side points to the National Republic Institute's suppressed exit polls, the ODM majority in parliament and statistical analysis to argue the opposite. (12) The Commission of Inquiry suggested that the "integrity of the process and the credibility of the results were so gravely impaired by these manifold irregularities and defects that it is irrelevant whether of not there was actual rigging at the national tally center. The results are irretrievably polluted." (13)

Most of the violence broke out right after the Electoral Commission of Kenya first delayed announcing the presidential results for days, then declaring Mwai Kibaki the winner of the presidency on 30 December 2007. (14) At first, some of the violence appeared to emerge out of spontaneous angry demonstrations against the Kibaki government and its PNU supporters by people who accused them of stealing the election. Hundreds were killed in brutal police action, which involved the use of live ammunition on so-called demonstrators, including women and...