Keeping it together: A historical approach to resolving stresses and strains within the Peninsula Shield Force.

• Author: Bowden, James

The modality and method of Arab tribal warfare have directly impacted the history of the Peninsula Shield Force and its operation as a sub-multinational organization of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The stresses and strains within the force have been driven by internal social forces rather than external factors, although American policy has helped exacerbate them. This article reviews the historical tensions and their linkages to past Arab tribal warfare and explores how the new U.S. administration can work to keep the Peninsula Shield Force together, rather than pulling it apart by treating it like NATO or other European or Western multinational organizations.

From the year 1981 to 2010, the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) never existed as an actual military security force. The force was a fiction perpetuated by media releases, Arab pronouncements, and security specialists. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) failed to transform it from a force in newspaper, into a standing force. The Peninsula Shield Force did not become a viable security entity because tribal warfare has been structured in the Arab world, and the Gulf in particular, along independent, non-subordinated lines. This method undermined the willingness and ability of the Arab Gulf states to contribute troops and material to the force and thus make it not only a real standing force but also effective. The only times that a Peninsula Shield Force has existed were those limited and isolated incidents of joint operations visible to the media. Apart from these, the force never had a coherent structure, officer staffing, or actionable mandate.

The purpose of this paper is to adjust many aspects of the literature on the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Peninsula Shield Force by explaining the nature of Arab tribal warfare and how it has impacted the GCC and hindered the creation of the Peninsula Shield Force. There are tribal dynamics that are deeply rooted in the society that still govern the practice of warfare. Through this paper, with its establishment of nomenclature and approximation of the force's structure, I anticipate that not only will this pattern be recognized but it will influence the creation of more prudent policy. Currently, there is inadequate distinction between the GCC and its Peninsula Shield Force as it operates today and how it operated in the past. Recognition that the Peninsula Shield Force is the military wing of the GCC will reduce reporting that is incongruent with the structure of the organization. The reason for this is to correct the interpretation of past actions, to highlight the past record, and to acknowledge the increasing reality of a Peninsula Shield Force as its only tangible iteration.

It does appear that the GCC nations are attempting to build an actual, capable Peninsula Shield Force through operations in Yemen. These efforts to create a viable, secure force are the most sustained and practical since the GCC's founding and would be threatened by removing responsibility of security and once again placing this on American forces in the region. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the reasons for this failure in order that the new administration will not undermine the current iteration of the organization and mask deeply rooted cultural influences with ephemeral political and equipment changes. These may fail to address how it can effectively function with these Arab cultural values. The Trump administration is likely to be a significant strain on a number of multinational alliances that have been built and precisely crafted over decades of steady American policy and active diplomacy. The Gulf Cooperation Council and its military wing, the Peninsula Shield Force, may suffer adversely from such pressures given that it is already a weakened organization attempting to emerge through a negotiated structure and continued Arab power politics.

Other Middle East organizations that have been formed have endured far longer than the GCC and, in particular, the Peninsula Shield Force. The political and social points of contact within these organizations appear to be much more numerous than in the area of security. The cultural forces pulling apart the PSF appear to be highly localized. This signals that the willingness of the Arab community appears to be, at least in this first phase, on the side of maintaining political and economic ties while seeing security and military ties as expendable and unnecessary by relying heavily on superpower resolve. An examination of the history of the organization as well as historical cultural patterns that continue to impact the nations organizing it can reveal the impetus underlying this lack of action.

Foremost, it should be noted that this is a unique and challenging interpretation of its failures. In discussions about failures or weaknesses in the PSF, military equipment and training form principle causes, rather than active, root cultural influences in Arab society. Consideration of these societal forces plays a role in more localized discussions but unusually does not appear to be considered on a regional level. Yet, the initial period of the GCC's existence, from 1981 to 2010, and its military force clearly demonstrates that these failures had a central role in fragmenting a united and coherent organization.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The thesis of this paper is the fruit of research done in the area of Arab military and social history, readings in contemporary Middle Eastern monographs, and personal interviews conducted with active-duty Arab military officers from the Gulf region.

There are a large number of Persian Gulf studies that have emerged over the past few years. Many of these are expanding the knowledge of the region which, until the early 2000s, was restricted to highly academic and obscure historical accounts or briefs produced by security specialists. A full range of historical and security-oriented materials was used in the research for this paper; there are three that bear special mention. The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation, Creation of Qatar, and The Imamate Tradition of Oman detail the process of state formation from at least the early 1800s through the end of the British period. All three of these countries, apart from Saudi Arabia, play various roles within the GCC and the Peninsula Shield Force and represent those nations where the largest amount of academic attention has been focused. Detailed studies such as these have not been done on Kuwait, however research has shown and been published on its own highly tribalistic, bifurcated society. This bifurcation includes basic levels of the Kuwaiti economy and government. (1)

These works principally show a unique and very strong pattern of tribal warfare that is anchored on the individual tribes and their brief, and often turbulent, mutual support without full alliance crafting. This method was more akin to an association model and mutual interest fighting rather than alliances based around long-term ideological structures or rigid systems of control. This literature also demonstrates that, up until nearly the last decade before the creation of the GCC and the Peninsula Shield Force, many of the nations did not have regular militaries. If they did have a military, it remained tightly under the control of either various emirates or the tribes. However, there appears to be even earlier antecedents to this, mostly within the Byzantine era.

Books that examine military tactics in the late antiquity period, such as The Byzantine Art of War and The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire by Michael J. Decker and Edward Luttwack respectively, detail Byzantine use of Arab tribal associations. Both of these clearly illustrate the independent and highly non-structural nature of the agreements that fit more closely with associations and common-cause relationships than with traditional alliances. This ensured that independence was guaranteed and a greater range of freedom was preserved. These books present a historical continuum beginning with the founding of the Byzantine Empire, between 337 and 475, and ending roughly with the 1453 capture. This resonance with the Gulf method of war argues that this approach was not entirely isolated or that there has been misunderstanding of the text. (2)

For the security studies portion, several books were used. One of the principle books that served as an inspiration of this present paper is a study of Kuwait's military since the Gulf...