Kennedy and the cold war imbroglio: the case of Algeria's independence.

• Author: Barkaoui, Miloud
• Position: President John F. Kennedy

When John F. Kennedy was inaugurated President on 20 January 1961, the Algerian question had reached a decisive phase, as French authorities had by then conceded the possibility of seeing an Algerian Algeria, but while still hoping to maintain close ties between France and the new state. They had also by then accepted the principle of a referendum on the future of Algeria. Faced with a growing international sympathy for the Algerian nationalist cause, coupled with a wider criticism in international circles of French colonial policies, in addition - of course - to the growing crisis at home, General de Gaulle spoke for the first time of an Algerian Republic potentially emerging from the proposed referendum with its own laws and institutions.(1)

The Algerian nationalist leaders, however, remained skeptical as to the real intentions of the French authorities, insisting on more information on the new proposal. Their apprehensions were centered round the question of whether the referendum was to apply to Algeria as one entity or rather as two separate communities - Algerian and colon - each choosing its own solutions leading thus to partition. They also wanted to know how an effective supervision of the plebiscite was to be guaranteed if the French government persisted in its intention to give its army full control over the proposed referendum, deliberately ignoring the latter's history of ballot-rigging and interference in the voting process.(2)

The Algerian Provisional Government (G.P.R.A.), with the backing of the Afro-Asian group at the U.N., had long been pressing for an international presence in order to secure free conduct of the plebiscite and to prevent the French generals from using coercive methods which had justified the traditional euphemism election a l'Algerienne.(3) It was against this background that the General Assembly adopted a resolution by 63 votes to 8, with 27 abstentions, recognizing the responsibility of the U.N. to assist Algeria along the road to independence with the preservation of its territorial and national integrity.(4)

The United States, in the last few days of the Eisenhower Administration, and as in the previous sessions, chose a non-committal vote. The State Department reiterated the long-held view that a settlement to the conflict could best be achieved through direct negotiations between the two parties concerned, away from the United Nations or any other international organization.(5) The novelty in such a stance, however, lay in the fact that the Eisenhower Administration, toward the end of its second term, seemed to condone some form of an external role in the conclusion of a possible workable settlement whilst keeping Algeria and the whole of North Africa out of the Soviet's sphere of influence. With regard to the referendum in prospect, it was inclined to validate the Algerian nationalists misgivings as to the credibility of the French-orchestrated vote. Overtly voicing doubts about the workability of the proposed polling process given the French army's unhealthy record of voting frauds, Secretary Herter inferred that this referendum might not after all be honest, free, and fair.(6) Yet, the United States stopped short of any attempt to bring pressure to bear on France to offer sufficient guarantees as to the non-interference of its army in the conduct of the plebiscite.

With the inauguration of the new administration, the issue of the referendum continued to be a major preoccupation of the United States. The Kennedy Administration, and contrary to the high expectations of the Algerian nationalists given Kennedy's stance toward the Algerian question as Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on U.N. Affairs, was to adopt almost the same approach as that of its predecessor regarding the Algerian question. It was, in turn, to opt for calculated diplomatic inducements in the attempt to drive France to bring the conflict to a quick settlement through direct talks between the two parties leading to a flee plebiscite on self-determination. The threat, which international communism was believed to be posing to Algeria and North Africa, was in fact to continue under Kennedy to be the major concern of the White House.(7) Whilst remaining critical of the pace at which France was moving in its handling of the problem, Kennedy the President would manifestly tone down the views he had assertively defended as Senator, as he would thenceforth oppose any attempt to involve the United Nations in the search for a settlement.(8)

John F. Kennedy's first official encounter with the Algerian conflict can be traced back to 2 June 1956 when - as Senator - he had advocated the view that the conflict was strictly a colonial issue, inciting the Eisenhower Administration to help all dependent peoples to achieve freedom.(9) In his famous speech to the Senate as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Sub-committee on United Nations Affairs on 2 July 1957, he had vigorously indicted France's policies in Algeria, which he considered a colony and not an integral part of France as the French authorities claimed. Such policies, he argued, stifled, exiled, or executed their leaders, and outlawed their political parties and activities.(10) Defending the nationalist leadership as led by what he called pro-Western moderates, he had insisted that the Algerian problem was the most critical impasse facing the United States since the crisis in Indochina.(11)

Kennedy the Senator had reproached the Eisenhower Administration for having renounced the American anti-colonial tradition and for providing France with arms to repress the local population: ". . . we cannot long ignore as being none of our own business, or as a French internal problem, a struggle for independence that has been and will be a major issue before the United Nations, that has denuded NATO of its armies, drained the resources of our French allies, threatened the continuation of Western influence and bases in North Africa and bitterly split the Free World we claim to be leading."(12) The Senator had also refuted the argument recurrently voiced by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles that decolonization was a long-term process, rejecting the contention that no less than twenty-five, if not fifty, years were required for the colonized populations to achieve the status of nationhood.(13)

Kennedy had even incited the Eisenhower Administration to involve itself directly in the Algerian conflict in the attempt of finding a solution. The time has come, he had declared, for the United States to face the harsh realities of the situation to fulfill its responsibilities as leader of the Free World - in the UN, NATO, in the administration of its aid programs and in the exercise of diplomacy - in striving of course toward political independence for Algeria.(14) He had also warned that if the United States government continued to ignore the Algerians' legitimate rights to self-determination, the Algerians would likely turn toward the Soviets for assistance.(15) Highlighting the far-reaching international ramifications of the Algerian problem, he had cautioned that its persistence might irretrievably compromise Western interests in the whole region.(16) The National Security Council, pressing the same theme a few months later, stressed the strategic importance of North Africa for the Atlantic Alliance in the Cold War showdown, warning that continuation of the conflict might compromise all endeavors to contain international communism.(17)

Although Senator Kennedy had not succeeded in persuading Congress to adopt his proposed resolution on Algeria, he had at least managed to attract the sympathy and backing of a number of active Congressmen, especially Senators, whose criticism of the Eisenhower Administration's approach to the Algerian problem was to continue to embarrass the White House. The Senator's biting criticism had in fact succeeded on a number of occasions in putting the government on the defensive, driving it to reiterate its expressed determination to contribute to the process of decolonization, albeit without identifying itself 100 percent either with the so-called colonial powers or with the powers which are primarily and uniquely concerned with the problem of getting their independence as rapidly as possible.(18) It was also in the wake of such Congressional criticism led by Kennedy that the State Department ordered the shipment of food and medical supplies through non-governmental institutions to Algerian refugees in the neighboring countries.(19) But, the Algerian nationalists were to remain manifestly skeptical about such aid, considering it negligible when weighed against the substantial assistance estimated at billions of francs provided France by the United States.(20)

The victory of Kennedy in the 1960 Presidential elections rekindled the hopes of the Algerian nationalists because of the stance he had taken as Senator toward their cause. But, the question that remained to be answered was whether the new President could politically and strategically afford to take the same stance he had taken as Senator, especially at a time when East-West rivalry was reaching its peak.

The major preoccupation of Kennedy once in the White House was beyond doubt what he saw as...